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ABSTRACT 
Don Luigi Sturzo (18?1-1959) has been acknowledged by his-
torians of Italian politics as an effective social reformer, an 
astute politician, and a great statesman. This active phase ot 
sturzo's career has been well documented and his name assured a 
permanent and honored place in the long history of his native 
country. But the fundamental character and depth of the social 
theory that also marks the achievement that was his life has not 
been adequately explored. It is the thesia of this work that the 
scope or Sturzo's theory embraced nothing less than an integral, 
concrete and coherent view or, being ~uman. The purpose of this _ 
study is to serve as an i~trochiction · fbr such an understanding 
ot Sturzo•s theory. 
..· 
• • f ·~ l. 
'\ t 
Al though this is an ih~erpi,-eta~i ve an.d construe ti ve exposi-
tion rather than simply a hlstoric~l<Qr· ··bextual analysis of 
Sturzo's thought, the inner logic of this study remains that or 
Sturzo's own thought. The movement of this logic is rooted in 
and follows the realization or the ontological structure of the 
person in his living, and thereby historical, reality. Since 
this realization is, in its essence, the concretization of soci-
ality--the associative dimension of man's becoming--the activity 
through which the person achieves his being is at one with the 
inward formation of society. The individual person and society 
are constituted together in a synthesizing relational process 
of differentiation-in-synthesis in which the closer and more 
intense the relationship, the deeper and more extensive is the 
distinct reality or each. The definitive and original irresolv-
able principle of sociality is rationality, the specifying 
principle of the person; and it is the projection of conscious-
ness through the inner dynamism of rationality for expression 
and completion through the mutuality of thought and action that 
constitutes the concretization ot sociality. An analysis of 
this process from the perspective of both the person and society 
is the starting point. 
$ . 
'two other essential features ot this process provide the 
focus or attention:. its concrete expression in social forms and 
the regularities of its movement, which Sturzo expresses in the 
form of "sociological laws." While the social process is plural-
istic in its structure, polarity is the dominating feature or 
it in its concrete process. Both characteristics have their 
ontological basis in the sole substantive and efficient principle 
animating the process, the individual person. 
Just as it is history, as the constitutive activity of man, 
that manifests the inner laws of man's associative nature--laws 
which reveal that man in and of himself cannot effect a totalizing 
and conclusive pacification of the tendencies that give rise to 
the laws--so is it history and history alone that reveals the 
presence of a personal, transcendent. unifying principle within 
the historical process. Therefore, not only is Sturzo•s theory 
of history the foundation of all his thought, but it is also the 
culminating point of his thought wherein he works out and brings 
together the implications of his integral social theory in all 
of its aspects. He bases his integral social theory on an open-
ended historicism that is able to account for both transcendent 
and immanent factors within the historical process, to preserve 
their intrinsic unity within a single process. and yet uphold 
the substantive reality of each. This study therefore concludes 
with an exposition of the main features of his theory ot history. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In view of certain trends and categories of contemporary 
thought the relative obscurity or the theory of Don Luigi Sturzo 
is puzzling. In view of the grave socio-political problems 
pressing in upon mankind from every side today this obscurity 
is inexplicable. 1 For it is not exaggeration to say that it 
is precisely the shadow cast over mankind by these problens 
that measures the stature of Don Luigi Sturzo as a socio-poli-
tical reformer and theoretician. As one commentator on Sturzo's 
thought has accurately expressed it: 
Don Luigi Sturzo was a man of his times: This is the 
key to his mind and spirit. His most outstanding 
characteristic was that historical identity which is 
the sole basis of greatness. He was of his times, 
1 Numerous reasons have been advanced for the neglect of 
Sturzo's thought. They are sometimes contradictory. For example, 
as a thinker who is Catholic, Sturzo has had the misfortune to 
be interpreted as a Catholic thinker. As a result, on the one 
side there are those who view his thought as simply a statement 
of'"Catholic Nee-Thomistic social :philosophy." One critic of 
Sturzo'a thought dismissed it as an instrument of influence of 
Catholicism, in this instance "based on a Catholic Platonism." 
Cf. Paul. Honigsheim's review of Inner Laws of Societt' in Am. J. 
of Soc., 57 (1945), 160-61. On the other side some end to find 
nis thought and its expression not "Catholic" enough. One critic 
finds a strain in his thought "which links him, not to Christian 
and Catholic traditions, but to the revolutionary thought of 
post-Reformation times." Cf. werner Stark's review of Timasheff's 
The Sociology of Lui~i Sturzo in Thought, 38 (Summer, 1963), 318-~0. See also Franz ueller's review of Inner Laws of Society in 
Am. Oath. Soc. Rev., 6 (1954), 109-11. Rone of the reasons, 
whether taken singly or together, provide an adequate account 
of the lack of attention given to Sturzo's thought. For exanple, 
even those, such as Nicholas Timasheff, who find Sturzo's theory 
"both original and profound" point to methodological and termi-
nological difficulties of an extremely complex theory. But, 
obviously, these difficulties are not peculiar to Sturzo's theory 
alone. 
1 
moreover, not only because he faithfully reflected 
their perplexities and problems, but also, because, 
to a significant degree, he mastered them.2 
2 
The problems that were to forge his thoughts and eventually 
shape his career were those of post-Risorgimento Italy.3 His 
vigorous and effective response to these problems gradually and 
laboriously extended itself from social and economic reform on 
the municipal and provincial level to the organization of a 
national political party, the Italian Popular Party, with which 
his name is so closely associated. The eminent historian 
Federico Chabod has described the birth of this party as "the 
most noteworthy event in twentieth century Italian history, 
especially in relation to the preceding century."4 This event 
occurred on the morning of January 18, 1919 when Don Luigi 
Sturzo made his historic and dramatic appeal "to all men f'ree 
and brave" to support the Italian Popular Party. It is here, 
in the person of Sturzo, that we find the locus of the inspira-
tion, spirit, and thought behind the Popular Party. Just as it 
marked a new phenomenon in the history of Italy, so too, did 
Don Luigi Sturzo. He bas been acknowledged by historians ot 
2A. Robert Caponigri, "Introduction" to Sturzo's Church 
and State (Notre Dame: U. of Notre Dame Press, 1962), p. vi. 
3For an illuminating account of these problems and Sturzo'a 
response to them, see A. Robert Caponigri's article, "The Ethi-
cal and Sociological Bases or Italian Politics: Sturzo and Croce," 
in Ethics, 59 (Oct., 1948), 35-48. The same author presents a 
tine biographical sketch of Sturzo's development in Review of 
Politics, 14 (April, 1952), 147-65. For Sturzo's own brief 
account, see "My Political Vocation,n in Commonweal, 34 (Sept. 
26, 1941), 537-40. 
4 Federico Chabod, L'Italia contemporanea (1918-1248) (Torino: Giulio EinaudiJ, p. 43. 
Italian politics as "un uomo nuovo," a new man.5 
Due to a renewed interest in the Popular Party in recent 
years this active phase of Sturzo's career has been well documen-
ted and his name assured a permanent and honored place in the 
long history of his native country. But it is not oerely his 
image, though it looms large, as refracted through Italian his-
tory that marks the achievement that was his life. It is true 
that Sturzo•s thought was formed and his theory articulated in 
actively coping with the problems of post-Risorgimento Italy. 
It was from within the context of this active and reflective 
engagement that his thought matured and his vision expanded. 
As they did, Sturzo came to see that the problems of Italy were 
not peculiar to her alone. In fact, he came to see these prob-
lems as reflecting an undertow of trends and currents that ran 
counter to the very values and ideas upon which Western civili-
zation had been built. His sense of history told him that the 
solution to these problems was not to push the clock back, nor 
was it t~e formulation and enactment of novel, counteracting 
theories. Rather, it lay in reenforcing and injecting new life 
into the basic values of Western civilization by integrating 
them with the positive values emergent in modern culture. And 
Sturzo saw the convergence of both old and new in the single 
value, basic and transcendent to all others, of the free and 
autonomous individual person. 
Very early in his career, in fact many yenrs before the 
5carlo Morandi, Ipartit! ~·;tict neila storiQ d'Italia. (Firenze: Felice le Monnier, 1 5 , P• 91. 
4 
founding of the Popular Party, Sturzo diagnosed the ills afflic-
ting Italy, and all· of modern society, as not mere surface phe-
nomena of particular social structures, but as lethal fissures 
in the social order reaching down to that which is at the basis 
of all social forms, the individual person. 
The social order violated in its very essence: here 
is the problem in synthesis •••• It is not the case or 
individual violations or or simply false applications 
to concrete cases, but of social violations founded 
on the false and erroneous conception of the nature 
of man.6 
It is this determination of the fundaoental character and depth 
ot the problems confronting modern society that defined the 
level of Sturzo's vision and from that level only can one ade-
quately understand and evaluate the theory his vision engen-
dered. It is the thesis of this work that the scope of Stur-
zo' s vision embraced nothing less than an integral, concrete and 
coherent view of being human. 
Sturzo•s active and reflective concern with the problem of 
"being human" is the unifying theme of his diversified writings. 
It is a concern that focuses on this problem not as it presents 
itself in abstract form, but in the concreteness and particular-
ity which is the reality of history. It is, then, a concern for 
the individual person. With this leitmotiv in mind one is able 
to move through his writings without the disorientation and 
discontinuity which may otherwise follow as a result of the 
diversity of form and the varying levels of theorizing they 
express. 
6Luigi Sturzo, L'organizzazione di classe e le unioni pro-
tessionali (1901), in S!ntesi sociaii, Vol. I, Seconda Serie 
de11 10pera Omnia (2nd ed., rev.; Bo!ogna: N. Zanichelli, 1961), 
p. 169. 
5 
sturzo saw it as no historical accident that the twentieth 
century has witnessed the rise of personalist oriented theories. 
Just as the nineteenth century gave emphasis to individual 
liberty because it had been denied in the name of authority, so 
it is the reassertion of t~e primacy and autonomy of the indi-
vidual person that the twentieth century calls for since "this 
is denied in the name of the State and o:f the collective entity--
race, nation, or class--that each State strives to express in 
a most tangible manner."7 Consequently, Sturzo•s own socio-
political activity and theory revolve around the individual 
person. It is here that he finds the effective counterpoint, 
both practically and theoretically, to the modern state, in its 
tendency towards a social, political, economic and even ethical 
monism and to the attendant movement of society towards a reduc-
tive secularism. In the first instance, as the practical coun-
terpoint, it is the autonomous person that was the basis and 
vitality of the Popular Party; and in the second instance it is 
the person that stands at the core of his socio-political 
theory. Sturzo himself states, "We must take a new road, lead-
ing to the revaluation of the human person, above and beyond 
individualism, which considers persons as so many numbers, nnd 
statism, in which they are swallowed up in the whole."8 
The primary aim of this study is to present an interpreta-
tive and constructive exposition of Sturzo's "revaluation of 
?sturzo, "The Crisis of Democracy," in Politics and Moral-
(London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 19~S), pp. 56=?. 
8 llli·· p. 56. 
6 
the human person." A few preliminary observations are in order 
for the proper understanding of this endeavor. The form and 
content has been imposed by what I consider to be the initial 
and most urgent task if Sturzo's theory is to merit the atten-
tion it deserves: to plumb as deeply as possible toward the 
center of his theory to lay bare that fundamental orientation 
of his thought and the potent ideas intrinsic to it which 
together give to that theory an enduring historical life of its 
own. 'Whatever criteria one may use to determine the historical 
significance of a theory on man surely first and foremost must 
be that quality which follows from effectively engaging the 
dominant human problems of a given era in such a way as to 
reflect the consciousness of that era and yet at the same time 
to transcend it by touching in some fundamental way essential 
features of human reality. In this way it never loses its 
initial vital quality of immediacy whereby it remains not only 
a line of thought which merits intrinsic consideration in its 
own right, but also a fund of ideas for further creative theor-
izing. The purpose of this study is to serve as an introduc-
tion for such an understanding of Sturzo. 
It is by reason of, and to emphasize, what I consider to 
be this dual dimension of value in Sturzo's theory that I have 
undertaken an interpretative and constructive exposition rather 
than simply a historical or textual analysis of his thought. 
This does not mean that the interpretation presented here is 
not based on a close and thorough textual analysis of Sturzo's 
writings. What it does indicate is that in my textual analysis 
? 
I have focused as much on the implications and ranifications of 
sturzo's ideas as thei~ explicit formulation. Many of the ideas 
rendered explicit here are either a complementing or a reinforc-
ing of what are fragmentary indications of ideas and dirsctions 
of thought in Sturzo's writings. A prime example of this is my 
treatment of Sturzo's theory of history because. although he 
intended to, Sturzo never had the op]ortunity to work into an 
explicit theory of history the historicism that underlies all 
of his thought. The operative criteria throughout my work has 
been not only the spirit or cognitive orientation of Sturzo's 
thought, but also, and especially, its intrinsic logical struc-
ture. 1:fheretore, the inner logic of this study remains that of 
Sturzo's own thought. 
The movement of this logic is rooted in and follows the 
realization of the ontologica.l structure of the person in his 
living, and thereby processive, reality. Since this realiza-
tion is, in its essence, the concretization of sociality--the 
associ~tive dimension of man's nature--the activity through 
which the person achieves his being is at one with the inward 
form<ltion of society. An analysis of this process is the sub-
ject matter of the first chapter. Two other essential features 
of this process provide the focus of attention in the next two 
chapters: its concrete expression in social forms and the 
regularities of its movement. Since it is in and through 
history that the inner reality of man realizes and manifests 
itself, it is in his theory of history that Sturzo grounds his 
theory and brings it to completion. This study therefore 
8 
concludes with an exposition of the main features of his theory 
of history. 
one further point that is basic both to my interpretation 
o! sturzo'a theory and to an appreciation of its encompassing 
contemporaneity must be clarified: Why did Sturzo express his 
revaluation of the person in sociological terms? Through his 
sense of history Struzo knew that if this revaluation was to 
have meaning, validity and power for the present, it must be 
formulated in response to and in terms of the present. Thus, 
by reason of the radical socio-political and secularized char-
acter of the problematic of contemporary man Sturzo approached 
and expressed his revaluation in terms of a social theory that 
is itself radical and fundamental. 
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within the text. References to the articles of ;)turzo and to 
the works of other authors are cited in footnotes. The more 
readily available English translations of Sturzo's writings 
have been used wherever posaible, but they have been checked 
against the latest approved Italian editions. The transla-
tions from Italian editions are my own. 
CHAPrER I 
P"ERSON AND SOCIETY: A SOCIO-PERSONALISM 
When Don Luigi Sturzo returned to his beloved native Italy 
after world war II, in recognition for what his career, and he 
himself as a person, represented to the Italian people, the 
National Council of Christian Democrats honored him with these 
words: "You symbolize a deeply moral conception or political 
and social life in the service of man and for the protection 
h . d' •t ul of 1s 1gn1 y •••• For no less an authority than the emi-
nent French thinker, Maurice Vaussard, these words synthesize 
the essential characteristics of Sturzo's career. 2 Sturzo 
initiated and carried out his social and political activity al-
ways "in the service of man and for the protection of his 
dignity." 
Just as the individual person stands at the center of his 
social and political activity, so does the person stand at the 
heart of Sturzo's social theory. In fact, his theory both be-
gins and culminates in the concrete person. Yet, this does not 
mean that Sturzo•s theory undercuts the reality of society. 
With the term "society" we arrive at the second of the two terms 
1These words were spoken by Adone Zoli in the name of the 
National Council of Christian Democrats, September 20, 1946. 
See Maurice Vauesard, Il pensiero ~olitico e sociale di Luigi 
Sturzo (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1966), P• 15. 
2Ibid. 
11 
12 
around which all social thought revolves--the individual and 
society. Just as the problem of the one and the many has domi-
nated all Western speculation into the nature of reality, so 
has the social dimension of this problem dominated all investi-
gation into the structure of social reality. 
The human community is indeed a mysterious reality, 
exhibiting a wholeness that far transcends a pure and 
simple atomism, a real unity which is yet a multipli-
city and which obliges us to rethink the very notion 
of the individual and the way in which he is related 
to society. The fact remains, and cannot be cancelled 
out through a desire for a simplistic solution, that 
while society is real gua society, it is still a com-
munion of individuals considered in their individual-
social being.3 
In grappling with this problem an array of conflicting and 
irreducible theories have marked social and political theory 
from its inception. Within the welter of these theories the 
limiting alternatives have been either to assign an ontological 
priority to one or the other of the two members, and thereby 
ultimately reducing the opposing member, whose reality, if it 
is upheld, is secondary, mediate, and consequential, into the 
ontological primacy of the other or else to view the two terms 
synthetically as constituting two interdependent aspects of the 
reality. The attempt here is not to simplistically categorize 
or "pigeon-hole" specific theories that have enriched the tradi-
tion of social thought, but merely to provide the limiting posi-
tions within this tradition. 
Among these positions, Sturzo•s theory at first sight 
appears to fall within those which view the reality of the 
3Robert C. Pollock, "L'uomo nella societa e nella storia," 
in Del metodo sociologieo (Bergamo: Atlas, 1950). p. 196. 
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individual and society as indivisible.4 It is true that Sturzo 
18 absolutely explicit in his opposition to any theory that 
views the individual and society as two distinct entities. In 
the concrete, to use Sturzo's favorite expression. the person 
and society are two integrating components of the "concrete 
real." It is only through conceptual analysis that we can 
treat them as distinct. To project the results of this con-
ceptual analysis as a reflection of reality is to be guilty of 
what Sturzo aptly terms "abstractionism." ~is fallacy consists 
"of presenting as concrete what is a mental abstraction of their 
own." (T.L. 9)5 In this instance it means that in analyzing 
the factors of an ongoing and unified process, we then proceed 
to hold that the factors were antecedently separated. 
But to categorize Sturzo's theory within the theoretical 
framework of other relational or synthetic social theories is 
to run the risk of overlooking not so much the distinguishing 
features of Sturzo•s theory but, more importantly, its radical 
originality and difference·. The terminology and mode ot expres-
sion may appear similar but the entire cognitive orientation 
4Nioholas Timashetf interprets Sturzo's theory in this way. 
See his book. The Sociolo6i of Luigi Sturzo (Baltimore: Helicon 
Press, 1962), pp. 66-71. or an exceiient critique of Tima-
sheft' a basic interpretation of Sturzo, see Victor Gioscia's 
"Discussion of Timashef't's Paper." American Catholic Sociologi-
cal Review, 22 (Spring, 1961). 34-3S. 
5It is worthy of note that abstractionism which Sturzo 
considers to be the basic fallacy of social theory includes 
what John Dewey has called "the philosophic fallacy." that is. 
"the conversion of eventual functions into antecedent exis-
tence." See Dewey's F?merienoe and Nature (New York: Dover. 
1958) • PP• 261 and 68. 
14 
could well be different. An equivalent example in the history 
ot philosophy would be a comparative analysis of the metaphy-
sics of Aristotle with that of St. Thomas Aquinas without taking 
into account or perceiving the fundamentally different cognitive 
orientation of the two thinkers. The result would be to inter-
pret the two systems in terms of the external modes of expres-
sion alone apart from the animating spirit that invests the 
terminology of each thinker with its specific meaning. It comes 
down to the difference between comparing two systems which 
can be distinguished, but both within the essentialist tradition, 
or comparing two systems which are not only distinguishable, 
but reflecting two irreducible orientations towards reality--
the essentialist and the existentialist. 
Sturzo's terminology may correspond to that or relational 
or synthetic theories, but the difference in the underlying 
meaning spans a cognitive distance as ~reat as that between an 
essentialist and an existentialist metaphysical system. Two 
brief examples will serve to clarity this and prevent the attempt 
to reduce Sturzo's theory to that of other similarly articu-
lated theories. A central notion to Sturzo•s theory and to 
any synthesizing social theory is that of relation. For both, 
relations are real. But whereas for synthetic theories the 
relational aspects of social reality flow out of already consti-
tuted natures, £or Sturzo, the very ontological structures ot 
both the person and society are constituted by relations. 
In real life all that exists is the social concretion--
concrete relations. (I.e. 144) 
The whole world is an immense system of syntheses and 
15 
and relations. Every being is a synthesis, and all 
beings are relational. Because of this the world is 
organic. It is organic because every synthesis making 
up the world takes and gives; it takes by resolving 
the kindred activities ra.d.iating from other syntheses 
into itself; it gives radiating round itself a part 
of its activity.6 
sturzo points up this distinction himself. He quotes a defini-
tion of society from Robert Mc!ver's Society: Its Structure and 
Changes: ''Society is the system of social relationships in and 
throu~h which we live." Sturzo•s view of. this definition is 
that it "is acceptable to a phenomenologiat, but it is only an 
observation of a fact without any explanation which could be 
philosophical, and therefore should be avoided." (M. 31-2) The 
significant term in Sturzo' s comment is the word ''phenomenolo-
gist." Sturzo uses the term "phenomenology" to indicate simp1y 
a direct analysis of facts as they manifest themselves in imme-
diate perception. Such an analysis would never reveal the 
internality and constitutive reality of relations. Therefore, 
such a definition as Mciver•s is only descriptive. 
Another essential difference between Sturzo's theory and 
other theories relates to the temporal dimension of social real-
ity, the function of time. In metaphysical terms the difference 
is between viewing social reality in terms of being or in terms 
of process. Sturzo's theory considers the person and society 
not so much something that is, no matter how closely interdepen-
dent their realities are, as something in continual becoming. 
Social reality, grounded on the interaction of persons within 
and with the social framework, is viewed neither in terms of 
6sturzo, "Theory of Knowledge in Neo-Synthetiam," Dublin 
Review, 18? (Oct., 1930), 290. 
16 
substance nor of being, but as process. It is only the procea-
sual perspective "which carries us to the heart of reality ...... 
uThe social structure of mankind is one with its concretization, 
and this is processive in time, that is historical." (I.L. xi-
xii) As will become clear in the unfolding of Sturzo's theory, 
this processual view follows from a recognition of temporality 
as an internal, necessary, and constitutive dimension of social 
reality. The originality of Sturzo's theory has been character-
ized as: 
••• a new vision of major size, distinctly sociologi-
cal. Its primary characteristic is the notion of 
process, which embraces a radical temporalisn, more 
sophisticated by far than the nineteenth century tem-
poralisms of Hegel, Marx, Durkheim, or of Sturzo's 
own contemporary, Bergson. It is a new conception 
of time as the basis of social life which contains 
the seed of a sociological relativity, the social 
equival~nt of Einstein's magnificent general rela-
tivity.'/ 
Sturzo's social theory begins with the problem of the in-
ward formation of society. The terms "inward" and "formation" 
carry a significant denotation for the correct pre-analytic 
perspective on Sturzo's theory. The word "inward" signifies 
that the emphasis of Sturzo•s theory is on discovering the 
inner structure and laws of social reality. His concern in 
investigating the data of various social phenomena is to lay 
bare the inner reality that manifests itself through these 
phenomena. The approach toward the study of society in terms 
of its formation indicates Sturzo's historical methodology. 
It is important to preface an analysis of the components involved 
in this formation, the person and society, with a reiteration 
?Gioscia, "Discussion of Timasheff' s Paper," p. 37. 
~ l? 
of this methodology. . To view these terms abstractly and analy-
tically is to view t.hem not only as separable, but separate; 
however, when they are viewed in the concrete dialectic of the 
historical process, they reveal themselves as reciprocal condi-
tions of each other's reality. Analysis is a necessary metho-
dological procedure for separating out in order to understand 
the synthesizing elements of the social process, but it cannot 
be over-emphasized that all analysis meansabstraction so that 
"reality is very different from what it appears in analysis." 
(I.L. 252) Thus, the results of analysis, as not only a step 
removed from reality but also "frozen" in the distorting immo-
bility of concepts, elucidate only insofar as they presuppose, 
are grounded in, are constantly referred back to, and prepare 
for the dialectical synthesis out of which they were abstracted. 
The synthetic processual view of social reality presents 
methodological difficulties which are never satisfactorily 
solved because they arise from the conceptual mode of our know-
ledge. But what can be done is to so recognize th~se difficul-
ties as to not allow the limitations of the conceptual formula-
tion to become more than that--precisely limitations of the 
theory and not of the contours of the reality under investiga-
tion. In regard to our specific area of concern here, the per-
son and society, we are forced to distinguish between them, in 
order to understand something of them, because all reality be-
comes intelligible only through differentiation. Yet, the 
reality of each is not only determined by, but constituted in, 
relation to the other. 
In the consideration of the individual person, we distin-
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guish between his individual and social life. This leads us to 
char8 cterize these two aspects of the one personal life with 
terms which are classically set in opposition to each other 
because they have been viewed abstractly and analytically, and 
not concretely and synthetically. The life of the individual 
person is one, not two, unifying the entire range of personal 
activity, whether individual or social. 
We often speak of the individual and the social as though 
or inner and outer, but in reality the inner, too, is 
social. Or they are taken as the subjective and objec-
tive, but nothing is objective that is not subjective 
also. Or at other times they serve to distinguish the 
idea from its realization, but every realization con-
tains the idea and is the fruit of individual activity. 
The analytical forms of speech are always incomplete; 
they elucidate only insofar as they presuppose or pre-
pare the synthesis. (T.L. 42-3) 
'l'hus, it is from the matrix of the socio-historical process that 
Sturzo unweaves the pattern of social reality. 
In the structural formation of society the individual per-
son is the active and efficient principle. Society is "the 
multiple, simultaneous, continuative projection of individuals 
in their activity." (I.L. xvii)8 This follows from the tact 
that the person is at once individual and social. 
He is so individual as not to partake of any life but 
his own, as to be an incommunicable personality. He 
is so social that he could not exist or develop any 
faculties not even live his life outside the social 
forms •••• It is evident that in the concrete we find 
neither individuals apart from society, nor society 
apart from individuals. In the concrete, there are 
only individuals in society. The associative princi-
ple in the individual is an inner principle. while it 
completes his individual reality. There does not exist 
an extra-individual and, hence, extra-human associative 
8cr. also T.L. 186; "The Philosophic Background of Chris-
tian Democracy,'' Review of Politics, 9 (Jan., 194?), 9-10. 
principle, self-subsistent and as such informing 
social life. (I.L. xiv) 
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It may appear tnat Sturzo is simply stressing the social nature 
o! man which clearly places the historical and ideal origins of 
his thought in the tradition of classical humanism. In a sense 
this is true because assuredly it is within this tradition that 
the social diroensior. of man's nature is highlighted. For an 
integral facet of this tradition is its emphasis that only 
within society does man achieve the depth and extension of his 
being. But in the historical development of the philosophical 
study of man, this insight has not borne the fruit it should 
have, mainly because only lip-service has been paid to it. 
This is manifest in the attempt to fix the nature of man apart 
from the social process. There is also a deeper reason. within 
the tradition of classical humanism, when they speak of man's 
nature as essentially social, it is precisely that--a nature 
which has a social dimension; that is, man's sociality, the 
associative aspect of the individual, is viewed as flowing out 
of an already constituted structure-- 11 already 11 indicating not 
a temporal or empirical priority, but both a logical and onto-
logical priority. To say that the individual does not have a 
temporal or empirical priority to society means that the indi-
vidual never actually develops outside of the social relations 
and forms that are generated and crystallized by his sociality, 
or if he ever did, it would be in an anomalous condition such 
as that of the "feral man," projected by anthropologists and 
social psychologists. But in the logical order, the person is 
prior to society. The concept of the individual is a logical 
presupposition of the concept of society. Sturzo agrees with 
both of these points, but not with attributing an ontological 
priority to man's nature apart from the realizing of its social-
ity. That the classical tradition of humanism opts for the 
grounding of man's sociality in an ontologically prior struc-
ture is indicated by such classical notions as "the state of 
nature, 11 "the isolated man," or "the man on an island." Here 
is the precise point where Bturzo goes beyond classical humanism. 
First of all, it is important to note that Sturzo deals 
with the concrete, existing individual man, not with man or 
humanity in the abstract. But he goes beyond this. He looks 
on man not primarily as an individual, but above all as a person. 
As individuals, all men are equal by reason of their common 
humanity, but it is only as persons that the depth of their 
reality is fathomed in its vital and qualitative uniqueness. 
Considering men as individuals results in the tendency to either 
reduce man to the level of nature, or at least to view him in 
the sa:ne terms as other natural organisms, but with his own 
specifying properties. The consequence ist and has been, to 
either fall into naturalistic dilemnas, which are often only 
pseudo-dilemnas, or to undercut the uniqueness of man which 
manifests itself only in the personal dimension. Ultimately, 
it can have no other result than the alienation of man from 
himself since it is only in the personal field that he comes to 
realize, and recognize, the spiritual dimensions of his own 
subjectivity. It is precisely on the basis of these insights 
that :3turzo rejects in social theory such comparisons as that 
between animal groupings and human society. (cf. M. 32-3; 
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I .L. 10-ll) 
In regard to Sturzo's focus on the personal dimension of 
there is a terminological difficulty that has to be clari-man, 
tied. sturzo uses the terms, "the personal," "the person," 
"personality," and "human personality" interchangeably. The 
term that most .frequently appears in his writings is "human 
personality." But in technical use today these words have come 
to assume quite different meanings. The difficulty revolves 
around the fact that both of the terms "personal" and "personal-
ity" relate to the person and would seem to denote those quali-
ties or set of characteristics by which a person is a person 
and distinguished from all beings which are not persons. But 
the term "personality" has generally taken on a more specific 
meaning to denote the sum total of attitudes, traits, or behav-
ioral patterns which distinguishes one person from another.9 
Sturzo uses the term "personality" in its wider denotation. 
The crux of the problem we are considering concerns the 
metaphysical implications of Sturzo's theory. It is a question 
ot whether his theory just fits within the tradition of classi-
cal humanism or whether his relational processual view extends 
to the ontological level. There is textual evidence that it 
does. He states that 0 without a society any human activity would 
be impossible. Society is always operating from the moment 
that there are individuals. It may lack a stable and purposeful 
organization; ••• but from the fact that there are individuals who 
9John Macmurray, Persons in Relation (London: Faber & 
Faber, 1959), p. 25. 
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seek to achieve something new through their own activities, 
sociality in the conc·rete exists." (I.L. 12) 0 Society is not 
an entity or an organism outside and above the individual, nor 
is the individual a reality outside and above society." (I.L. 
xivfO Although Sturzo is careful to maintain the reality of 
both the individual person and society, he views the reality of 
each not in terms of being, which would make of them two dis-
tinct entities, but in terms of a relational process out of 
which the distinct reality of each evolves only as relational 
to the other. They are two factors or elements of a single 
synthesizing process. Man is at once individual and social: he 
is essentially individual and necessarily social. Man "is so 
individual as not to partake of any life but his own, as to be 
an incommunicable personality. He is so social that he could 
not exist nor develop any faculties nor even live his life out-
side the social forms." (I.L. xiv; 206) 
What we are trying to determine is the ontological rela-
tionship between these facets of the person. Sturzo gives "to 
the associative instinct its full value as an ever-developing 
exigency and social impulse, and by this very fact we resolve 
the individual into society." (I.L. xvi)11 It should be noted 
that Sturzo says "resolve," not dissolve the individual into 
10 For some other pertinent passages exemplifying Sturzo•s 
relational processive view of the person, see: I.L. xix, 13-15, 
162, 210, 301, 30?; T.L. 45; I.C. 44-45, 49-50; N.&I. 132; 
"History and Philosophy," Thought, 21 (March, 1946), 56. 
11
sturzo unfortunately uses the term "instinct" for the 
natural and primordial tendencies and aptitudes of the person. 
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But the basic sociological resolution12 is the reso-society. 
lution of society irito the individual person. ',-/hat Sturzo is 
indicating in this reciprocal resolution of individual into 
society and society into the individual is the continuous cycle 
or the syntheses involved in human becoming, "a cycle that runs 
from the person to the collectivity and from the collectivity 
to the person, a cycle of inward thought finding outward expres-
sion, of practical activity conceived and actuated." (I.L. 300) 
The social process is so co-natural to us that society is sim-
ply the externalization of our own inner reality joined in a 
dynamic synthesis. Thus, as Robert Pollock states in his acute 
analysis of Sturzo•s thought, "society is not an accidental 
attribute of man. but rather a necessary aspect of his indivi-
dual essence,u so that "the personal life and the life of soci-
ety are not two separate lives, but the one individual-social 
life. 1113 
For Sturzo, then, the very ontological structure of the 
person is constituted in and through his sociality. Sociality 
is an ontological structure because it is the act by which the 
person achieves his own being. That is to say, the activity by 
which sociality is concretized in social forms is the activity 
by which the personal is established together with the "concrete 
real," or in other words, its actual world. The nature of man, 
that is, the personal, is not in any way pre-existent to the 
12sturzo's theory of sociological resolution will be dis-
cussed later. For now it is sufficient to note that he takes the 
term from the physico-mathematical sciences. It indicates the 
reduction to the primary elements that do not permit any further 
resolution. Cf. I.L. 8. 
13Pollock., "L'uomo nella societ} e nella storia, '' p. 194. 
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actual process of the concretization of sociality. Social 
life is not "as a voluntary choice posterior to individual 
existence, but necessary and co-existent with it from the time 
of the first appearance of human life on the earth." (I.e. 143) 
It is entirely immanent to that concrete process itself. By 
this I oean that the person is not an entity distinct from the 
process itself, but the process itself is actually internal to 
and constitutive of the person. Prior to and apart from the 
concretizing process of sociality the person !!, not. It attains 
its being only in actualizingthis process. Th.is means that in 
the dimension of being the person is open-ended because it is 
always becomin~--"always" because the plentitude of its being 
in its depth and extension opens onto the infinite contours of 
reality, and "becoming" because these two dimensions of its 
existential concreteness, its depth and extension, are each con-
stituted by the other in a reciprocal process, which together 
form the concretization of sociality, "without which the human 
individual is inconceivable.'' (I.L. 5) 
Since the person is characterized by the quality of open-
endedness, so also is the process whereby he is generated. 
Therefore, by reason of this self-generative dynamism within the 
process, the process never achievesa closed or completed facti-
city, but rather is always tendential. This process through 
which the existence of the person is established is the one and 
the same process whereby society, or more specifically, the 
social forms are established. "Sociality cannot remain a matter 
of merely individual relations, but tends of itself to some form 
--it may be elementary--of organization, that is, to the estab-
~ 
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lishillent of a hierarchy of forces." (I.e. 48) It is only in 
generating these concrete forms of society that the person is 
generated. And it is these concrete social forms themselves 
that reveal the emerging of the inward structure of the person. 
"Society with its variety and its perennial process, is nothing 
but the manifestation, ever in becoming, of an inner reality." 
(I.L· xiii) Thus, society is not something that is exterior 
to the person in the sense that it is to be set off from the 
interior dimension of the person. For as we are now indicating, 
this interior dimension is itself social in a concretely consti-
tutive mode of the person. The person's mode of being is social 
because his ontological structure is social. Thus, within the 
totality--a totality not of facticity but tendential--of human 
reality society, too, is interior to the person. Its external-
1ty consists only in the extent to which the inner reality of 
the person has been achieved. The entire span of human civili-
zation gives awe-inspiring evidence of degrees to which the 
field of the personal has developed within the self-generative 
emergence of the person. 
All that crystallizes outwardly as language, traditions, 
institutions, laws, all that incorporates itself with 
places--towns, streets, labors, monuments, records, 
temples, and churches--or with forms of costume of 
intercourse, of living all that is expressed by works 
of thought and art, and that which develops with time, 
namely history--all are the personal activity of man •••• 
(T.L. 186) 
All of the achievements of the human spirit within the person 
are not "outside of'' or exterior to ·that spirit, but are the 
expression of that spirit seeking to obtain the fullness of 
its being. 
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!rhe transitive aspect of human activity tends to obscure 
the fact that spiritual activity is not transitive. But within 
the framework of Sturzo's thought, personal activity in its 
~ost intimate character as personal is centered in the spiritual 
dimensions of that activity. In personal activity, then, and 
to the degree that it is personal, nothing other than the person 
himself is discovered and defined, since it is the human spirit 
generating its own presence to itself in which its reality as 
spirit consists. This does not mean that all activity in which 
the person engages is necessarily generative of his own being, 
any more than in classical thought did anyone hold that all the 
activity of man, just by the mere fact of having been performed 
by a man, was thereby human activity. The delimitation of such 
activity in either case has to be set. The activity under con-
sideration here is limite1 to that activity in which the person 
gives form to his own being. And the active and creative prin-
ciple of that activity is the human spirit, which as immanent 
to the process is itself embodied in the external crystalliza-
tions of the process. This process within which the person 
emerges is clearly not a physical or mechanical process that 
characterizes the physical order, but rather it is a creatively 
--in the richest meaning of that word--sel!-generative process 
in which the person comes to be. 
Out of the dialectical synthesis or this concrete process, 
it is necessary to disengage the elements involved through the 
process of abstraction and conceptualization, not only in order 
to better understand the process itself but also to form the 
logical concepts necessary for a viable social theory. Yet, 
2? 
here such a procedure not only carries its usual inbuilt limi-
tations and risks of distortions, but is extremely difficult. 
EVeryone recognizes the legitimacy and necessity of studying 
man according to the formality or one or the facets of his being 
tor theoretical and scientific purposes, whether it be the biol-
ogist or doctor viewing him as a biological organism, or the 
psychologist studying only the psychological aspects of his 
being, or the anatomist analyzing his physiological structure. 
Here it may be thought that we are considering another distin-
guishable aspect of man, his social dimension. But within the 
context of Sturzo's theory, not only is this dimension necessary 
and intrinsic to man, but constitutive of him in his totality 
as a person. Thus, it not only influences and includes ·the 
other formalities of his being, but is their underlying ontolo-
gical structure. 
While Sturzo is at pains to preserve the reality of both 
the person and society, yet the reality of the person embraces 
within itself the reality of society in a reciprocal relation-
ship of dependence. That is why he holds that sociology, the 
study of society, is really nothing other than social anthropol-
ogy. (I.L. xvii) Tbis is also why he demands that man must not 
be viewed "as an abstract formula in a world of abstractions, 
but as a truly living being whose consciousness develops only 
with his experience, and insofar as he lives his life in the 
social and historical complexity of his existence. 1114 In addi-
tion to this, the person is a synthesizing reality, e~bracing 
l4ill£, •• p. 1?5. 
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within itself "spirit and sense, individual life and social 
life, culture and religion, earthly interests and supernatural 
life." (P. & M. 5?) The person not only is a synthesizing 
reality in itself, but as the locus of intelligibility within 
the world, is also the grounding principle for the reality of 
the world. 
Natural history is distinguished from human history 
for objective and didactic reasons; not certainly for 
the reality of the human concrete, because the nature 
and history of the complex we call nature are perceived 
and appraised only insofar as they are per~eived and 
realized by man. Everything that does not enter into 
that human sphere is for us as if non-existent; the 
day that it enters into that sphere, either through 
observation or possession and transformation, it be-
comes history, our history.15 
Although we still have to go into some detail to clarify 
the human process, we have already indicated that for Sturzo the 
person has no existence apart from the concretizing process of 
sociality and, as immanent to this process, he is both the sub-
ject and term of the process. The very nature of this process 
as process and as constitutive of the person, reveals the his-
toricity of human reality. Just as the social order is not 
extrinsic and alien to man, so the historical process is not so 
much that in which man assimilates an external and alien world 
of nature, as rather that through and by which he defines his 
own being. 
This history is not extraneous to our life, but like 
land transformed from stumps into flowering gardens 
and fertile fields, it is our life. our history is 
the search into the bowel's of the earth for materials 
that are transformable and transformed by the hand of 
15 Sturzo, "Historicist Sociology," Cross Currents, 9 (Fall, 
1959), 334. 
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man; it is the study of the stars, towards which today 
we reach out as towRrds zones to be explored, by draw-
ing near to them. This life, inaofar as it is realized 
and remenbered, is history, and insofar as it is fixed 
in our culture, in our institutions, in our industries 
and activities, it is the life of society.16 
What has been established thus far: has important methodo-
logical implications both for and beyond an understanding of 
sturzo's own theory. From a methodological point of view it 
means that in order to grasp Sturzo's concept of the person, 
since it is the ultimate object of his theory, the entire sys-
tem has to be presented; and yet, at the same time, the concept 
of the person is at the basis of the theory. In order to arrive 
at an understanding of that reality out of which the theory 
arises and in which it terminates we have to give an exposition 
of the entire system. The difficulties arising from the neces-
sity of having to present piecemeal and successively what can 
only be understood in its totality and simultaneously are inher-
ent in both the formulation and exposition of any encompassing 
theory. But these difficulties are infinitely increased with 
a theory that has a processual, relational and synthesizing 
perspective. Thus. a philosophical understanding of man demands 
a socio-historical understanding of man, "because the individual 
man is of such a nature that he cannot be known without his his-
torical development, his present activity, his possible future. 
His life unfolds in time; man is not a fossil in a museum. nor 
a slab in a pavement. 1117 This methodological procedure in the 
16Ibid. 
-
l?sturzo, "History and Philosophy," p. 56. 
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study of man is a clear demarcation between 3turzo•s view of 
aan' 8 "social nature" and that o! classical humani3t1. Classi-
cal hwnanism holds that man is social by nature and yet attempts 
to determine the ideality of this nature independently of the 
social structures which arise out of the determinations of this 
nature. For Sturzo this can only lead to a misunderstanding of 
both man and society since the structure of each determines the 
structure of the other within a dialectical historical process 
that generates both together. 
The light this sheds on Sturzo's own methodology is note-
worthy. Although the concrete individual person stands at the 
center of ::sturzo' s theory of society, he does not begin his 
theory by presenting a theory of human nature and then deducing 
the structures, laws and finalism of society from it. To do so 
would indicate that the structure of human nature is ontologi-
cally antecedent to both society and tistory. This is clearly 
contrary to Sturzo's position since the person is both the sub-
ject and term of the social and historical process. Hence, 
Sturzo's historical method is not imposed on his subject matter, 
but rather follows from the socio-historical ontological struc-
ture of "the reality of the hu!llan concrete." He does derive 
his theory from an analysis of human nature, but not in an a 
-
Rriori and apodictic way as independent of the socio-historical 
process within which it appears and wtich in fact is its concre-
tization. He rather focuses on human nature as it manifests 
itself in process. 
Thus far we have only adumbrated a positive concept of the 
person in his sociality. we have seen that the person and 
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society are not distinct entities, irreducible and set in oppo-
sition to one anothe·r, but rather two synthesizing realities 
established by a dialectic of a reciprocal dynamic process. 
'through this perspective the person is discerned in his self-
creating activity as the existential agent of society. Prior 
to a more thorough analysis of this concept of sociality we are 
confronted with the fundamental problem of whether this dynamic 
processual view of the person does not ultimately presuppose a 
personal reality which is already differentiated. we have al-
ready indicated that for Sturzo the person is not pre-existent 
to this process which is constitutive of his very being. Yet, 
as to the question whether this process does not presuppose an 
already differentiated reality, Sturzo answered that it does 
"to us who admit the separate creation of each human soul." 
(T.L. 45) At first sight this seems to either conflict with 
our interpretation of Sturzo's theory or else Sturzo himself 
is inconsistent. Thia is an essential problem and demands a 
careful analysis, because Sturzo•s statement seems to make the 
person ontologically prior to the process. 
We could say that man as a natural being is a presupposi-
tion of the process. But this is unsatisfactory for three 
reasons. First of all, this would be looking at man in terms 
of being and not in terms of process. Secondly, this would 
constitute man as an entity distinct from society, which Sturzo 
clearly rejects. As a logical abstraction it is possible to 
consider the individual as distinct from society in order to 
try to determine its constitutive and fundamental elements. 
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Jut what aspect of the concrete individual is there that is not 
touched by and thereby affected by the socio-historical pro-
cess .1a Thirdly, t•· is would be reducing man to the level of 
other natural entities which is the alienation or man from him-
self• 
It is important to remember that we are dealing with the 
field of the personal, that is, with man as person. The two 
dimensions of the person involved here are his individuality 
and his sociality, which is the associative aspect of the indi-
vidual person and which coneretizes itself in social forms. 
These two aspects of the person, it is true, have their primor-
dial origin in a physio-spiritual unity. "Man is at once indi-
vidual and social. His individual potentiality and his social 
potentiality have a single root in his sensitive-rational 
nature." (I.L. xiv) "Individual'' in this instance refers to 
not just the de facto differentiation of man, but more strictly 
to "personal individuality," since Sturzo relates the term to 
man as "an incommunicable personality." The term "potentiality" 
in this case should not be confused with the traditional notion 
of potentiality. Whereas potentiality is traditionally set in 
opposition to, but ordered-toactso that pure act excludes poten-
tiality, it here carries the activistic signification of a dyna-
mic and creative principle that generates and supports both the 
18The theological doctrines of the Fall of man through 
Original Sin and his redemption through the historical events 
Of the Incarnation, Death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ 
indicate the extent to which the. soul of man is touched by 
the socio-historical process. 
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person and social forms together in its own creative process. 
fbus, this physio-spiritual unity, or in other words, man's 
"sensitive-rational nature" is presupposed by the process. but 
only as the active immanent principle of the process. It is a 
''personal reality already differentiated'' in the active signi-
fication of potentiality. 
The de facto differentiation of the unique personal real-
ity is established at the moment of inception of the physio-
spiritual unity within the socio-historical process which 
grounds the creative process of the personal individuality of 
just this person who is determined by, and in turn determines, 
other personal and social realities within the socio-historical 
process. This physic-spiritual unity is determined by the socio-
historical process even prior to its conception to the extent 
that it reflects the socio-historical determination of its 
geneological heritage. 
Sturzo also provides another set of concepts which may 
serve to further clarify the relation of the person's "sensitive-
rational nature 11 to the relational-processual development of 
the person. Sturzo uses these concepts in elaborating the nature 
of society, but since society is simply the crystallization of 
the social dimension of the person, they can equally as well 
apply to the person. He states that what he means by society 
in the concrete is simply society in its own dimensions: the 
structural and the temporal dimension. 
have a structure, would not be able to 
did not move, if it did not develop its 
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be able to exist."19 These words are also applicable to 
the person. The structure of the person consists in his sensi-
tive-rational nature, without which he would not become. The 
temporal dimension is the becoming itself. But it is Sturzo's 
understanding of the word "structure" that reveals the radical-
ness of Sturzo's process view. Structure generally implies the 
notion of fixity, stability, immobility; not for Sturzo. Struc-
ture itself is "mobile, it is a process." But later in the 
passage he distinguishes between structure and process when he 
speaks of the "study of society as structure and process, that 
is to say, in its synthesis of existence and history." (H.S. 
333)20 
These passages, I believe, can be explained in this way. 
Structure indicates those aspects of the person, and thereby 
society, that persist in the constitution or the person. But 
these perr.ianent elements--per:nanent only in the sense that they 
are always present as necessary components of the person, not 
in the sense that they are unchanging or not subject to process 
--are themselves process. As Vico puts it, "The nature of' things 
is nothing but their coming into being at certain times and in 
certain fashions." 21 As an example we can take the ability to 
think as one of the structural aspects of the person. This 
19sturzo, ''Historicist Sociology, 11 p. ;33. 
20Ibid. 
-21Giambattista Vico, The New Science of Giambattista.Vice, 
trans. from the third edition, !744, by '.rliomas aoddard Be~gin 
and Max Harold Fisch. Ithaca: Cornell u. Press, 1948, par. 14?. 
~ 
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ability is a peroanent characteristic of the person, a presuppo-
sition for becoming .a person, and yet the ability itself, as 
principle of thinking, is not ontologically prior to or dis-
tinct from the process of' thinking, but is ontologically con-
stituted only in the process of thinking. This ability is the 
initial actualization of an inner exigency for (still further) 
concrete realization. we can go beyond thinking to the very 
core of the person, his consciousness. Although we will later 
more fully elaborate this central notion in Sturzo's system, 
nevertheless, within the context of the present discussion, 
sturzo's processive view applies to consciousness as it does 
to the ability to think. Consciousness attains actuality only 
in process. It is only in the process of "inter-individual 
relationships and the outward, common activity of men," that 
"the consciousness of each has found the possibility of becoming 
actual, of evolving and perfecting itself." (I.L. 301) This is 
why Sturzo relates structure and process in a "synthesis of 
existence and history. 11 Existence in this context in no way 
connotes the passive overtones of "being there," signifying a 
toothold in reality. but rather evokes the dynamic and causi-
tive signification of its etymological roots. 
With its conception, the sensitive-rational nature of man 
"stands forth" as an intrinsic need to further actualize it-
self; that is, it exists as the principle of its becoming. 
Structure is the "rational, volitive, and active power" of man 
to "stand forth 11 and it is real, i.e., exists, only as ''stand-
ing .forth." Man exists, or creates himself not all at once, but 
through time, processually. Therefore, man's existence and 
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history are one. That is why Sturzo speaks of the "synthesis 
of existence and his·tory." Man's coming to be, i.e. his 
"standing forth" as an independent interdependent reality--inde-
pendent in that he is an autonomous be-ing, interdependent in 
that this autonomous be-ing is gained only through mutual rela-
tions with other persona and other realities--is nothing else 
than history, and history is nothing else than man's coming to 
be. Since the limits of this nature, or str'Uoture, oa.nnot be 
fixed, neither can its existence, that is, its actualizing 
process. Thus, the person is an open-ended being because it is 
a being that exists or becomes. 
In traditional ter~inology, it may seem as though we have 
identified essence and existence. In actual fact we have not. 
Essence corresponds to the ideality of man, that is, man as a 
"simultaneous and perfect whole. 1122 The physio-spiritual nature 
of man as concretized in the concrete individual embraces this 
within itself as a potentiality which is actualized through and 
with its act of existing. But the actualization, its act of 
existing, never achieves the complete realization of this poten-
tiality. "Neither the individual taken in himself, nor society 
as the outcome of its individuals can be said to possess them-
selves wholly, and, hence, to be able to rest on the realization 
of the moment as final and definitive." (I.L. 13) Thus there 
is a basic distinction to be :r:J.ade within the concrete individual: 
22 ~ Sturzo, "Maurice Blondel's La Pensee; the Philosophy of 
'L'elan spiritual,'" Hibbert Journa!, 34 (April, 1936), 347. 
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the nature as realized is nothing other than its existence, but 
between this nature·as realized and the nature in the fullness 
of its potentiality as a dynamic and creative principle, there 
is a distinction that can only be adequately described as 
"real." The reality of this distinction expresses itself within 
man as an inward exigency for further realization. 
Up to now we have sketched some of the broad contours of 
the relationship between the individual and society. We have 
discovered that for Sturzo this relationship is so basic to 
both as to be ontologically constitutive for each. When Robert 
Pollock compared the relationship between the individual and 
society to that between the body and soul within the concrete 
existing individual--an inextricably intertwined relationship 
of reciprocal and intimate compenetration--he was not giving 
expression to an exaggerated metaphor, but to an analogical 
reality. 23 
The individual human being becomes a person only through 
relationship with another person. His very existence consists 
not in ;nere "being-for-another,'' but in the complex mutuality 
of "being-for-each-other." As we plumb the depths of the self-
consciousness we 1iscover, as Hegel has expressed it, not the 
n1n but the 11 \./e, 11 the ego that is "We" and the "We" that is 
ego. 24 The problem confronting Sturzo was not only to discover 
the nature of this union, but to determine how this union can 
23Pollock ... L'uomo nella societA e nella storia," p. 200; 
er. I.L. 32. 
~4G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenolo~~ of Mind (New York: Har-
per & Row, Toochbook ed., 1967), p. ?. 
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be adequately symbolized in reflection. 
In his attempt. to articulate the nature of this union, 
sturzo first explained it in terms of the relational nature of 
man. Then with the publication of Essai de sociologie in 1935, 
hiB emphasis shifted from relations to the individual-social 
consciousness of the person. The words "his emphasis shifted" 
are chosen ~ith care because in his later stress on conscious-
ness Sturzo in no way rrdropped" his relational perspective. 
Timasheff incorrectly interprets Sturzo in this fashion. In 
discussing Sturzo's earlier relational view, Timasheff states 
that ''unfortunately Sturzo dropped this line of investigation 
altogether and did not coordinate it with the newly acquired 
insight that consciousness was the key to the problem (of what 
is the nature of the unity of society and the individual). 025 
It would have been contradictory for :~turzo to do so because 
consciousness itself is essentially relational, in its origin, 
its development and fulfillment. (cf. I.L. 175, 301, 306) The 
relational view was not dropped, in fact it can hardly be said 
to be in the background. A number of' significant topics are 
explic.it.ly handled relationally. The value of one's own person-
ality id deepened through the widening o.f the circle of personal 
relationships. Knowledge only arises out of an interpersonal 
relational context. The relational nature of the person finds 
expression in social groups. Mutual relationships "have value 
as a society insofar as they resolve themselves into the forma-
tion of personalities spiritually and morally richer and more 
25T1masheff, The Sociology of Luigi Sturzo, p. 72. 
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complete than they would have been had such relationships not 
been experienced." (I.L. 303; cf. 20, 207, 255) 
In sddition to these topics that Sturzo explicitly handles 
relationally in Inner Laws of Societz, the entire thrust of the 
work is rooted in a relational perspective not only of tbe per-
son and society, but of all of reality. This relational per-
spective on reali t;y was :uost explicitly ex-pressed some ti ve 
years e1J.rlier by Sturzo in his analysis of Mario Sturzo' s theory 
of Neo-Synthetism. Although be is presenting Mario's own theory, 
the entire tone of the article :nakes it clear that Sturzo' s own 
position concurs with that of Mario. The processive relational 
character of reality provides the ontological foundation of 
Mario's theory of Neo-Synthetism. "The whole world is an im-
mense system o.f syntheses an.·1 relations. Every being is a syn-
thesis, and all beings are relational. 1126 Reality. then, pre-
sents itself as a kind of Hegelian °altogetherness of every-
thing." If all of reality is relational in character, then the 
relationship between indi vidua.ls cannot a.lone be the specifying 
element of human society as distinct from animal groupings. 
Sturzo saw early in the development of his sociological theory, 
that the specifying element in human society is its rationality. 
As he focused his attention more and more on the place and func-
tion of rationality within the complexity of society and its 
movements, Sturzo came to see that the determining factor of 
society is collective consciousness. The insight into the 
26
sturzo, "Theory of Knowledge in Neo-Synthetisc," Dublin 
R_eview, 18? (Oct., 1930), 290. 
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formation and function of collective consciousness became, in 
sturzo' s own words, ·••the theory on which I built thP- whole so-
cial edifice," "the key of my sociological theory."2? 
It is in his second work published during his exile, in 
1929, The International Community and the Ri5ht of War, that 
sturzo stresses tte relational character of man in explainir:g 
the person-society unity. The entire life of man is a life of 
social concretion, that is, concrete relations. Man exists 
socially by reason of the .tact he is relational. Human society 
is the expression of this human relativity--the interrelational-
co-exiatence of men. Therefore, society in general, apart from 
any particular form of societ;y, follows from the relational 
nature of man as "a necessary natural datum." "Every human 
society is nothing else than s relationship between individuals 
in some \vay grouped together. 11 (I.e. 23; of. 36. 45, 144) Every 
person develops as a radiating nucleus of relationships, acting 
and reacting with other nucleated networks, "so that there comes 
to be g continual multiplication of each in others and of 
others in each." (I.e. 45) Each nucleated network o.f relation-
ships radiates a two-fold motion that is at one and the same 
time ce11tripetal and centrif'ug:il. Tbis reciprocating, rela-
tional activity arises from the two-fold di~ensionality of the 
person, his ''individuality" and "sociality." Both of these 
dimensions are dynamic tendencies, each of which is reciprocally 
established through the '1ynamism of the other and both together 
27 Sturzo, "Some Notes on the Problem of Education," Thou5ht, 
22 (March, 1947), 123; cf. M. l?. 
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have as their end-in-view the achievement, expansion and perfec-
tion of the person. 
The reciprocal relationship between these two factors con-
stitutes what Sturzo views as the intrinsic law of the genesis 
and development of both the individual person and society: "The 
more individuals increase in conscious personality, the fuller 
the development of their associative qualities and forces; the 
fuller the development of such associative forces, the more the 
individuals develop and deepen the elements of their personal-
ity." (I.C. 45; cf. 49-50) The depth and autonomy of the person 
is acquired in proportion to the extent that the person extends 
himself in relation to others. In the development of the asso-
ciative aspects of the person, they become externalized in the 
form of particular societies. "Thus by continual action and 
reaction society comes to be individualized in types, institu-
tions, moral bodies, and the individual to be socialized in the 
institutions circumscribing his life." (I.e. 45) As the dimen-
sion of sociality becomes externalized in organized society, 
the feedback from the process itself as well as from the society 
formed thereby deepens the individuating elements of the person. 
This reciprocating, intrinsic law of "individuality-sociality" 
"is always in force and functions according to the stage of 
development attained by the individual and social factors." (I.e. 
50) 
This relational perspective of Sturzo as presented in ~ 
International Community and the Right of War contains within 
itself several fundamental ideas that led Sturzo to see that 
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the primary datum in the concretization of sociality which effec-
tuates the unity between the person and society is individual-
social consciousness. First, he saw that society evolves in 
conjunction with the development of the individual conscious-
ness. Secondly, he saw that the relational existence of man is 
primarily rational and communicative, and not merely physical 
90 that the specifying element in human society is its ration-
ality. Thirdly, he saw that the whole social process is not a 
dialectic of blind, extra-human forces, such as physical or 
historical conditioning, without outcome, but is rational and 
tinalistic. And it is precisely in focusing his attention on 
these factors in an attempt to coordinate and determine their 
role within the matrix of the entire socio-historical process 
that led 3turzo to recognize that collective consciousness was 
the key to the problem of the nature of the union between the 
individual person and society. (M. 17-19; of. I.C. 55, 36, 49-
50) The term "collective consciousness"28 is a comprehensive 
formula to indicate the consciousness of each of us which is 
reflected in the consciousness of others in the mutual process 
or determining and realizing a common end. (M. 19) 
The unity between the individual person and society is 
established in the process called by Sturzo the concretization 
of sociality. Sturzo also calls this process "the concretization 
28In addition to the term "collective" consciousness, Sturzo 
also uses the terms "individual-social,n "inter-individual," 
"group," "national," "social," or "historical" consciousness--
all referring to the same reality, but stressing different as-
pects of it .,according to the various shades of language." 
Ct. I.L. 4; M. 19, 91. 
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society." The .first phrase refers to an analysis of the 
process in terms of.the individual person, the second looks at 
it from the viewpoint of society. Sociality is the ability of 
the person to generate and support social forms. (I.C. 48) 
The specific, definitive and original principle of sociality is 
consciousness. (M. 97) Within the development of conscious 
activity, there are two interdependent processes that consti-
tute consciousness and thereby both the person and society: the 
processes of projection and internalization. Sturzo does not 
actually use the term "internalization," but rather uses the 
terminology of the ''deepening of consciousness,'' or the "deep-
ening of personality." The social dimension of this 0 deepening 
of consciousness 11 is the synthesizing of society into the indi-
vidual person. I have used the generally accepted term 11 inter-
nalization 11 to encompass every aspect of what Sturzo calls the 
"deepening of consciousness." These two processes correspond 
to the dimensions of extension and depth of the person that we 
referred to previously in this chapter in discussing the person 
as open-ended. For the person confronts infinity whether he 
turns toward the bottomless vortex of his own be-ing or the 
limitless reaches of reality. Internalization is the process 
ot receiving and assimilating socio-historical facts and values. 
or any aspect of reality that constitutes the human and natural 
world, in such a way that they become part and parcel of his 
own becoming as realities which he has made his own. (I.L. 300-
301) 
Internalization as a process of receiving and assimilation 
conveys the connotation of being a passive process on the part 
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ot the person, while the projection of consciousness denotes a 
dynamic activity. ·In actual fact both reveal the person as an 
active and dynamic center. This is indicated in regard to in-
ternalization by the fact that no social value or pattern of 
social conduct, for example, can simply and completely be im-
posed froo without by any form of coercion. The most that can 
be produced by !actors of coercion, whether they are legal or 
illegal, is external conformity, unless these factors are not 
imposed but arise from within the spirit animating the social 
life. And mere conformity is recognized as not being able to 
sustain social life since it neither is an expression of the 
animating forces of social life in the individual person nor 
does it reinforce these forces. To internalize a social value, 
then, is not a passive receptivity or undergoing of exerted 
influences, but is to actively assimilate it whereby it in turn 
becomes an active and effective principle of activity. For 
example, a person becomes ''just 11 and is recognized as such by 
others only when he acts justly, not by reason of any factors 
external to him, but by an inward movement of his own personality. 
Correlative to internalization is the projection of con-
sciousness. It is precisely in this projection of consciousness 
that i3turzo locates the concrete sociality of the individual 
person. (I.L. 5) This projection or consciousness not only 
gives rise to the structural formation of society which becomes 
individuated into specific social forms, but it is also a bio-
physical, psychological, Bthical, and socio-historical datum 
"without which the human individual is inconceivable." (I.L. 5) 
This concept of projection recurs repeatedly throughout Sturzo's 
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writings and it is in terms of this notion that he most frequently 
explains the formation and nature of society. But in most pas-
sages other than the above one where he locates the principle 
of the concretization in consciousness, Sturzo relates the 
notion of projection not to consciousness, but to the entire 
person, and especially the person in his activities. Hera are 
some representative passages: 
The whole of society is the projection of individuals 
in their relationships and inter-activity. (T.L. 4) 
But there is no activity, not even thought, which does 
not project us into society; which is not effectively 
social. (T.L. 178) 
Society is nothing but the projection of single acti-
vities in the interweaving of all activities. (T.L. 186) 
Society is essentially the coexistence of individuals 
and the projection of human personality. (I.L. 299) 
The social instinct, that projection of the ego into 
an environment necessary for action •••• (I.L. 311) 
Society is only the simultaneous and progressive projec-
tion of the activity of man's personality concretized 
in the multiplicity of individuals who, either nec~~­
sarily or voluntarily, cooperate among themselves.~ 
The significance of these passages lies not only in what 
they reveal about Sturzo's underst~nding of the unity between 
society and the individual person in terms of his key concept 
of projection, but more importantly they give a clue to his 
understanding of consciousness and its relation to both the 
person in his activity and to human activity itself. Since 
the eophasis in these passages is on activity, they may seem 
to diminish the importance of consciousness within Sturzo'a 
29sturzo, "The Philosophic Background of Christian Demo-
cracy, u pp. 9-10. 
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system. Actually, the contrary is true. To determine this 
requires a careful analysis of what Sturzo understands by con-
sciousness. As mentioned above, these passages give some indi-
cation of this. Closely centered around the one process of pro-
jection we find consciousness, the person and activity. Our 
task is to determine their precise relationship; and in doing 
60 , we should be able to arrive at a clearer understanding of 
all three. 
we have seen that c ::;1:sciousness is the principle of social-
ity and that the projection or consciousness is the concreti-
zation of sociality within each individual person. This process 
as simultaneous and continuous among a number of persons brings 
about the realization, or fornation, of a particular society. 
Yet, Sturzo also views society as the projection of the entire 
person and of the activities of the person. This does not mean 
that Sturzo identifies the person with consciousness; but he 
does hold that the individual is a person through consciousness. 
(I.L. 300-301) Although Sturzo limits the notion of conscious-
ness to the human level, and for this reason denies that any 
animal grouping is a society, (cf. M. 21-22) he does not set up 
a dichotomy between consciousness and the rest of reality. 
Rather, he subscribes to Blondel's theory of "Cosmic Thought" 
and its evolution through the levels of reality to reach its 
apex in conscious thought. He thus extends the roots of con-
sciousness back into the whole of reality. There is "a process 
of thought intrinsic to reality, leading to the flowering of 
conscious thought as active intelligence, for which unconscious 
creation is the preparation, the conditioning environment and 
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means of development." (T.L. l?4)30 
Consciousness involves much more for Sturzo than a simple 
"psychic awareness." Nor is it limited to thought. In fact. 
it is a single synthetic process that embraces within itself 
the cognitive and volitional. the theoretical and practical 
dimensions of human activity. I use the term "dimensions" to 
indicate the indivisible unity of these aspects ot human acti-
vity. This does not mean to imply that these are not able to 
be distinguished theoretically. But it does mean that they are 
not separable within the synthesis of conscious activity. In 
trying to grapple with the reality of consciousness, we encounter 
a mysterious vortical process of synthesis which surpasses 
everything that it unites. Some of the phrases Sturzo uses to 
describe consciousness are: "the intelligence and will united 
together in an operative synthesis directed to action"; "the 
synthetic function of the internal faculties of man"; "knowledge 
of that which one desires to obtain and the relative determina-
tion to obtain it, foI"'iliing the synthesis which precedes the 
personal human act." (C. & P. 13; l?; 22-23; 9; ct. also M. 96) 
As will become clear in determining the nature of the inward 
synthesis of consciousness, the term "precedes" must not be 
understood in a temporal sense, but within the order of exis-
tential causality. The inward synthesis of consciousness sus-
tains the human act and in sustaining it is itself constituted 
as such. The dynamism of consciousness, then, extends beyond 
303ee also, "!1aurice Blondel 1 s La Pens~e: the Philosophy 
of 'L'elan spiritual,'" pp. 344-45; T.L. 96, 294; I.L. xxi. 
synthesizing of the cognitive and volitional dimensions of 
the person to the re.alization of their object through action. 
We find here, then, within a synthesizing process the unity or 
thought, "which is the rationality of action,'' action, "which 
is the realization of thought," and consciousness, "taken as 
the presence of rationality and activity to themselves." (I.L. 
x:xix) .Each of these calls for fuller elaboration in order to 
better understand the unity they achieve within Sturzo•s theory, 
although this very unity renders an analysis of each separately 
extremely difficult. 
In accord with his entire methodological procedure, Sturzo 
approaches knowledge as it functions within the concrete dialec-
tic of the human process. To do otherwise, that is, to approach 
it as an abstract problem of an analytic situation is contra-
dicted by the human experiential process. 0 which is not separa-
tive or analytic, but unitive and synthetic."3l It is in rela-
tion to the totality of human experience that Sturzo makes an 
analysis of knowledge. "In the concrete, there is never any 
knowledge of reality which does not, at the same time, imply the 
coexistence of other beings which, taken together with the 
knowing subject, can be considered as a totality." (S.P. 2?; cf. 
T.L. 214) Encompassing every particular act or knowledge there 
is an implicit cognitive situation that includes within it an 
indefinite totality which embraces both the knower and object 
and at the same time transcends them. Sturzo goes on to make 
a careful analysis of this totality and its relation to knowledge. 
31sturzo, "Theory of Knowledge in Neo-Synthetism,n p. 280. 
~uffices for our immediate purposes, now, to merely 49 call 
attention to the totality within which knowledge functions, 
because in view of this totality we are Qrima facie confronted 
with the incompleteness of any particular act of knowledge and 
thereby at the same time its processual character through its 
inherent dynamism toward further completion. 
Within this processual prospective, Sturzo always keeps 
in the forefront of his theory the proposition stressed so much 
by st. Thomas Aquinas--but how much more it needs to be con-
stantly reiteratedt--that it is the entire man who knows and 
not his faculties. And man always acts within a unitive and 
synthetic process. It is out of and within this synthetic 
process that knowledge arises and functions. "The basis of 
cognition, indeed, is an experience simultaneously sensitive 
and classificatory, affective and volitional, theoretical and 
practical. 11 32 But as rooted within and part of a synthetic 
process, the knowledge process itself must be synthetic. Thus, 
for example, in the classical distinction between the sensitive 
and intellectual process, th~re are not two processes with each 
taking place by means of a separate faculty, which are juxta-
posed and co-ordinated by the knower, but rather there is the 
synthesis of two tendencies or powers in a single synthetic 
process. 
This synthetic proce,ss embraces within itself not only the 
cognitive powers o.f man, but al so the will. The will syntheti-
cally enters into the cognitive functions just as the cognitive 
32 ~-' p. 288. 
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powers synthetically enter into the function of willing. There 
is never a purely intellectual act unassociated with an act of 
the will, or vice versa. 
Even the coldest and most arid speculation is in 
itself an act of will, containing affective values 
whether direct or indirect. we call it an intellective 
act because it is mainly theoretical, just as we call 
a primarily practical act an act of the will.33 
Thus, there is no such phenomenon as pure speculation apart from 
practical overtones, just as there is no practical activity 
that is completely devoid. of theory. One or the other prevails 
in a single synthetic process according to the direction given 
to his activity by the individual person. This synthesis of 
the internal powers of man has its ontological basis in the 
seamless integrity of the liff~ of the human spirit in which 
body and soul are joined through a mysterious synthetic union. 
lt is the entire human person that is the single multi-dimen-
sional principle cf activity by means of various capacities 
which are operative, not as juxtaposed or concomitant, but as 
inwardly synthetic within consciousness. As multidimensional 
its powers are distinguishable theoretically, but not in tact. 
They achieve reality only in the monolithic integrity of the 
life of human person.34 
It follows from this synthetic view of knowledge in which 
the cognitive faculties are united together with the w:11 in 
the operative synthesis of consciousness that knowledge is not, 
for Sturzo, a purely representational activity in which the 
33Ibid., P• 28?; S.P. 27. 
-
34Ibid., PP• 286 and 288. 
-
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person reproduces or a.ssimilates in himself tbe ideali ty of the 
external world. The knowing process comes to achieve its full 
reality in fact only as joined to, and completed by, willing 
and action. 
Those who make of knowledge a purely representational 
faculty, those who translate it into an existential judgment, without cleaving heat or without repulsion, 
abstract from reality, ignoring the finalistic char-
acter of knowledge, leaving out of count the movement 
of sympathy towards truth, of recoil from error as 
such, and the desire to seek that grain of truth that 
every error contains. (T.L. 86; cf. I.L •. xxix; S.P. 33) 
Knowledge, just as sociality, is an ontological structure 
of the person because it, too, is an activity through which he 
comes to realize his own being as a person which is constituted 
as a radiating and receptive principle of presence. For the 
mode of being proper to the person as such is that of presence. 
Presence is both manifested in and generated by the recipro-
cally interdependent activities of knowing and loving. These 
activities find their principle and term in the presence of the 
person because presence is most intimately and constitutively 
characterized by an ontological "openness" toward all of reality. 
This openness consists in more than an active "facing outward 0 
which, in opening out onto the rest or reality, at the same time 
is filled by the radiating activity emitted by that reality. 
In addition to this dimension of openness, presence is also 
marked by another dimension that opens onto itself in an imme-
diacy that transcends all mediation. It is this that ontologi-
cally constitutes the person as such in its spirituality and 
subjectivity. 
Both knowledge and love arise out of, generate and terminate 
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in thiS openness of presence because on the ontological level 
they are equivalents. All three encompass the totality of 
personal reality. Within the operative process of human acti-
vity knowledge and love are mutually dependent activities • 
.Each is the principle and condition of the other because each 
provides the openness of being that makes the other possible. 
In a sentence that is pregnant with meaning, Sturzo states that 
"loves makes reality an experience." (T.L. 99) Reality becomes 
an experience for us--it takes on meaning--as we open ourselves 
up to it. And it is love that gives us that receptivity and 
transparency, as it were, of being whereby we are able to ac-
tively assimilate--actively in the sense of "reaching out" and 
"making our own"--the reality that confronts us. That movement 
of being that allows for the understanding embrace of something 
is precisely the stirring of love. And in so moving love itself 
is deepened and expanded. 
The development of the altruistic tendencies, by moder-
ating innate egoism, awakens that understanding sympathy 
which is fundamental for a full knowledge or the world 
in which we live •••• It is fundamental in any sane theory 
of knowledge that we succeed in knowing only what we 
love.35 
"The deeper the knowledge, the stronger the love; the keener the 
love, the ~ore intimate and close-cleaving the knowledge.rt (T.L. 
86) Only to the exterit that one "opens up" through knowledge 
and love is he able to love and know. Each, and both together, 
provide for an ontological metamorphasis--as radical as that in 
the biological transformation from caterpillar to butterfly--
35sturzo, ''Some Notes on the Problem of Education," p. 110. 
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whereby the individual is able to "step outside 11 of the indur-
ated and closed larva of egoism, and in so "stepping out" to 
achieve his personal being. For egoism, as a constricting 
movement turned exclusively inward, is, from an ontological 
viewpoint, pure negation because it is the alienation of the 
person from himself. (I.L. 306) 
Since the mode of being of the person is that of presence, 
knowledge, love and life are convertible terms on the personal 
level. "Knowledge is experience, it is life, it is love. We 
may invert the terms: love is knowledge and it is lite; life is 
knowledge and love." (T.L. 87) Thus, knowledge, for Sturzo, in 
its full significance, is not mere awareness nor a representa-
tional activity. Any type of "spectator" theory of knowledge 
is completely alien to the entire orientation and spirit of 
his thought. Knowledge is a generative and creative process 
of the person, and together with him, his world, Knowledge is 
not a passive mirroring of the world, nor is it an adjustment, 
passive or even active, to the world. Rather, as ineffably 
joined with the will in the inward synthesis of consciousness, 
it is the active and creative manipulation of reality which man 
transforms, and in transforming discovers both himself and his 
world. (I.L. xix, 220)36 
The historical source for Sturzo's view of the active and 
creative character of knowledge is the theory of Giambattista 
Vico, "who best saw the intimate relationship between doing and 
knowing; who threw into relief the value of thought as lived in 
36cr. also "Historicist Sociology," p. 334. 
events." (T.L. 222) Vico's doctrine on the unity of thought 
and action is epitomized in his famous dictum that man only 
knows what he makes. 3? Thia dictum is rooted and takes its 
tundamental meaning from Vico's entire theory of man. But for 
our purposes here it is sufficient to note that aspect of it 
that is operative within Sturzo's own theory in terms of our 
present discussion on knowledge. This aspect is, for Sturzo, 
Vico's theory that 
••• man does not acquire knowledge through 'simple and 
clear ideas• ••• but by becoming himself in a manner the 
cause of the fact into which the true is convertible • 
••• Man really knows what he makes (which is history) 
because he makes it. Man knows nature through what 
he is able to make or recreate of nature by his exper-
ience and activity. (C. & S. 354; cf. T.L. 8?) 
The difference between this type of theory of knowledge 
and any kind of "spectator" theory is equivalent to the distance 
between simply observing the moon. or actually going to the 
moon and bringing it in its totality within the human sphere. 
In the first instance, the moon is "known" only'!f'rom afar" and 
in an external and superficial manner as an object "out there." 
But man's knowledge in the full sense of the word only occurs 
in the second instance in which he "makes" the moon "his own" 
and masters it by his activity. To speak of' knowledge ''in the 
full sense of the word" is to indicate that Vico•s, and Stur-
zo's, theory does not mean there is not knowledge in the first 
instance. This relates to a distinction Vioo makes in his theory 
between "coscienza" and "scienza."38 The distinction involved 
37vico, De Italorum Sapientia (Bari: Laterza e Pigli, 
1914), pp. 134-35; fhe New Science, pars. 364-66. 
38Vico, De Italorum Sapientia, P• 138. 
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here is that between a mere awareness of something and a genu-
ine understanding of it. It is the distinction between ''look-
ing at'' the moon and "understanding" it. In this latter instance, 
the moon is not simply, nor even primarily, an object "out 
there" to be looked at, observed and studied; it is rather "an 
element of human conquest and creativity," as Vico would put it, 
or "a conditioning of the creative energy of man 11 as Sturzo 
would view it. (C. & s. 354) Genuine understanding calls for 
direct participation and total involvement on the part or the 
knower. 
It must be noted that the term "makes'' as it is used in 
Vico's dictum, and as correctly interpreted by Sturzo, is not 
used in the same sense as a machine "making'' a product as some-
thing completely distinct from the movement of the machine and 
with the product totally other than the machine. The term has 
reference to an activity such as tha.t o.f an artist in which the 
tinished work of art contains within itself and thereby expres-
ses the creative activity that effectuated it. Thus, the rela-
tionship between the artist and his work of art is not one of 
alienation and complete otherness, but rather one of discovery 
and recognition precisely because it is the expression of his 
own spirit as the immanent principle of it. It is used in the 
sense in which man "makes 0 history. The full significance of 
this will be brought out in the exposition of Sturzo's theory 
of history. 
Although Sturzo's perspective on the participatory and 
creative nature of knowledge has its direct historical source 
~i~o's theory, the historical roots or this view extend~s 
, 
far back as the Hebrews of Biblical times.39 In his epistle to 
the Philippians St. Paul says of Christ, "I want to know him 
in the power of resurrection and to share his sufferings and 
even his death, in the hope of attaining resurrection from the 
dead. 1140 The Hebrew idea of "to know" is not the reception or 
intellectual information but to accept vital participation; 
the Hebrew "knows" his wife and a baby, not an idea, results. 
To know Christ, then, is, for St. Paul, to accept vital parti-
cipation in Him and to experience in oneself the power of the 
transformation. According to the Hebraic mentality truth is 
something which is lived. As Sturzo says, it is a matter of 
experience and not only of pure speculation. Man knows God 
"insofar as he can succeed in experiencing the Godhead in him-
self." Knowledge, "insofar as it is real and full knowledge, 
is undoubtedly love. To know God is equivalent to establish-
ing a relationship with Him •••• " (T.L. 8?, 86) St. John urges 
us to 11live the Truth" because it belongs to the existential 
experience of Christian living. For the Hebrews as it is for 
Sturzo, loving and knowing are correlatives. 
It was to communicate their love of Truth (to the Semi-
tic mind, loving and knowing are correlatives) that 
the inspired writers undertook their task. Their pri-
mary purpose was not the propagation of truths, the 
composition of a body of doctrines, but the attraction 
and conversion of men by exhortation, consolation, 
reprimand, and encouragement, so that they might 
39
ciaude Tresmontant, A Study of Hebrew Tho~ht, trans. by 
Michael Francis Gibson (New York: nesclee Oo., l o). 
40 Philippians, 3:10-11. 
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'live the Truth. ' 41 
As sturzo expresses lt, "the knowledge of truth is a cleaving 
of the will, an operative act," (T.L. 89) because truth must 
be loved or it loses, for us, the character of truth. There-
fore, "the fixed point of departure (for education) is the 
search for and adhesion to truth as life and truth as good."42 
Thus any purely intellectualist approach to truth as implying 
a separation from tta cleaving of the will," can only result in 
the evasion of the truth sought, because, as sought without the 
sense of love, it can only continually recede into nothingness 
before the act that seeks it, much like vapor on a hot summer 
day. 
We have seen that the historical origin of Sturzo's per-
spective on the nature of knowledge is Vico's theory, but it 
bas its theoretical and ideal basis within Sturzo•s system in 
his concept of rationality, because it is rationality that is 
the principle of knowledge. But it is much more than this. 
Sturzo states that his concept of consciousness is the key to 
bis sociological theory. This is true, yet, it is equally accu-
rate to state that the concept of consciousness is the lock 
to his theory and his notion of rationality is the key that 
opens this lock. In many respects it is just as fundamental 
to his theory aa the notion of consciousness. Sturzo, in fact, 
sometimes tends to identify consciousness with rationality (T.L. 
41n. M. Stanley, ''The Concept of Biblical Inspiration," 
~oceedin~s of the Catholic Theological Society of America, 58, p. 6. 
42 Sturzo, "Some Notes on the Problem of Education," p. 118. 
217; I.C. 145). Nevertheless, within his overall theory, there 
18 a theoretical distinction between them. Consciousness is 
more basic and extensive in that rationality is an aspect 2!,. 
consciousness, but it is that determining factor which makes it 
to be what it is--a human consciousness. In fact, it is so 
intimate to the nature of consciousness that to lack rationality 
18 to lack consciousness. Therefore, there can only be human 
consciousness because it is rationality that constitutes man 
as a man. (I.L. 11) The dominating motif of Sturzo's social 
theory, especially as elaborated in the Inner Laws of Society, 
is the function of rationality in the concretization of social-
ity in the historical actuation of the social forms and in the 
formation and dynamism of the social synthesis. (M. 79) 
A concept as pervasive and fundamental as that of rational-
ity calls for a careful analysis in o~der to pinpoint exactly 
what Sturzo means by it. Unfortunately, Sturzo does as most 
major thinkers do with the concepts that are central to their 
thought: He uses the term "rationality" with a number of differ-
ent meanings. The uses may in no way be contradictory to one 
another, but that makes them no less different. The basic dif-
ferences in the meaning of the term can be reduced to four: 
Jirst, a concrete principle of knowledge and activity within the 
individual person (I.L. xxiii and 11); second, the ontological 
character of reality as intelligible (I.L. xxix); third, thought 
itself inasmuch as it is systematic (I.L. xxvii); fourth, the 
ideal order transcending the defects and imperfections o! pre-
sent reality (I.L. 210). All of these uses of the term 
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"rationality" find their logical, ideal and historical locus 
in the concrete nature of the human person. The full signifi-
cance of these various meanings of rationality for Sturzo can 
be elaborated only with the entire exposition of his social 
theory, especially as it applies to the dynamism of the social 
process. Within the context of the present discussion on the 
unity of thought, action and consciousness, the first, and 
primary meaning of rationality as 1an essential principle indi-
vidualized in each man' is what concerns us here. 
Sturzo emphasizes that rationality is not a generic and 
abstract element, but rather is rra concrete factor in the indi-
vidual, in whom this light shines making him what he truly is, 
man." (I.L. 11) Within rationality, then, we touch the very 
nerve center of the person. It is this that expresses, in the 
deepest .sense, the human spirit. The focal point of man's 
nature, then, is his spirit, and the attainment of rationality 
is the movement over materiality, which encompasses the physical 
aspects of man*s nature, toward its spiritualization. The 
prepositions "over" and "toward" must be stressed. In emphasiz-
ing rationality. Sturzo makes it quite clear that he is not 
implying a. movement awa;y froT11 sense reality in the sense of 
evading it, but rather a transformation of it by ordering it 
toward a higher finalism. In this process, the physical dioen-
aions of man's life find their fulfillment and completion at 
the same time they are raised to a higher level and his spiri-
tual dimensions are deepened and enriched. (I.L. 34-36; T.L. 83) 
The form that this concrete factor takes within the indi-
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vidual is that of' "both an intellective-discursive faculty and 
a projection brin.girig about the social actiV'ity of men." {f"t. 80) 
These words o.f Sturzo are of the utmost importance for under-
standing not only his concept of rationality, but the entire 
thrust o! his socio-personalism. We are uncovering here the 
nerve center of his entire theory. We must therefore backtrack 
over the trail we have traveled to be sure we bring into sharp 
focus this nerve center. 
The overall context of our :pres13nt exposition is the con-
cretization of sociality. The principle or this process is 
consciousness. Consciousness is achieved and consists in the 
activities o.f internalization and projection, the latter of 
which is the concretization of sociality. But Stur.zo's explana-
tion of t11is process of proj':fction made it quite clear that it 
involved not just consciousness, bu.t the entire person in his 
activity. This called, then, for an investigation into what 
Sturzo • s concept or consciousness involved. '.../i thin the trans-
parent immediacy of consciousness we round the synthesizing 
unity of thought and action. The analysis of thought led us 
to its principle, the faculty of rationality. \Jith rational-
ity we hav~ come full circle back to the activity of projection. 
It is extremely 1illportant, then, to determine exactly the rela-
tionship between rationality and projection. In doing this, 
we will not only reveal the ultimate principle of projection 
and the :aature of rationality, bllt also the extent to which 
thought and action are united in tho theory of Sturzo and the 
ultimate basis for this unity. 
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The first fact to note is that the process of projection 
1s not an activity that follows from the activity of rational-
ity such as a wake following from the movement of a ship; nor 
15 it concomitant with the activity of rationality. Rather, 
it is a process that is ontologically constitutive of ration-
ality itself. Projection in the form of activity is the reali-
zation of rationality itself. Rationality as a concrete and 
essential factor of the individual is not "something that is 
there" antecedent to the progress of projection itself. It 
consists precisely and wholly in the process of expression and 
completion. Human action, and insofar as it is human, expresses 
and completes rationality in its ''inner exigencies." Sturzo 
states that ''rationality, by its inner necessity for expression 
and fulfillment, urges to an action that will surmount the con-
ditioning limits." (I.L. 11) With the phrase "inner necessityu 
Sturzo is not indicating the presence of a deterministic prin-
ciple a.t the core of rationalit.y. This would be contradictory 
since rationality is the principle and ground of freedom for 
Sturzo. Rather, he is giving expression to the inherently dy-
namic, processual character of rationality by pointing up "the 
nature of the rational in the concrete as something that cannot 
remain potential, but must find fulfillment in a continuous 
succession of voluntary acts." (I.L. 11) We, therefore, find 
rationality realizing itsel.f only in a process of projection 
which consists in "a continuous succession of voluntary acts.'' 
In order to delineate the nature of this process, we should 
set it within the concrete context of its occurrence--the human 
process. 
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The human process is, for Sturzo. "an activity essentially 
of mind and will, in the psycho-physical complexus of man's 
t ft axis ence. {I .L. xxi) The immanent principle of this process 
is rationality "as an essential principle individualized in 
each man, so that each man's own experience and personal acti-
vity does not pass to others except by way of knowledge and 
effects." Then Sturzo goes on to state that "knowledge and 
purpose are features of human rationality but it is through 
rationality that unification comes." (I.L. xxiii) These pas-
sages, all within the context of a single discussion, reveal 
the terminological difficulties in.a close textual analysis of 
sturzo's thought, because we have placed together so many cul-
turally freighted words--mind, will, knowledge, purpose. ration-
ality--without a clarification as to their precise meaning or 
relationship. ~~at we are especially interested in here are 
the statements that ''knowledge and purpose are features of 
human rationality" and that rationality expresses itself by 
means of "knowledge and effects." From them we see that ration-
ality embraces within itself the entire.rational dimension of 
the person in his knowing and willing, as would be expected 
within the synthesizing perspective of Sturzo's integral real-
ism. It also follows from the inherent dynamism 0£ rationality 
toward expression and completion. Rationality expresses itself 
through "knowledge and effects.'' 'What Sturzo is indicating 
by these terms is the distinction between knowledge and other 
kinds of human activity, which could all be subsumed under the 
one term of "action." Sturzo uses the term "action," or 
"effects" as in the above sentence, with the realization that 
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knowledge itself is action. We have already seen Sturzo's 
-n.ew of knowledge as ·an ontological structure of the person 
iS a creative-participatory activity in which the person achieves 
that presence which is comTiensurate with the person as such in 
hiS subjectivity. Doing or acting holds the same constitutive 
relationship to the person since it is doing that brings about 
the realization of knowledge. The principle of this action is 
the will, in the same sense in which rationality is the princi-
ple of knowledge. But as doing is itself the realization of 
knowledge, the will is itself identical with that inner urge of 
rationality toward realization through action. It is the active 
sustaining principle of rationality itself. It is for this 
reason that Sturzo can say that knowledge and purpose, that 
is to say, willing, are "features" or dimensions of rationality. 
It must be reiterated here, in accord with Sturzo's inte-
gral realism, that as dimensions of rationality they are inse-
parable aspects of rationality and not separable elements in 
a complex. In separation from one another they are abstractions. 
The only distinction between them is formal. They are dimensions 
or rationality only in their mutual relation through rational-
ity, which in turn finds reality through its constitutive acti-
vities of knowing and willing. "Human process is fundamentally 
the continuous striving towards the integral and most intimate 
possession of rationality; and towards the transformation of 
every element external to us into the reason of our being and 
or our activity, by means of knowledge and purpose." (I.L. xxiv) 
We thus discover that the mutuality of thought and action and 
their basic unity is ontologically rooted within the constitu-
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tive activity of the. person which has rationality as its prin-
ciple and term. 
we have already encountered the inward synthesis of the 
cognitive and volitional faculties of man in treating of con-
sciousness, knowledge, and here again, with rationality, We 
must here examine the actual processes of thought and action 
in their mutuality so that this mutuality of thought and action 
in the realization of rationality will be specified more com-
pletely. In our analysis of knowledge we have seen that it 
achieves reality in fact only through willing and action. In 
accord with the Vichian inspiration of his thought, Sturzo holds 
that reality reveals itself to us not through mere speculation, 
but ttgradually as the human will and action realize, in fact, 
the truths which are known." (S.P. 40) The metaphysical basis 
for this is the corporeal nature of the external world. In or-
der to be known it must be spiritualized, and since the knowing 
process is itself wholly immanent, material reality must be 
spiritualized as it is touched and transformed through human, 
that is rational, activity. In this one and the same process, 
rationality in the mutuality of knowledge and action achieves 
reality and reality becomes rational. 
All things touched by man bear his hallmark; the worked 
stones, like the tilled fields, the printed papers, 
like the quarries and mines, all speak of this living 
flame that is human rationality, wherever the foot of 
man has rested• transforming the outer world and making 
it his own. (I.L. 14) 
As transformed material reality embodies rationality as an 
immanent principle. But it is an immanence that is only proces-
~ly relational and transitory because the reality transformed 
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t;brough rationality "no longer contains the value of the ration-
ality communicated to it unless it is renewed from that undying 
fount of vital reality that is man." (I.L. 14-5) 
As we penetrated deeper into the analysis of knowledge, we 
discovered the ultimate basis for its realization in action 
lay in the very nature of its principle, rationality. There-
fore, sturzo rightly emphasizes that "there is no science however 
speculative--not even metaphysics, mathematics, or astronomy--
which is not ordered to practical ends, whether individual or 
general, subjective or objective." (S.P. 27) This follows from 
the nature of rationality, so that "knowledge of truth is never 
purely speculative because it does not reach, as such, the inner 
finality of ~an, who is impelled by nature to transform the 
tru-th into living reality as good and love." (S.P. 69) 
Since knowledge, as a dimension of rationality, is insepa-
rable from action, ideas or theories, as the results of know-
ledge, are not mere objects of contemplation, but rather con-
tain within themselves the call to action whereby they, and 
thereby rationality, are realized in fact. They are a call to 
action because it is the idea that moves the will toward action. 
Neither can be taken in abstraction from the other since the 
reality of the idea is determined by the extent to which it 
sustains the will in action. 
In the mutuality of thought and action within the structure 
of rationality, this mutuality must also be viewed from the 
side of action itself, as theoretically distinguished from the 
specific activity of knowledge, so that the fullness of the 
reciprocal relationship and unity may be validated. There are 
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principles of human activity: the interior principle of 
rationality which is both the efficient and final principle of 
action, and the principle of conditioning, which may be inter-
ior, such as ignorance or prejudice, or exterior, such as phy-
sical or historico-social conditioning. It is conditioning 
tbat provides the material ror •ction and as such is an abso-
lute necessity for action, and therefore tor man himself if he 
is to live and work. Sturzo emphasizes the ambivalent character 
of conditioning in that it must not be considered just as a 
bond, restriction, obstacle, or a limiting of human action, but 
conditioning also functions as an urge and stimulus to action 
as something to be surmounted, dominated and transformed. Con-
ditioning may be a positive or negative factor to action accor-
ding to the individual and to the circumstances. Taken in its 
totality, as internal and external, as physical and historico-
eocial, conditioning forms a kind of co-existential solidarity 
with the individual. Whatever the force exerted by condition-
ing an action it is never complete because at the very heart of 
action as human stands freedom--always freedom as condition to 
be sure, but never entirely absent so long as it is genuinely 
human action. Since conditioning factors are co-existential 
with the individual, "freedom cannot be conceived of as an 
unconditioned state or as a process towards an unconditioned 
state." (I.L. 162) The inner freedom of human action remains 
untouched by conditioning because the ultimate, immanent prin-
ciple of action remains rationality and free will "is connatural 
to any essence as spiritual, intellectual beings." (T.L. 68) 
-----------------------------
.i 
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In fact, it can be said without !ear of contradiction that 
freedom of the ~vill follows from the inner necessity of ration-
ality for expression and completion. We have already seen that 
due to this inner necessity rationality "urges to an action 
that will surmount the conditioning limits." Now the action 
that "will surmount the conditioning limits" is precisely "a 
continuous succession of voluntary acts." Sturzo emphasizes 
that this inner necessity of rationality cannot be separated 
trom the voluntary character of its acts of realization. The 
constitutive foro of rationality, then, is precisely that of 
treedom. It is freedom that defines rationality in its onto-
logical character. 
It is rationality that gives to man "the faculty of deter-
mining himself" (M. 16) and it is precisely in auto-initiative, 
in the auto-decision of our action, and in the power to attain 
dominion over oneself and over the situation conditioning the 
achieving of the autonomy of personality that free will mani-
fests itself. Since rationality is something to be attained, 
and in attaining exists, so too is its dimension of free will. 
Free will manifests itself in the striVing for self-detercina-
tion of the individual and it is in this striving that it con-
sists. "What shows free will is the attainment of self-mastery, 
in whatever circumstances we may find ourselves •••• Thus we come 
to a progressive liberation of ourselves, an achievement of 
freedom of will •••• 11 (T.L. 66-7) It is here in free will that 
is the locus for the originality, creativity and indeterminate-
ness--in the sense of open possibilities--of human experience. 
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..... within the laws and limits of his being and of the condi-
tioning factors about him, he (man) is not determined but self-
determining, and by this very fact may be considered a creator 
ot his own experience." (I.L. xix) Between freedom, then, as 
individual initiative, and conditioning there is a continuous 
interlinking and interaction. "The interweaving of initiative 
and conditioning factors makes up man's experience in his striv-
ing for any immediate goal." (T.L. 199; I.L. 11) But through 
the freedom of his activity--and the more so the more he is 
tree--man is so able to overcome the conditioning factors ot 
his existence that they 0 cease to be a bond and an obstacle and 
become a means and a coefficient of realization." (T.L. 198)43 
It must be stressed that it is only through his activity, as 
tree and conditioned, that man masters the conditioning forces 
ot the natural and socio-historical world and makes them his 
own and in this process his action becomes more free than condi-
tioned. Man is able to extend this process even to the depths 
of nature whereby through a creative transformation even the 
laws of nature become self-laws. 
The very laws of his being and the limits set by his 
psychophysical conditioning (the outer world and even 
the human body) become in man experiences of his own and 
phases of his own process. Thus the natural laws, 
objective though they are, become auto-laws, and psycho-
physical limitations become transformed into motives of 
human activity and experiences. (I.L. xix) 
Sturzo states that "in a philosophic analysis of human 
action we find· at the root the tendency of each man to make 
himself the center or his own inner and outer activity, to 
43Pollock, t•L•uomo nella societ~ e nella etoria, 11 p. 22. 
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expand, to realize himself and his own faculties, to seek within 
himself and outside for that which corresponds to his needs, 
hiS aspirations, his life." (T.L. 68) The efficient and final 
principle of this tendency is rationality. We are here touch-
ing on the entire thrust of Sturzo's social theory because 
rationality "as the moving force and finality of action, ex-
presses itself in truth and love, so that truth and love always 
remain the sole and perennial factors of individual and social 
perfection." (M. 80) The use of the term "finality" is highly 
significant because it denotes the always incomplete, or defi-
cient, expression of rationality. Human action never terminates 
in rationality as an end that can be grasped in its fullness, 
but only as an end-in-view. This important aspect of Sturzo's 
theory will be elaborated more fully in dealing with the dyna-
mism of the concretization of sociality. Also, the term "final-
ity" emphasizes that rationality as the final principle of ac-
tion is not distinct from the process achieving it. 
Although rationality in projecting itself is the principle 
of both knowledge and action, their unity, which constitutes 
rationality, is more complex than simply one of equilibrium. 
Rationality does not stand in exactly the same relation to ac-
tion that it does to knowledge. Sturzo provides us with the 
clue for this insight when he states that thought "is the ration-
ality of action" and action "is the realization of thought." 
(I.L. xxix) Rationality more immediately expresses itself in 
knowledge than in action, but action is no less commensurate 
with rationality and constitutive of it, as has already been 
noted. Rationality is the efficient principle of action through 
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)l:nowledge, whether this be in the form of ideas or ideals; and 
it is in action that knowledge, and thereby rationality, 
achieves the fullness of its reality. Hum.an action is such 
insofar as it is informed by rationality and thereby illumin-
ated by its inner light. Rationality in the form of knowledge 
is that in a human act which makes it a human a.ct and not sim-
ply blind activity. The common expression of "an enlightened 
act" for an act in which the light of rationality is especially 
intense reveals this fact. 
In order to further specify the relationship between know-
ledge and action, the concept of action must be further delin-
eated, not in its logical form, but in the form of its actuality. 
One aspect of its actuality has already been determined--know-
ledge. It is in this that its rationality consists. But action 
bas been defined as the realization of thought. All the other 
aspects of action in which knowledge is concretized or exter-
nalized can be subsumed under the one term of 0 doing." Action, 
then, as the realization of thought, consists in the unity of 
knowledge and doing. The unity of these two aspects of action 
cannot be over-emphasized. They are abstractions in separation 
from one another. They must be viewed as inseparable within 
the structure of action as action and knowledge are within the 
structure of rationality. It may appear that action can be 
broken down into two further activities, the one subjective, 
knowledge, and the other objective, doing. As so analyzed they 
are abstractions. "The analytic forms of speech are always 
incomplete; they elucidate only insofar as they presuppose or 
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prepare the synthesis." (T.L. 43) Also, these distinctions, 
subjective and objective, are operative only from the stand-
point of reflection, not of action. And reflection is secondary 
to and derivative of action. In addition to these objections, 
and more basic to them, is the fact that as aspects of a single 
process, their reality consists only in their mutual relation 
within the process. Knowledge achieves the fullness of its 
reality only through the doing of action and the reality of 
doing is the externalization and realization of knowledge. It 
is well to recall here that when we say that knowledge achieves 
th;e fullness of its reality only through doing, the idea, for 
sturzo, contains within itself the power for action, or, more 
specifically, doing is the expression of the inner necessity of 
rationality for completion. As Sturzo puts it, one cannot ndis-
tinguish the idea from its realization, but every realization 
contains the idea and is the fruit of individual activity." 
(T.L. 42-3) 
Sturzo states that there is a "reciprocal flux between 
thought and action. 11 (i?.P.I., Vol. I, 104) In another instance, 
in discussing the reciprocal influence between theory and prac-
tice, he speaks of "a mutual action and reaction between fact 
and idea, for the fact is the fulfillment of the idea and the 
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idea the classification of the fact." (I.e. 17) On the level 
of our present analysis, this mutuality between knowledge and 
doing can be expressed in several ways. Knowledge enables one 
to "see" what he is doing, and doing enables one to bring into 
reality what one sees. More basically, knowledge is doing 
~t realized in its spiritual inwardness and doing 
ledge itself realized in its external concretization. 
?2 
is know-
Knowledge 
1s the interiorization of doing whereby it is illuminated by 
the inner light of rationality and doing is the externalization 
of knowledge whereby it is concretized in lived events. Al-
though the unity between knowledge and doing in action is an 
inseparable unity, it is not for this reason a static union, 
but a dynamic one within which there is a mutual action and 
reaction. In the concretizing of a particular idea through 
doing, the feedback from the process alters the idea which in 
turn reacts on further doing. This becomes clear when knowledge 
and doing are viewed within the matrix of the total lived exper-
ience of the individual. 
In this long exposition of Sturzo•s understanding of know-
ledge and action and the nature of their unity, we have dis-
covered that the basis for their unity lies in the very onto-
logical structure of the person as rational. It is in ration-
ality that is the locus for the ultimate quality of being for 
the person and it is rationality that expresses the mutuality 
and basic unity of thought and action because it, rationality, 
is ontologically constituted only in its two-fold dimensional 
projection of knowledge and action. The inward dynamism of 
rationality extends beyond thought to the realization of thought 
through action. This requires a radical shift in perspective 
on the nature of rationality, and therefore, on the nature of 
man who is viewed as such in terms of his rationality. Tradi-
tionally, rationality is viewed as the capacity for thinking 
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and since rationality is the specific difference that deter-
mines man as such, man was studied in terms of this essential 
difference and therefore viewed as primarily and essentially a 
thinker. Of all the errors and dilemmas this perspective has 
given rise to, the basic result is the alienation of man from 
himself and his own realization because thought is realized 
only through action. Therefore, basically and ultimately ration-
ality is not the ability to think, but the power to act, that 
is, to give real life to thought. Man, therefore, is primarily 
a.nd essentially an ''actor" and is only secondarily and in a 
derivative sense a thinker. This shift in perspective in no 
way degrades the value that has traditionally been attributed 
to thought. It has just the opposite effect of enhancing its 
value because by overcoming the traditional cleavage between 
thought and action, knowledge ceases to be viewed as something 
extraneous to daily human life, but rather is seen to be pre-
cisely that which is of worth and value concretized in lived 
experience. It also ceases to be viewed as merely the principle 
and term of speculation, but rather is seen to be the principle 
and term of lived experience. In fact, it is the theoretical 
separation of thought from action that undermines the value of 
thought. This perspective leads to an indifference towards 
knowledge since it is not seen in its actuality within the liv-
ing matrix of personal action. It becomes divorced from the 
practical life of the person and thus results in the condemna-
tion of the practical life itself. The separation of thought 
and action is the virtual absence of the person from himself 
?4 
because it rips asunder personal life as a coherent unity of 
thought and action.· It is the alienation of the person from 
himself because his inmost nature is constituted in and through 
this union, so that "the man of thought and the man of action 
are interwoven in the living reality which is one, single, and 
collective, a reality that can be analyzed but never divided."44 
The present analysis of this living reality, in an attempt 
to determine the nature of its constitutive process which has 
already been discovered to be constitutive of both the indivi-
dual person and society, has moved in a full circle with the 
concept of projection as its starting and finishing point. We 
began our analysis with the projection of consciousness, because 
it is this that is the concretization or sociality--the process 
in which both the person and society are constituted. This 
process Erima racie presented itself as involving not just 
consciousness, but the entire person in his activity. The rea-
son for this can now be determined with some accuracy: the 
inner dynamism of rationality--which is the specifying principle 
of the person--for expression and completion through thought and 
action. The projection of consciousness can also be defined 
more precisely; it is the expression and realization of ration-
ality through thought and action. Rationality embraces within 
its constitutive process knowledge and action as inseparable 
components. Rationality itself is rooted within the more primi-
tive activity of 0 that one individual-social consciousness hence, 
as from a living spring, comes the whole complex and dynamic 
44sturzo, 11 History and Philosophy," p. 62. 
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mode of life of man." (I.L. 60) 
Consciousness, ·as rationality, achiever; actuality only in 
rational activity, that is, thought and action. (I.L. 301)45 
It is for this reason that Sturzo stresses activity in his des-
cription of society. 
society is nothing but the projection or single acti-
vities in the interweaving of all activities. (T.L. 186) 
society is a kind of multiple, simultaneous and continua-
tive projection or individuals in their activity. (I.L. xvii) 
Society is only the simultaneous and progressive projec-
tion of the activity of man's personality concretized in 
the multiplicity of individuals who ••• cooperate among 
themselves.46 
Since; as has been noted, rationality, and therefore conscious-
ness, finds fulfillment only when thought is realized in action, 
it is action, as rational, and the conditions necessary for it 
that carries the ultimate significance in the defining process 
of the person, and together with him 9 society. It is primarily 
to meet the demands of action--always understood as the means 
of realizing rationality in the world and thereby transforming 
that world through the creative touch of rationality--that the 
necessity of society as conatural to the person is made evident. 
"The activity of men postulates association between them. pos-
tulates order in such association, postulates the guaranteeing 
of this order." (I.,L. 60) For this reason Sturzo defines the 
social instinct of the person as "that projection of the ego 
into an environment necessary for action.'' (I .L. 311) 
45see also the very significant article of Sturzo, "The 
Influence of Social Facts on Ethical Conceptiona,u Thought, 20 
(March, 1945), 110. 
46sturzo, "The Philosophic Background of Christian Demo-
cracy," pp. 9-10. 
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Since the projection of consciousness is the concretization 
of sociality in each individual, it follows that this process 
at one and the same time gives rise to the concretization of 
society. Yet, it is clear that although the ooncretization of 
society is simultaneous with the concretization of sociality, 
yet sociality of the individual is not commensurate with soci-
ety. In the concrete individual consciousness there is a two-
fold, opposing directionality in its activity: a personal dir-
ectionalj.ty and a social one. Under the movement of the per-
sonal directionality the person views himself as the center of 
his surrounding world and feels that everything around him 
resolves itself into his life and whose value is determined in 
terms of his own life. Under the movement of his social direc-
tionality, the person has the instinctive and reflective convic-
tion that his thoughts, aspirations and activities belong to 
others and the world just as they and it belong to him. It is 
an "instinctiveu conviction because it arises out of his very 
nature and it is at the same time reflective because as the 
individual reflects upon himself, and his own life, he becomes 
increasingly aware of his own indigence in separation from asso-
ciation with others. {I.L. 4, 5, 300) 
It must be noted that this twotold directionality is related 
to but not equivalent to the processes internalization and pro-
jection. The latter processes are ontologically constitutive 
of the individual consciousness, the twofold directionality is 
not. The evidence fort.his is that internalization and projec-
tion are never in opposition to one another. In fact, they are 
mutually interdependent whereas there can be and often times is 
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an opposition between the pe~sonal and social directionality or 
conscious activity. An exa.Ilple of this would be the domination 
of one movement to the stifling of the other. The danger here 
16 usually on the side of the personal directionality when it 
develops into an individualistic egoism, but there can be a 
movement towards the social group without a corresponding gain 
in depth and strength of personality. When these two movements 
do not stand in opposition, they may "now integrate, now counter-
act each other, now act as a mutual stimulus, now are combined." 
(I.L. 156) These two movements are reflected in the direction-
ality of social dynamism, where the movement to a widening and 
amplific~tion of social nuclei is generally the positive moment 
in the social process, while the movement back towards the 
personal world of the individual, as often marked by egoism, 
violence, and intransigence, is usually the negative moment 
in the process. Although often in opposition to one another, 
these counteractive movements within the social process gener-
ate a thrust that nmakes possible the great social achievements, 
which could not come about in a society where all dynamism is 
artificially prevented." {I.L. 15?) 
Now that the development of the individual consciousness 
through the processes of internalization and projection has 
been adumbrated. the factors involved in the coneretization of 
sociality from the perspective of the individual person have 
been determined. Since society as well as the individual is 
formed in the concretization of sociality, this process must be 
approached from the viewpoint of society in order to fully arti-
culate the nature or the union between the individual and society. 
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our investigation has f ooused on the actuation of consciousness 
since it is in this· process that is the loous for the union 
between the individual and society inasmuch as it is constitu-
tive of each and both together. From what has already been 
said about sociality as an ontological structure of the person, 
it follows that since it is through consciousness that the 
individual is a person, the determining element of society is 
also consciousness. "The element o.f consciousness is so neces-
sary to animate society and to render it effective that without 
it there cannot exist a true human society.'' (M. 19, 22, 91) 
"Just as without consciousness ot self, human individuality 
cannot be appraised ••• so without consciousness or the society 
in which we live, of its value and continuity, there can be no 
true society but only approaches, conjunctions brought about 
more or less by chance or force." (I.L. 6) Society in the con-
crete essentially involves a cooperation or communion among 
individuals for the attainment or preservation of a common end. 
The formality of society consists in the consciousness ot this 
communion as it is interreflected among the members of the 
groups in thought and action. Thia consciousness as interreflec-
ted in thought and action forms the collective consciousness, 
and through it society. A society is organized through the 
formation of a collective consciousness "which alone can give 
it being and t'unetionalit;y."4? The problem confronting us now 
is to determine the process whereby this collective conscious-
ness is formed, the exact nature that Sturzo assigns to it and 
4?sturzo, "Some Notes on the Problem of Education," p. 124. 
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relationship to the individual personal consciousness. 
The problem or· the nature of colleetiv6 consciousness and 
its relationship to the individual consciousness is inseparably 
tied up with its formation. The reason for this is clear rrom 
what already has been stated concerning the processual nature 
of both the individual and society. The nature of each is 
process and both are constituted together in a single process. 
Although the reality of each is constituted only in a reciprocal 
relation with the other so that each is the sine qua non condi-
tion for the reality of the other, even to the extent that 
person and society constitute together a single reality, never-
theless, these two ''components" of' the socio-historical process 
cannot be resolved into a unity of identity. Sturzo is very 
positive in his affirmation that collective consciousness is 
not something that is ontologically distinct from the conscious-
ness of those who together make up the collectivity (I.L. 4; 
T.L. 203;. c. &. P. 55) At the same time, he is equally clear 
that society• and therefore, collective consciousness does have 
a reality of' its own which cannot be reduced to a relation of 
identity with the individual consciousness. (I.L. ~03) Tb.us, 
the individual consciousness and collective consciousness stand 
in a complex dialectical relationship of reciprocity and differ-
entiation, or more precisely, of differentiation-in-synthesis. 
The more the individual and society reflect and reveal the 
reality of each other, the more they are differentiated. There 
is no release for the tension that develops in this dialectic 
of differentiation-in-synthesis because it is rooted in the 
ontological structure of the individual person. 
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This relationship between collective consciousness and the 
individual consciousness is a manifestation of a fundanental 
Blondelian thesis that reality cannot be explained by the prin-
ciple of identity. The attempt to reduce reality to identity 
"far from satisfying the mind ••• is a counterfeit ot any explana-
tion."48 Sturzo's theory is in too close a contact with reality 
to be prone to the danger of such a counterfeit. His theory 
faithfully mirrors the complexity and diversity of reality; 
but, as a result, just a.s physical reality yields its treasures 
only with great labor, so does it require no leas exertion to 
mine the insights of Sturzo•s theory. 
Out of this dialectic, the collective consciousness stands 
in a paradoxical relationship with the individual consciousness. 
It at one and the same time is formed in the same developmental 
process of the individual consciousness and is a presupposition 
tor this process. It is the former in the fact th~t its forma-
tion is simultaneous to and coterminus with the projection of 
the individual consciousness. It is the latter in that the 
development of the individual consciousness presupposes the 
collective consciousness of society as a sine qua non condition 
of its development. There are several factors that give evi-
dence to the fact that social life is a precondition tor the 
development of individual consciousness. Most immediately is 
the fact that the individual comes to self-awareness only in 
relation to another person, and in terms of the entire milieu 
ot limiting and determining concrete factors which mark this 
48sturzo, "Maurice Blondel's La Pense"e: the Philosophy of 
'L'elan spiritual,'" p. ~3. 
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relationship. "Human coexistence is as necessary for individual 
existence as air is necessary tor respiration. Even before a 
child has a notion of himself he has an idea of the other--of 
a mother, foster mother, nurse, playmate."49 Knowledge, too, 
18 social in its origin. It arises only within a social context. 
A language structure, for example, is an expression of an aspect 
ot a collective consciousness that precedes the development of 
the individual consciousness and influences the .formation of the 
individual consciousness. The total social environment, in 
its tradition, institutions, laws, language, all that goes to 
make it up, provides the necessary matrix within which the 
individual consciousness develops. As Sturzo puts it, social 
lif'e, "as it .fulfills itself, is knit up (even while it modifies 
them) with traditions, doctrines, and theories that through 
the ages often form strata in the consciousness of associated 
members." (I.L. 4; er. 207, 210) 
But while collective consciousness is a precondition for 
the individual consciousness to become present to itself, to 
develop and perfect itself, at the same time collective con-
sciousness is dependent on the individual consciousness for its 
life. As Blondel puts it, society is at once the mother and 
daughter of thought. Sturzo describes this relationship as 
"fulfilling a cycle that runs from the person to the collectiv-
ity and from the collectivity to the person, a cycle of inward 
thought finding outward expression, of practical activity 
49sturzo, "Some Notes on the Problem of Education," pp. 
107-08. 
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· 00noeived and actuated." (I.L. 300)50 
In tracing this·cycle from the person to the collectivity, 
it should be clear that just as the development of person con-
sciousness is rooted in and realized through action, so also is 
collective consciousness. It has al.ready been indicated that a 
society is such not through just the association of its members 
in cooperation for a common end, but through the consciousness 
of this association and common end as it is mutually reflected 
among the menbers. But this consciousness is mutually reflected 
only through the social activity of the individual members. 
Without this activity one could say at most that there is only 
an individual orientation in sympathy with that or others. 
-The collective consciousness may be considered a resultant of 
the individual consciousness only when the individuals express 
in !acts, in however inchoate a fashion, the ends of their 
association." (I.L. 254; M. 92) An essential fact to note 
about character of the collective consciousness which is formed 
is that it does not mean that all the members or the group under-
stand their association and ends in exactly the same way. In 
tact, it is essential to the vitality of the collective conscious-
ness that some understand the ends of society "in a different 
way and dissent therefrom, so that in the end there comes about 
that maximum and that minimum of consent and of reciprocal in-
fluence which create action." (N. & I. l?) 
In order to indicate both the reali ~, and the vitality of 
5°cr. also Sturzo' a, "Maurice Blondel • s La Pense'e: the 
Philosophy of 'L'elan spiritual,'" p. 351. 
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of collective consciousness, Sturzo poses that through its 
collective consciousness a particular society achieves a social 
personality analogous to that of the level of the individual 
person. The term "personality" indicates the active conscious-
ness of a group, giving it a spontaneity, vitality and autonomy 
of its own. (N. &. I. 13) The use of the term "personality" in 
this instance is in no sense a mere figure of speech. a metaphor, 
but neither does it indicate an entity standing by itself above 
individuals, whether it be a bio-physical or spiritual reality. 
It is a reality, a moral socio-historical reality that is "born 
of consciousness and developed through consciousness, resolves 
itself into consciousness as its natural center." (I.L. 300) 
Although the social personality, or society, formed through 
collective consciousness is not a ~ertium guid, neither is it 
a merging of the many into one, nor yet can it, as a vital 
unity, be dissolved into its components. Collective conscious-
ness is the vital bond that unites and organizes the members of 
a society, while it at the same time transcends them, much in 
the same way that the individual consciousness inwardly synthe-
sizes all the faculties of the person while at the same time 
transcending them. Although Sturzo views society in terms of 
social personality to point up its character as a vital reality, 
he nevertheless warns against viewing particular societies 
analytically as individualities in a conventional framework. 
Such a perspective is an abstraction from reality. Societies 
must be viewed in their activity. 
From within this perspective their reality will be revealed 
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as "a particularizing through means and ends, a converging, a 
dualizing, a grading." (I.L. 255, 301) Although the .full signi-
ficance of this will be brought out later in an analysis of the 
social syntheses, it is clear in the light of what already has 
been said that what Sturzo means by these words is that the 
conjunction of persons in society is at one with the development, 
a "particularizing" o.f their own personality. 
The unity or the collective personality is not a psycholo-
gical or mechanical unity, "but moral-historical, founded on an 
intercommunication of consciousness.u (T.L. 201) This unity is 
primarily achieved through the development of an historical 
consciousness through which its continuity is established and 
those values expressed that form the nexus or the intercommuni-
cation of consciousness. Just as the individual "preserves and 
recognizes his identity through his consciousness of himself and 
ot his past. so society in the concrete, that is. a given society, 
through the succession of years and generations preserves its 
identity through the consciousness formed among all its members 
that it is the same society as in the beginning." (I.L. 3) This 
historical consciousness gradually comes into being as a society 
little by little evolves and extends itself from the initial 
consciousness of the elementary tact of association to "the 
consistency of several families bound together by a bond that 
unites, organizes and transcends them." (T.L. 204) This bond 
is the collective consciousness of the group. The development 
of collective consciousness. then. contains within itself the 
movement to transcend a given social nucleus to a new sphere ot 
relationships, which coexists with its composing nuclei but is 
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not commensurate with them as it always reaches beyond them. 
"The transcendence is achieved when the collective personality 
18 felt simultaneously by its diverse components, in their com-
mon activities and in their conflicts or interests and domin-
ion." (T.L. 205) 
The moving force behind this transcendence of social nuclei 
in the development of collective consciousness, ever impelling 
it toward unification and a better future. is a collective final-
ism, which through the strengthening of inner forces engenders 
the spirit of achievement. Just as the individual seeks ends 
that transcend himself in the very process of fulfilling and 
perfecting himself, so does the collective activity of the 
group ever strive towards a goal that transcends the present 
situation. This impulsion generates the spirit of achievement 
that "gives vitality and unification to the collective person-
ality." This spirit of achievement is the expression of the 
"desire for greater welfare, seen each time as a necessity or 
an enhancement of 11.fe. n The term 11welfare 1' must not be re-
stricted to the plane of material interests, although these 
are certainly to be included, and not just as "a necessity" 
tor life but also for "an enhancement" of life since they f'ur-
nish the foundation for man's moral, intellectual and religious 
life. It includes the entire range of man's needs, feelings, 
and aspirations, "from the most primitive to the loftiest." (T. 
L. 202) 
As collective consciousness takes shape the past is exper-
1 
L. ienced as the present "in tradition, language, customs, conti-nuity of place, and representative symbols." (I.L. 3) These 
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embrace within themselves those values, idealized as a reality 
to be preserved and defended or yet to be attained, which unify 
and express the collective consciousness. For the collective 
consciousness is unified and formed by that past which continues 
to live in the present as the principle of life and collective 
activity. This past that continues to live in the present is 
that which corresponds to the present situation and needs of 
the collective consciousness. Just as the memory of the indi-
vidual is selective, so is the contact of collective conscious-
ness with the past filtered through the mesh of its present 
needs, circumstances and popular orientations. nThe systematiz-
ing of these memories is not theoretical and abstract, but 
realistic and concrete like social life itself. 1• (I .L. 4) 
Just as the life of the individual person follows a path 
from birth through periods of maturation. and then to decline 
to death. so does the life of the social personality. The 
social personality formed through the collective consciousness 
continues to live as long as its past continues to animate its 
present and provide an orientation towards the future. It is 
this inward vitality and continuity, rather than simply outward 
events, that makes the life of a social personality. Events 
are a potent influence in increasing or diminishing the vital-
ity Of the collectivity, but the principle Of this vitality is 
not in outward events but in the collective consciousness. 
This continues to exist and survive the greatest cataclysms, 
"so long as the people concerned maintain the consciousness of 
its own continuity." (T.L. 206-?) An example of this is Ireland 
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which maintained its consciousness as a nation throughout its 
subjection to England even though it lost its language and did 
not have its own independent political configuration for cen-
turies. 'w'hereas on the other hand, the collective consciousness 
of ancient Greece was not reborn with the modern Greece because 
there is no continuity of consciousness. Despite the same 
approximate territory and even a similarity of language, the 
collective consciousness of modern Greece is not animated by 
the past of ancient, Greece. This past no longer lives in the 
present as the source of collective activity, but is only pre-
served as a pure memory of something that once had life, but 
now is in a state of petrifaction. The same holds true for 
Rome and Italy today. Its collective personality, that is, its 
active collective consciousness, is other than that of ancient 
Rome. Ea.oh has their own rhythm ot life, their own finalism 
and spirit of achievement, their own institutions and culture, 
in a word, their own history. As Robert Pollock has acutely 
pointed out, this originality reveals itself in the difficulty 
every epoch encounters in trying to imitate the works of another 
--works which so many could produce at one time, even with a 
certain natural facility.51 Therefore, the collective person-
ality that objectivates human action and makes it lasting lives 
and has value insofar as it is animated by a collective conscious-
ness and its processive continuity. Once this continuity is 
broken, so is its life-line. 
5lPollock, "L'uomo nella societ~ e nella storia," pp. 
232-33; T.L. 20?; 200-01. 
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What gives collective personality its dpecific determina-
tion is its ethico-organic nature. The term "ethico-organic" 
indicates the finalistic and, therefore, ethical character of 
society and its organic structure which follows from the coor-
dinated activities of the associated individuals. Although the 
social personality does have a life of its own, it is the indi-
vidual that gives it this life and its ethico-organic structure. 
In the development of collective conmciousness, and hence 
the social personality, there is no factor that is external to 
the individual that brings about this movement from the indivi-
dual to the formation of a collective consciousness. This should 
be clear from the fact that sociality is an ontological struc-
ture of the person. However. in tracing the formation of the 
collective consciousness we have spoken of a collective finalism, 
which is sometimes interpreted to be extraneous to the indivi-
dual. It is true that the movement from the individual to the 
formation of an organized society there is always functioning 
a common end which gives impetus to, and thereby organizes 
around it, a whole complexus of personal.activities. But this 
collective finalism is intrinsic to the individual person. In 
tact, it is his very nature ttconsidered as a tendency or exi-
gency to seek fulfillment and perfection." (I.L. xv) Since 
the person achieves his own reality in the concretization of 
sociality into social forms, social finality is the inner final-
ity of his own activity. (I.L. xvi) In view of this, since it 
is the human person that is realized in society, it is the indi-
Vidual person that is the end of society and not vice-versa. 
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society is the means whereby the indiVidual is able to attain 
bis end. "Such expressions indicate the theoretical and prac-
tical value of the unicity of the consciousness and of the end 
which from individuals passes to society." (I.L. ?) 
This position does not ~dercut the reality or social ends; 
but it does emphasize that their reality is rooted in and 
arises from the interior finalities or coordinated personal 
activity. Finality is the conscious rationality that directs--
and in directing is itself realized--personal activity; and 
there is no extra-social personal activity. It is clear trom 
the ontological structure or the person, in which the individual 
and society form one constitutive process, that there is no 
aspect of personal activity which, although originally indivi-
dual, does not have a social character. "Without society there 
is no life. Pain is personal as thought is and like thought 
it is at the same time social. Neither the experience nor the 
overcoming of pain are so personal as not to be at the same time 
a collective experience, a collective victory." (T.L. 166) The 
same applies equally as well to persona.l finality. Society is 
the projection of personal activities, which of themselves 
involve a network of inter-individual relationships, so that 
within this process it attains its own reality, not apart from 
or above individuals, but consisting of individuals united to-
gether. It is a reality that is collectively produced, and 
exists only as collectively maintained, but it is not for this 
reason any less real than something that is produced by a single L person. Its reality is manifested in the fact that it cannot 
be dissolved into the single and isolated individuals that 
together constitute· it. It is a whole that transcends the 
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sum total of its parts. Social ends hold the sane relation-
sbiP to personal ends. But to try to determine the reality of 
society apart from the individuals that compose it, is to move 
as far into the realm of abstractions as it is to try to deter-
mine the reality of individual persons apart from society. 
As sturzo states, ordinary language is delusive when it opposes 
individual to society, the individual good to the common good. 
(M. 86) The reality of each is constituted together. However, 
this fact does not lessen the dynamic interplay and tension 
between the two. The situation can be summed up in this way: 
individual ends and social ends are both real, but only as they 
together form a single reality. Within this single reality 
they do not stand in opposition to one another and neither can 
they be reduced to identity. 
In regard to the general end of any society, this has tra-
ditionally been designated as the common good. Sturzo generally 
does not use this traditional term, but rather the terms "so-
cial euds," 0 finality," or "finalism." There are two reasons 
for this. One is his effort to clarify the specific end of 
every social form according to their intrinsic characters as 
they correspond to the natural requirements of human nature. (M. 
84-5) Another is the more active and processive connotations 
conveyed by the term "finality" or "tinalism. '' And the social 
ends are never attained in their fullness, but only partially 
and temporarily within the flow of the human process. There-
fore, instead or speaking of a common good, Sturzo prefers to 
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talk or ''a collective finalism which is the welfare of the group 
and its members, and which, taken as a whole. transcends the 
exigencies of individuals and even present life, pressing for-
ward into the future." (T.L. 201) 
But by combining the few statements Sturzo does make about 
the common good with those he makes in terms of a collective 
tinalism we can get some picture of the relationship between 
the individual personal good and the common good. In view of 
the fact that the collective finalism is the nature of the indi-
vidual person considered as a tendency toward fulfillment, the 
relationship between the individual good and the common good 
is not one of a lesser good, the individual, and a greater good, 
the common good, but rather that in which the one, the indivi-
dual good, finds its realization in the other, the common good. 
Yet, the end of society is the individual person, and the common 
good is real and effective, that is, achieved within a society 
only to the extent that it is resolved into the individual good, 
that is, becomes a good actually participated in by the indi-
vidual persons united together. Although the individual, per-
sonal good, which of itself is individual-social, becomes 
through itself the common good• and although the end of society 
is the individual person, yet the common good, taken as a whole, 
transcends the exigencies of the individuals taken,singly, and 
cannot be dissolved into the individual good. Sturzo states the 
relationship in this way: 
Collective consciousness is based on two value judg-
ments which are correlative: 'The community is worth 
more than the individuals who compose it--insofar as 
it provides them with a common good; 'The individuals 
92 
are worth more than the Community--insofar as they are 
the end for which the Community is formed.52 
The organic structure arises from the coordination of indi-
vidual activities for the attainment of the social end. The 
individuals themselves are the organs of society as they parti-
cipate in the pursuit of the social end. They are the func-
tional organs taken either individually as mother and father 
within the family, or as united into intermediate groups within 
a larger society, such as towns and classes within the state. 
Since not all participate in the social finalism in the same 
way, this specification of functions makes up the organic 
structure of society. This organic structure is essential both 
from the perspective of society and of the individual person. 
On the level of society intermediate organizations are necessary 
to meet the complex needs of social life. On the level of the 
individual, it is only in an organic social life, that is, a 
social life which each contributes to, that individuals are 
able to achieve consciousness of their own being (I.L. 175) 
Considered in the abstract, social organs are distinguished 
from social ends. But within the concrete process of social 
life, they are the processive realization of the social end. 
The end is the conscious rationality of the practical action 
of individuals and the social organ is proceasive actuation of 
this conscious rationality through the coordinated activities 
or individuals. Therefore, social ends and organs are simply 
the practical manifestation of "the consciousness of individuals 
52sturzo, "Some Notes on the Problem of Education," p. 
~4; er. M. 84-9. 
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of being in communion among one another and of acting accor-
dingly." (I.L. 6-8;.cf. also xvii• 174-5) 
In discussing the organic structure or society, Sturzo 
frequently uses the term "organism." Sometimes he uses it 
where he means the organization of a particular society. 
"Societies are usually distinguished by the end and by the 
organism of each.n (I.L. 6) Other times he uses it to refer 
to social units composed of various organs, as when he states 
that the members of a family "all together form a single orga-
nism.'' (I.L. 1?4; cf. I.L. 1?5; M. 35) The use or this term 
is not compatible with his strong rejection of any organistia 
view of society, either in the sense or viewing society as a 
real organism with its own structure and life independent of 
the individual composing it or in the sense of building up a 
theory of society on the basis or similarities drawn between 
social and biological organisms. "The play or analogy, however, 
cannot create a science. To speak, for instance, of social 
biology reduces itself simply to transporting biological data 
into the social field, on grounds of analogical or imaginary 
resemblances.,. (I.L. xii; M. 33-4) Sturzo's opposition to a 
social theory modeled on a natural science such as biology has 
its roots in his historico-processive view of society. The 
tendency of an organistic perspective is "to consider society 
as morphologically fixed, once and forever, and not to observe 
it historically, both in its progressive phases or sudden 
arrests, and in its variable forms according to time, place, 
and civilization." (M. 33; I.L. xii) The error of viewing society-
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a self-subsistent reality also follows from not viewing it 
its processive activity. In addition to these objections to 
the biological model, there is also the factor that the model 
o! a biological organism presents a totality that is relatively 
colored in its structure, whereas the wholeness proper to society 
is equivalent to that on the personal level--open-ended, as is 
evident in the continual emergence of new social groups. In 
view of these objections, Sturzo•s use of the term 0 organism" 
should be interpreted not as an unfortunate figure of speech, 
but as indicating the importance he placed on the organic struc-
ture of society and the autonomy of intermediate social groups 
within a larger society, such as the state. To call these 
intermediate groups "organisms" served to emphasize their 
natural origin and autonomy in opposition to any theory of 
both individualism and statalism. (I.L. 175) 
In tracing the growth and development of society through 
the formation of collective consciousness, Sturzo sought to 
pinpoint the definitive and original irresolvable principle of 
this process that would include all social forms and resolve 
them into itself. In this quest, Sturzo discovered it to be 
rationality, as concretized in the individual, and thereby 
threaded his way between the protruding shoals of determinism 
and voluntarism. The exponents of determinism place the origin 
of society in bio-psycho-physical conditioning or in such forces 
as the instinct of self-preservation or the preservation of the 
species. Although Sturzo recognizes the presence and necessity 
Of conditioning factors in thed:ivelopment of social life, as 
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well as the function and value or such elementary forces, yet 
they can never of themselves give rise to true social living 
which transpires only when "there comes to be a true mental 
communion among those associated in an active convergence lit 
by the ray of human reason." (I.L. 10) 
Within a voluntaristic social theory, a social contract, 
either tacit or explicit, is considered to be the source of 
society. Sturzo raises several objections to this theory, but 
they all have their ultimate basis in his theory that sociality 
is an ontological structure of the person. In view of this, 
there could be no human situation, such as an alleged state of 
nature on which voluntaristic theories are founded, that is 
extra-social. Also, whereas there are no necessary societies 
for social contract theories, within Sturzo's theory not only 
are there necessary societies, but society in general is cor-
relative to the field of the personal. Sturzo recognizes the 
function and value of the voluntary factor in the origin and 
development of society, but as has already been noted. this 
voluntary aspect in the process is rooted in the inner exigency 
of rationality to seek expression and fulfillment "in a contin-
uous succession of voluntary acts.n Since sociality is part 
of man's rational nature, it too is caught up in this incessant 
dynamism of rational\ty, and it is this that brings it to frui-
tion. Thus the original irresolvable principle or sociality 
is "the rational capacity of individuals to acquire conscious-
ness of their associative nature, and this they actuate endlessly 
by their own individual voluntary activity." (I.L. 13; cf. 8-13) 
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It is precisely t~is inner dynamism of rationality for 
completion that renders the concretization of sociality pro-
oessive and dynamic. As Sturzo states, "it is realized through 
time." (I.L. 13) It is important here to determine the exact 
relation between the inner dynamism of rationality and this 
tourth dimension of society--time. We have already seen how 
rationality as a concrete and essential principle of the indi-
vidual person consists entirely in its impelling drive for 
expression and completion. This process, in which the person 
and society are constituted together, is a process of unceasing 
becoming because 
••• in no moment does rationality find adequate and entire 
expression in the human concrete •••• Neither the indivi-
dual taken in himself, nor society as the outcome of 
its individuals can be said to possess themselves wholly, 
and, hence, to be able to rest on the realization of the 
moment as final and definitive. (I.L. 13) 
Rationality continually realizes itself through the process or 
projecting itself and, in this process, it becomes objectified 
as language, institutions, laws, cities, monuments, works of 
art, all as the objectified outcome of rationality seeking 
realization. All these are expressions or the activity of ra-
tionality which in generating them is itself realized. But 
they are never exhaustive of that activity; and, although they 
are concrete embodiments of rationality seeking completion, they 
are never adequately expressive of that urge that gave rise to 
them. As mentioned previously, the various meanings assigned 
to rationality by Sturzo have their ideal and historical locus 
in the concrete rational nature of the person. It is here in 
the inner dynamism o! the concrete individualized rationality 
, I 
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that the world in its intelligibility is rendered intelligible 
to us, and it is here that individualized rationality is related 
to rationality "conceived as an absolute" or as an ideal order 
transcending the defects and imperfections of present reality; 
tor this ideal order is both the presupposition and term of 
tbiS inner dynamism. It is a presupposition as latent within 
this dynamism seeking to burst forth in the grandeur of its 
actuality. It is this which gives the thrust to this inner 
d)'namism and the orientation of its creative energy, incessantly 
iJllpelling it toward further realization. This ideal order is 
also the term ot this dynamism or individualized rationality 
as that in which it finds completion. 
The process or rationality is marked by two dialectical mo-
ments, the negative and the positive. The negative moment 
reveals the incommensurability of the concrete embodiments or 
rationality with its creative energy, while the positive moment 
reveals the continued thrust ot this creative energy in the 
form ot "the idea to be realized which ~ill supply the lacks, 
the incompletenesses and the limits of what has already been 
achieved." (I.L. 14) The negative moment of this process is 
the result and manifestation or the finitude of man's being. 
It man were infinite, he would at once and in a single act 
achieve the fullness of his being. But this is not the human 
situation. Man's being consists in an unceasing becoming 
through a succession of acts. In no single act does he possess 
himself wholly and entirely, with the result that it always in-
oludes an element of otherness which must yet be cancelled out 
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transformed into his own being. 
In addition to.this metaphysical viewpoint, the negative 
moment in the process of rationality can also be considered 
trom the perspective of the dialectic of human action and from 
the ethical standpoint. Both of these are rooted in man's fini-
tude. Within the confines o! this finitude, human rationality 
can realize itself only in dialectic with material reality 
through human action. In this dialectic of human action the 
negation of rationality is that moment in which a concrete 
embodiment or rationality has become separated from the source 
ot ratio~ality and thereby becomes an obstacle to further acti-
vity. That which has been rationally achieved retains its 
value of rationality only as it continues to be renewed "from 
that undying font of vital reality that is man." From an 
ethical viewpoint, the negative moment is manifested "as the 
erroneous and faulty actuation of rationality when the end to 
be attained and good to be realized have presented themselves 
to human action in defective or equivocal guise." (I.L. 15) 
This too comes about as a result of man's finitude which 
aeans that rationality as coneretized is always limited and 
relativistic in character. The further achievement of ration-
ality is always the urge to action. Yet, due to the limited 
scope of the rationality already achieved, we often are unable 
· to distinguish true rationality from se:mi-rat1onali ty, which is 
rational only in certain aspects and in an incomplete fashion, 
or from pseudo-rationality, which is rational in appearance 
only. (I • L. l?) 
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It should be no.ted here that Sturzo uses these terms, the 
semi-rational and the pseudo-rational, to refer to the rational 
element contained in the negative moment. For in regard ta the 
overall process of rationality, the rational element contained 
in the negative moment always is the semi-rational or the 
pseudo-rational in comparison with the rational element con-
tained in the succeeding positive moment. 
This negative moment, whether viewed in its metaphysical 
roots or from its dialectical or ethical aspects "unfolds in 
its true value man•s continuous endeavor to win for himself his 
own rationality." (I.L. 15) This endeavor consists in overcom-
ing the negative moment and resolving it into the positive. It 
is a continuous effort because just as the rational element 
contained in the negative moment is revealed to be the semi-
rational, or even the pseudo-rational, in the light of the 
1deality of the positive moment, so in turn will the deficien-
cies of the rationality achieved through this identity eventu-
ally become manifest. Although within the concrete flow of the 
human process, whether on the level of the individual person or 
society, one or the other moments may dominate, nevertheless, 
there is for Sturzo no relaxation of the tension between these 
two moments, and most assuredly there is no denouement to it. 
Since the term of this process is absolute rationality, in 
which the process finds its unification, the inward drive of 
the concrete individualized rationality for completion is con-
tinually frustrated by its negation. 
The claim to a human society founded on pure reason, 
overcoming once for all any admixture of the irrational, 
i 
11 
100 
lacks a realistic.basis, tor it presupposes the trans-
formation of the dynamism of human process into a 
rationalistic staticism which, being against nature, 
is fundamentally irrational. (I.L. 16) 
The dynamism of the human process is that inner necessity 
or individualized rationality for completion in absolute ration-
ality. It is precisely here in the inner dynamism of rational-
ity that Sturzo locates the origin of time. 
We need points of reference in order to establish time. 
But it is not the clock that makes time, nor the rising 
and setting of the sun that makes the succession of 
things, nor the material evolving of our aging body, 
nor the succession and pressing on of the generations, 
which arise and vanish, nor the succession ot Kings and 
governments. These are outward indications of a con-
sciousness that is never exhausted, and that tinds 
realization at every instant of its inner process 
while, projecting itself into the outer world, it gives 
it its imprint. (I.L. 14) 
Although Sturzo uses the term consciousness, it has already been 
explained how, within the inward synthesis of consciousness, it 
is the projection of rationality that constitutes its most 
primitive activity and marks the ultimate quality of its being. 
This is clear from the continuation of the passage: "All things 
touched by man bear his hallmark; ••• this living flame that is 
human rationality." Since rationality is the essential prin-
ciple of the human person, this drive of rationality is the 
constitutive activity of the person, and thereby society. 
Therefore, the most intimate reality of the person consists in 
this movement from the presentt but partial concretization of 
\ 
rationality towards its complete realization. And the present 
actuality of the person resides in the tension between the nega-
tive and positive moments of the process. It is precisely this 
tension that constitutes time. 
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Time is the very form of the personal field as the modality 
according to which ·the individual person constantly moves from 
bis present actuality toward the further realization of ration-
ality--a movement that finds no cessation short of absolute 
rationality. Sturzo states that "we need points ot reference 
in order to establish time.'' Time marks the rhythm, or more 
exactly, is this rhythm, of the inner dynamism ot rationality 
toward absolute rationality and it is this absolute rationality 
that in turn ultimately measures time. It is in terms of abso-
lute rationality that there is the unceasing movement of indi-
vidualized rationality• and this movement is the essence of time. 
In uncovering Sturzo's theory of time, we, at the same 
time, lay bare the theoretical basis for his most basic under-
standing of the person that is the supposition for his entire 
social theory. For it is here, in the essence of time, that 
the process that is human reality reveals itself to be funda-
mentally and constitutively a tendency towards absolute ration-
ality, or in a word, "rational becoming." (I.L. xx111-xxiv; 16-1?) 
It is precisely this that define~ the person in his ulti-
mate character: the tendency towards absolute rationality in 
time. Time is the inner rhythm of this tendency that is the 
person. Temporality 1 then, as the internal, necessary and con-
stitutive dimension or the person is that which defines the 
person in its ontological character. 
In arising from within the dynamic structure of the rational 
nature of the person, temporality is also an intrinsic element 
or sociality as an ontological structure of this nature. 
t 
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society, then, as the concrete outcome of sociality, has tem-
porality as one of its essential factors. This is the theore-
tical basis for Sturzo's insistence that "to fulfill its scien-
tific purpose sociology should carry the study of society in 
the concrete into the fourth dimension, that of time •••• " (T.L. 
') To do otherwise is to be guilty of abstractionism. Time, 
as an inward dimension of the person, is the inner lite ot so-
ciety. To study society outside of time, therefore, is to 
study a nonexistent abstraction. 
Since sociality is an ontological structure of the person, 
the tendency towards rationality embraces within the totality 
of its dimensions both the person and society. Or more exactly, 
this movement towards rationality is the realization of indi-
viduality in sociality. (I.L. 36) At the beginning of our 
analysis of collective consciousness it was noted that the 
individual consciousness and collective consciousness stand in 
a complex dialectical relationship of dif ferentiation-in-synthe-
ais, and that in the working out of this dialectic, the collec-
tive consciousness develops together with the individual con-
sciousness and at the same time is a presupposition for the 
formation of the individual consciousness. We have already 
seen an articulation of this differentiation-in-synthesis rela-
tionship between the person and society from the side of the 
person in Sturzo's formulrition of the law of "individuality-
sociality.1153 The nature or this relationship can now be more 
specifically determined through Sturzo's theory of sociological 
~ 53see p. 41 of this chapter. 
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resolution. 
In tracing the.contours of the realization of individuality 
in sociality, we have seen that the person is constituted in 
the conoretization of sociality and yet that there is a feed-
back from both the process itself and the social forms that are 
the result ofthis process--a feedback which has a formative and 
determining efficacy that functions both internally and exter-
nally upon the individual. within the concrete historical pro-
cess the individual comes into an already formed society. How-
ever, we have already seen that society is as open-ended in 
its structural process as the individual person, so that "never 
is society so complete that a new existence can add nothing to 
it." (I.L. 302) The individual penetrates into an already 
existing social structure in a way that can be figuratively, 
but concretely, pictured as similar to that of a fish breaking 
through the surface of the water that contains him. The person 
is born into and immersed in a social environment in the same 
life-giving and determining way as the fish in water. And as 
the fish draws the strength from within its aqueous environment 
not only to move within it, but even to rise up out of it to 
penetrate back within it, causing an ever-expanding sphere of 
ripples in the surface of the water, so the individual through 
the radiating vitality of his thought and action ripples the 
surface of his social environment in an ever expanding sphere 
ot influence, even to the extent of transforming it. The social 
environment in its turn, even while being modified, pours back 
upon the individual the complex values, attitudes, beliefs, all, 
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in a word, that has .been formed within it through collective 
activity. 
Within the socio-historical process, then, the dialectical 
coexistence of the person and society is such that the more 
tbeY influence one another and interpenetrate to form together 
a living synthesis, the more they develop and deepen their own 
reality. This is explained by the fact that their coexistence 
"is a continuous succession of resolutions." (I.L. 300) The 
process of sociological resolution is that whereby "all that is 
produced as social returns to the individuals according to the 
capacity of each, and such capacity is more or less developed 
according to the greater or lesser participation in social lite, 
in its ends and its values." (I.L. 305) Sturzo uses the term 
resolution, which is derived from the physio-mathematical sci-
ences, to indicate that social values are such only insofar as 
they pass into the consciousness of each individual to !orm a 
deeper and more complete personality. Since the synthesizing 
resolution transpires in the individual consciousness, it is 
fundamentally "a deepening of consciousness." This resolution 
takes place according to the capacity of the individual con-
sciousness and this capacity is in proportion to "the greater 
or lesser participation in social life, in its ends and its 
values.'' Thus, there is between the individuals and society 
a reciprocating vital cycle in which the closer and more intense 
the relationship, the deeper and more extensive is the reality 
ot each. The more the individual participates in the social 
lite the more vigorous the social life becomes and the deeper 
and richer is the personality of the individual. This is the 
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result of a feedback from both the process of participating 
in the social life and its ensuing results. From the process 
itself the individual has a greater capacity to receive the 
feedback of the resulting social values because he feels the 
social life to the extent he participates in it and makes it 
his own. And the more intensive the social lite, the greater 
the feedback of values and advantages upon the individual. 
We have seen that the point of contact between the indivi-
dual and society is on the level of consciousness, understanding 
that term now in all the richness or its meaning tor Sturzo, 
and that just as it is consciousness that specifically deter-
mines the individual as a person, so ia it collective conscious-
ness that determines society. Since resolution transpires in 
the individual consciousness, when Sturzo states that it is 
accomplished "as a deepening of consciousness," he is referring 
to the individual consciousness. But it is clear that there is 
a teedback onto society from this process so that collective 
consciousness itself becom~s deeper and more extensive. Since 
this resolution takes place according to the degree of the ac-
tive synthesis between the individual and society, their rela-
tionship as one or differentiation-in-synthesis therefore 
clearly manifests itself. 
Although the process of resolution makes it ever more clear 
that the individual person is the efficient and final principle 
ot collective consciousness, nevertheless, it at the same time 
gives .further evidence of the reality of the collective conscious-
ness. For in this process whereby social values and factors 
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are resolved into th.e individual consciousness there are always 
remainders. This is the term Sturzo uses to denote those per-
manent elements of society that cannot be resolved into the 
individuals of society taken singly and persist beyond the 
collectivity that has produced them. These are such objectifi-
cations of collective consciousness as traditions, language, 
beliefs, laws, institutions, all that goes to make up the living 
heritage o! a civilization. Since these permanent elements con-
stitute the social nucleus that is the socio-historical presup-
position for the process of resolution, without them "there 
could not be that very resolution into personality which thus 
would not be able to achieve its ends." (I.L. 303) 
In this chapter we have traced Sturzo•s theory on the 
inward formation of society. It began with the individual per-
son as the active and efficient principle o! this process, since 
society, for Sturzo, is the simultaneous and interweaving 
projection of individuals in their activities. His theory ot 
sociological resolution is rooted in this conception of society 
and reveals the person as "the term towards which the social 
oomplexus is directed." (I.L. 303; et. M. 88) Hence, the emer-
gence of the person, then, is the end of society so that it is 
efficacious in its social values to the extent that they resolve 
themselves into the individual consciousness to form a more 
complete and a spiritually and morally richer personality. 
"Without such resolution, the whole effort ot social activity 
would be in vain and incomprehensible, and man would be out of 
Place in an absurd complexus of impenetrable elements.'' (I .L. 
303) In the formation of society, then, the person stands 
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revealed as the efficient and final principle. 
The entire thrust of Sturzo's theory, therefore. is direc-
ted toward unveiling the reality of the person because it is 
this that realizes itself in society. The ultimate basis for 
this lies in the very ontological structure of the person which 
is constituted in and through sociality. It is in the concre-
tizing of sociality that men win their personality. ''Therefore, 
we say that sociality starts from the individual person and 
resolves itself into the individual person. like the continuous 
cycle of the synthesis of human becoming." (I.L. 302) 
CHAPl'ER II 
SOCIAL FORMS: THE STRUCTURAL PROCESS OF SOCIE1'Y 
The inward formation of society is at one with the process 
whereby the individual person achieves his own being. For the 
ultimately constitutive act of the person is the concretizing 
ot sociality, that is, the associative dimension of hie nature • 
.And the aoncretizing or this is constitutive of the person 
because as we have seen in articulating Sturzo's theory of this 
process. the intrinsic determinant of this process is the inward 
synthesis of consciousness with rationality, "either as princi-
ple of communion or as unifying value or as finalistic tenden-
cy." (I.L. 19) As society takes shape, then, it reveals the 
emerging of the inner reality of the person since its concreti-
zation is the realization of this inner reality. From the point 
of view of the structural formation of society, there are 
several significant factors in this process that must be noted. 
First of all, the associative nature of the person never realizes 
itself through just random individual relations, but tends 
rather in the formation of its own structural process through 
these relations to generate nucleated clusters ot relations that 
become concrete forms of organization. 
'!'he social tendency is towards the organization of 
every special associative trend. (I.L. 1?4) 
Human society seeks to give form to the constant or 
semi-constant elements in human relations. That is, 
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it tends to create and develop social types justifying 
their demands. molding their customs and enforcing 
their laws. so that by a kind of gradual crystilliza-
tion institutions emerge able to withstand the flux 
of events and the anarchial forces ot destruction. 
(I.C. 36) 
Yet. while on the one band. the concretization of the rela-
tional nature of the person does not remain a matter of unor-
ganized individual relations but rather gives shape to concrete 
organizational structures, on the.other hand. 11not all social 
relations, even if indefinitely repeated, succeed in forming a 
concrete society, but only those relations to which the histori-
cal process has given prevailing significance in the social 
structure. These relations acquire such significance when they 
express a group of general interests--in the sociological and 
not the economic sense; only then do they materialize as social 
institutions with an autonomy and personality of their own." 
(I.e. 3?) These general interests are generated by natural 
needs and historical developments, function in the concrete 
formation of specific kinds of society and social institutions 
and also to their continued development and modification within 
the complexity of human society. (I.e. 3?-8) 
There are two ways in which one can view this complexity 
of human society that embrace the earth in a web of conscious-
ness. It can be viewed either as a multiplicity of interacting 
societies, each of which is individuated but all joined together 
in a vital network of relations, or in terms of its totality 
as constituting a single complex society composed of many indi-
vidualized, but interrelated social forms. (I.L. 22) In either 
case, whether one gives emphasis to the complexity as in the 
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first instance, or to the totality, as in the latter, it is 
clear that sociality, although common to all nen, is not con-
cretized as a single homogeneous society that embraces within 
its monolithic structure all men. Rather, it is concretized 
as specific individuated societies or social groups within a 
larger society. The differentiation of societies is the nega-
tive moment in the concretization of sociality that is neces-
sary tor social unification. We have already seen indications 
ot the individuation of society in dealing with its organic-
tinalistic character. In organizing together around a common 
end, a group of individuals distinguishes itself from every 
other group in terms of its organizational structure and final-
ity. The differentiation or the group is the negative moment 
in the formative process of the social group aud the positive 
moment is the actuation of the unitiva principle, the collective 
consciousness. (I.L. 19, 20; ct. also p. 174) 
Only as individuated can society "respond to the need 
inherent in each individual not to lose his own individuality 
by his association with others." (I.L. 20) This need is rooted 
in the nature o.f social1 ty as an ontological structure ot the 
person. Since it is in the concretizing of the associative 
diaension or his nature that the individual achieves the auton-
omy and the individuality of his own personality, tho social 
groups formed in this process reflect, in projecting, this inner 
reality. "In the differentiation of his own society from every 
other, that is, in the group consciousness and in its unity, the 
. individual feels not the suppression of his own personality, but 
~ 
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its projection, reflection, enlargement." (I.L. 20) The indi-
yiduation or society is another aspect of the differentiation-
in-synthesia relationship between the individual and society. 
ror, as has already been seen it is the social consciousness 
o! those who belong to a group that its reality consists in 
and by which it is therefore individuated. The individuation 
of society, then, is an expression of this relationship on the 
social level, viewed from the angle of the society as thus 
differentiated from other social units. The nature of this dif-
ferentiation must be exa~ined in order to understand Sturzo's 
theory of the structural process or society and thereby shed 
further light on the more basic differentiation-in-synthesis 
relationship, or in other words, the field of the personal. 
Every concrete society is individualized, and it is indi-
vidualized through a form. Just as every individual entity is 
such through a form, so, too, do collective realities, "in order 
to be realities, call for a form that will embody them in their 
being and in their activity." (I.L. 23) By a social form Sturzo 
means "the mode or specific reason of the concretizing of society." 
Since society is the projection of interrelated persons in their 
activities, the social forms, then, will be "the projection of 
the f'inalism of human action." The formation of the collective 
consciousness, in which the reality of a particular society con-
sists, is in terms of a common finality nwhioh invests the whole 
complexus of individual-social activities." In fact, Sturzo 
calls this common finality "the soul of society." Thus the 
structural eoncretization of society is "an immanent actuation 
Of this !inalism." (I.L. 23) This structural concretization is 
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a social form. Since it is through a form that a society is 
individualized. Sturzo uses the term "social form" as synony-
mous with the terms "social group" and nsociety", understood 
as individualized "society in the concrete," although in a 
atrict sense "social forms" refers to the kinds of concrete 
society, such as family, state, class, township, nation. 
This terminology of Sturzo, "the structural concretiza-
tion of society," is highly significant in revealing his proces-
aual perspective. We have already seen that even in dealing 
with society in terms of its structure, Sturzo views it as 
process.1 He speaks of the social form as the cooperative 
prosecution of a common end "in a direction that we may call 
structural." (I.L. 23) The term "structure," then, within 
sturzo's theory does not carry its usual connotations of a rigid 
or fixed stability. There is a certain stability to the social 
forms, but it is a stability of process, not of form. A dis-
tinction in Sturzo•s social theory, such as Timashett makes in 
his analysis, 2 between "social morphology" and "social dynamics 0 
is misleading, because the social forms themselves are marked 
by an intrinsic dynamism that manifests itself in several ways, 
as will become clear in the course of this chapter. Sturzo's 
social theory is grounded in the thesis that reality is process. 
Therefore, the distinction that should be made is not in terms 
ot social structure and process, but rather between structural 
1
see chapter I, pp. 33-35. 
2Timasheff t The Sociology of Luigi Sturzo, cf. Chapters 
V and VI. 
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process and dynamic process. The first regulates the dynaraism 
ot the second, both by tending to function as a brake for its 
dynamism, but only by offsetting it with a different rhythm, and 
by channelling its fluctuations into a patterned flow, while it 
itself is undergoing modifications due to this more dynamic 
process. 
The meaning and function of social forms is grounded in 
the inward synthesis of consciousness with rationality as 
realized in action. Since the concretizing of sociality is the 
active realization of this inward synthesis, the social forms 
that are concretized in this process must be explained in terms 
ot human activity. In relation to individual action the social 
torms are through consciousness the conditioning factors and 
means, associative organs and ends. In explicating these 
aspects of social forms Sturzo relates them to physical and 
mental habits on the level of individual action. These habits 
are forms of action through which the individual expresses his 
meaning, his will, his ability. They are intrinsically final-
istic in that they are ordered to the end of human action. 
Betore they are acquired as habits, they are themselves the end 
ot a particular activity. Once they are achieved they serve as 
a means for attaining further ends. The social forms function 
in a parallel fashion on the social level. A social form 
starts out as a cooperative working towards an essential end, 
around which the activities of the associated individuals are 
coordinated. As the end becomes actualized in and through the 
coordinated activity, this activity takes on an organic structure 
l'l.4 
that in turn becomes.a means for realizing further ends, or 
the further actuation of the essential end. As the social form 
takes on an organizational structure with a relative stability 
it will also be a conditioning factor for the activity engaged 
iD within this structure. "The social term therefore, starts 
as an end, and becomes a means for a further end, tor it be-
oomes structure. organization, continually readjusting itself 
tor new realizations in the direction of new ends, or better, 
in the direction of an end, its proper end, and finding endless 
t . It actua ions. (I.L. 23-4) 
In this passage Sturzo speaks of the social form "continu-
ally readjusting itself for new realizations." He also speaks 
ot "their transformation if they are no longer adapted to 
man's incessant urge to act." (I.L. 25) Although it is the 
torm that specifically differentiates a given society from 
another society, and although Sturzo recognizes certain funda-
mental forms, the family, political and religious forms, as 
present in all social life, these forms cannot be interpreted 
within Sturzo's theory as constituting unchangeable and fixed 
types. Social forms, tor Sturzo, are structural processes 
within the dynamic matrix of the human process so that every 
torm. has its own inner dynamism and its adaptation to the dyna-
aism of both other social forms and the total social process. 
Within such a dynamic conception of social life the social 
torms are perpetually becoming and being modified. The law of 
human evolution cannot "be evaded even by the societies that 
appear to be fully formed and definitive, such as political 
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·. ,ociety as represented by certain individual States. Just as 
political society today is in a process of evolution, with its 
~)l7thmt crises, involutions, so also are the family and reli-
gs.ous forms. Therefore, even in its fundamental forms human 
80018ty is not fixed in concrete types that, while channelling 
the social prooess, are not themselves subject to the process. 
sturzo goes so far in his procesaual stance as to state that 
"everything is a flux and reflux among the forms themselves, 
within each form and in the various social agglomerations, on 
the margins of the separate forms or or several forms together." 
(I.L. 15?; cf. I.e. 40-1) 
Such a processual view Rrima facie seems to give such a 
protean character to the social process as to deprive the social 
torms of the minimum of consistency and stability required if 
one is to properly designate them as structural processes. 
Sturzo recognizes this objection and answers it by reminding 
us that "the axis of this dynamism is the social consciousness, 
which is what makes every society coherent and stable, and 
makes it evolve in a process realized by immanent forces uni-
fied in rationality." (I.L. 24) True, social consciousness is 
not only the wellspring for the inner dynamism of the social 
torms but also the unifying principle and stabilizing factor. 
This stabilization by social consciousness manifests itself 
concretely in the fact that every society has its external 
features such as traditions, beliefs, rights, customs, laws. 
Sturzo presents two reasons tor these external features which 
clearly show the stability of the social forms. The fundamen-
tal reason lies in the inner necessity ot rationality to 
i I 
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project itself so that "every fact of consciousness ••• must !ind 
e11bodiment, for its explication, ~ust as our soul. in order to 
11ve and act, must form a single personal principle with the 
b04Y•" (I.L. 32) In addition to this reason arising from the 
nature o! consciousness, there is another reason following from 
the nature of the social forms themselves. As formed by social 
consciousness the social forms have a nuclear development con-
sisting of a network of intersecting and interacting relations. 
'.fhis kind of nucleated structure with its inner dynamism gener-
ated by the social consciousness has no fixed, enclosing frames. 
Since the social forms are set within the dynamism of a wider 
social process. if they are to maintain their own autonomous 
movement, they must be circumscribed and guaranteed, both from 
within and by the other interacting social forms. Such objec-
tification ot social consciousness as laws and traditions do 
this. 
Since the activity by which the social forms are esttblished 
is the activity by which the person achieves his own being, 
there are certain fundamental social forms that correspond to 
the permanent and irreducible exigencies of human nature. In 
the light of evidence from historical, experiential reality 
Sturzo discerns three such basic requirements: affective-pro-
creative communion, the guaranteeing of order and defense, and 
tinalistic-ethical principles. To each of these basic needs 
the family, political and religious forms of sociality, respec-
tively, correspond. (I.L. 25, 51; T.L. 262; M. 34) 
It is important to note that although these tlindamental 
forms are, for Sturzo, co-relative to permanent aspects of 
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human nature, he arrives at designating these three forms ".from 
bistorical, experimental reality," and not by deducing them 
from an antecedent theory of human nature. The reasons for 
this have already been suggested in that hum.an nature is not 
even logically prior to the socio-historical process. Its 
ideality is established in and through this process and it is 
rrom here that it must be derived. Although in view of the 
aims of this essay it is sufficient here for our purposes to 
briefly indicate more the conclusions of Sturzo's argumentation 
than its historical eVidence, nevertheless, he does present an 
extensive historical analysis of the fundamental social torms 
in the Inner Laws of Society in order to establish them as 
fundamental, as well as coeval and irreducible. 
Since the fundamental forms do correspond to the permanent 
exigencies of human nature, it follows that they are, in their 
essentials, at least, present in all ages and all ciVilizations. 
This may not appear to be actually the case historically since 
a clear-cut distinction between the social forms belongs to a 
fairly advanced stage in the developmental process of human 
society. In tact, it was only with the appearance of Christian-
ity that there was produced a clear-cut distinction between all 
three fundamental forms. Thus it may seem that a kind or tem-
poral linear progression characterizes the respective emergence 
or the different forms, beginning with the family, then the 
religious form and finally the political form. It is true that 
the family appears as the first fully articulated social form., 
but even where it appears in primitive societies as the prevailing 
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torm• "the other two subsist in an embryonic state and tend to 
evolve and win a physiognomy of their own as little by little 
tbe family nuclei interweave and multiply; and. ceasing to be 
nomadic, become stable. forming widespread tribes and creating 
villages and towns." (I.L. 25; cf. 68. 8?-8) Just as only 
gradually did the various kinds of families take concrete 
expression. so only gradually did concrete political and reli-
gious forms take shape. But these forms were also present from 
the beginning of the first familial social form, it only ten-
dentially and in an embryonic stage, though always towards a 
positive and autonomous concretization. Even in an elementary 
and primitive state a social form requires a guaranteeing of 
order and defenae--a function it may initially perform itself 
but contemporaneously giving rise to a distinct political 
form. (I.L. 50) Also, it is only in its religious expression 
that the primitive family was able to subsist as a stable and 
continuative social form. And this religious bond, although 
initially coinciding with the family, at the same time reached 
beyond it towards the formation of an autonomous form. There-
fore, these fundamental social forms cannot be interpreted as 
appearing in a progressive temporal sequence even though they 
do not simultaneously appear as clearly distinct trom one 
another. But when the one, that is, the family, does emerge 
as a definite, even if elementary and primitive. form., the others 
are also present in an inohoative manner. As projections of 
innate exigencies of human nature, the fundamental forms are 
coeval to one another. One can say that by definition they, 
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individually and together, traverse the entire span of the 
bUl'llan process so that they are not temporally related to one 
another as different moments in a linear development of human 
society. 
The contemporaneous coexistence of the three fundamental 
social forms, as well as their close connection, is also mani-
fested in the three kinds of guarantees that have always and 
everywhere ensured the autonomy of the family. One is intrin-
aic to the family consciousness, that is, the pervasive aware-
ness of belonging to each other and expressed "by the trepida-
tion and reserve of a rite responding to the instinct ot puden-
OJ• tt (I.L. 32) The second guarantee is the recognition by a 
wider human group that what hae been formed is an autonomous 
tamily unit, to which the children to be born will belong. In 
this public recognition the family receives from the existing 
political form the legal guarantees necessary for its stability, 
its social status, and economy. (I.L. 93) The third guarantee 
is provided by the religious consecration of the family. This 
may not be distinguishable in rite and spirit from the other 
two, but it is none the less present, giving the family its 
stability and the ethical elevation ot its natural end, which 
results in a stronger and more respected moral and social union. 
"What reaches beyond the historical fact and touches the root 
of the nature of the family as institution, is the constant 
exigency or these guarantees which 9 whatever concrete form they 
may taket in their essentials are never absent." (I.L. 33; ot. 
p. 324) 
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Even if one accepts the contemporeity of the three funda-
mental forms, the question remains as to how one form, that is, 
the family, could be the undifferentiated organ ot the other 
two if they are fundamental and irreducible to one another. 
Pirst of all it is recognized that in primitive society the 
ends proper to eaoh of the three forms were achieved through 
the one familial form, as in the patriarchal family in which 
the paterfamilias was also law-giver, judge, rulerand priest. 
fhis historical fact indicates that human consciousness had not 
developed to where it felt the diversity even of social rela-
tions that are substantially diverse, and therefore the merging 
or the confusion of social !unctions in a single organ did not 
create inner disturbance. In these elementary circumstances 
the fields of activity were limited and the margins of freedom 
restricted so that the finality proper to each fundamental form 
did not require an autonomous sphere of activity of its own in 
order to insure the freedom necessary for its realization. 
In these rudimentary eon<itions human consciousness was not able 
to differentiate its projections beyond the family form. But 
once any social relation, and especially those that are funda-
mental, comes to be experienced as autonomous, then "a stage of 
historic evolution is reached in which the need is felt tor the 
corresponding distinction of social organs and then activities." 
(I.a. 40; I.L. 76) Once the autonomy of a social form has been 
asserted by its members with the differentiation ot its organic-
f1nalistic character, any suppression or confusion of its organs 
and ends is a regression in the social process. (I.L. 118) 
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Also, in considering this problem of the irreducibility of 
tbe primary forms ot sociality and their original--original in 
a temporal and not ideal sense--lack of differentiation and 
their continuing movement of interference after they do achieve 
an autonomous form, an analytical distinction may be made in 
each social form between form and content. The form is the 
organio-finalistic structure that the interrelated activities 
ot associated individuals assumes. It is the modality of this 
activity. Content is "the whole practical activity in which 
aen engage within the various forms." (I.L. 51) There can be 
a transposition of the content, or activities, of one form into 
another one. Thus, in the example of primitive society when 
the family was the only prevailing form, it carried out the 
functions of the other two. Another example would be a theocracy 
such as that of the Hebrews at certain periods when it assumed 
the functions of the political form. Today there is a transpo-
sition of activities to the political form from the oth~r social 
forms, both primary and secondary. (I.L. 51-2) The reason why 
this transposition of content continues even today after the 
social forms are differentiated is that the dynamism of collec-
tive consciousness tends to outstrip the relative stability of 
the historically established forms. This process tends to bring 
about modifications in the structure of the form. If there is 
no_change in the form, a dualism is created between form and 
content, which leads to the great crises and revolutionary 
•oments of history. "Yet, never can content and form be really 
•eparated, so that, even through analytical disintegration, they 
come always to new unifying syntheses." (I.L. 57) 
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In the dynamic flow of the socio-historic process there is 
a continuous dialectical movement by the social forms, tending 
on the one hand towards autonomy and on the other towards reci-
procal interference and the predominance or one torm over the 
others. The limiting points in this fluctuating motion are, 
on the one side, an autonomy that is never totally achieved, 
and, on the other, an interference that never succeeds in 
merging and suppressing the others. All social forms, even if 
they nave not in tact actually achieved it, tend to individua-
tion and autonomy. This tendency to autonomy by the social form 
1s rooted in the very thrust or the concretization ot sociality, 
•ince it is in this act that the individual achieves his own 
personal autonomy. Therefore, this tendency can never be com-
pletely suppressed, although the counteracting movement ot 
interference between social forms may, in certain instances, 
appear to have done so. It is this constant tendency toward 
autonomy that provides the dynamism to the social processes 
which makes possible human process.(I.L. 118) 
Given the character of the social process, it is clear that 
the term "autonomy" does not mean a separation from other social 
forms nor even from other social relations. It does refer to 
the self-dependent existence of one social form from another 
and the independence of activity, but it is not the self-depen-
dent existence or independence of a biological organism, but 
rather of a "specific and characteristic personality." (I.e. 3?) 
'- That is, the term must not be interpreted in a biological sense, 
but rather in a personalistic, and therefore, relational sense. 
I 
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t'bS autonomy of the social forms is not that of a self-contained, 
complete, and self-subsistent reality such as a biological orga-
The reality of the social forms is a nucleated network 
ot relations bound together by a collective consciousness, so 
that sociological autonomy, the autonomy of a social form, is 
achieved once there is the consciousness that a communion of 
interests and ends has been created. "Just as for an autonomous 
society to affirm itself its members must be conscious of it as 
such the moment that this consciousness is formed, autonomy is 
affirmed." (I.L. 88) This is true for all forms of sociality, 
whether fundamental or secondary; but since the fundamental 
torms are original and irresolvable into any other, the conscious-
ness that constitutes their autonomy includes a recognition of 
their originality and irresolvability. 
That the autonomy of the social forms is never complete or 
self-contained is due to the tact that it is the individual 
person that is the efficacious and vivifying element of the 
social forms. The relational nature of the individual person 
extends beyond the confines ot any one social form to help give 
shape to several according to the various needs of his own life. 
'l'he social eomple:xus that arises from. the interaction of indi-
viduals involves, then, the intertwinings and interferences 
among the social forms. It is only by reason of a logical or 
legal abstraction that we think of social forms as complete, 
self-contained realities. "Thus we speak of the family, but 
no one thinks that the whole category of the relationships of 
those persons constituting a family is exhausted within its 
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circle. It is the same when we speak of tribe, village, city, 
state, Church." (I.L. 245) 
Within the social process the collective consciousness of 
a larger society will encompass various social forms that 
express all the spheres ot the interrelated activity of the 
associated members. According to the times and circumstances, 
there will be a transposition of content from one to another, 
or to one from all the others, or even a confusion or organs 
and ends depending on the orientation of the collective con-
sciousness. These interferences among the social forms are 
regulated by the consciousness of autonomy the members ot these 
torms have. "It this consciousness is keen on both sides, there 
arises a tension that may become a conflict. If, on the con-
trary. it is weak on the one side, the weaker side suffers an 
interference that may become a superposition or a contusion of 
organs and ends." (I.L. 92) 
In this two-fold movement towards autonomy and interter-
ence, history presents an undulating series of combinations 
with one of the other of the three fundamental forms predomi-
nating. As Sturzo states, "the sociological problem of inter-
ference of forms is highly complex and can be clarified only 
on the historical plane, in which all experiences have their 
concrete expression." (I.L. 51) It is sufficient for our pur-
poses to note three historical experiences that mark salient 
Phases in this movement and at the same time cover its range. 
The first experience is that which we.have already noted 
in the case of the family in primitiYe society in which one 
~ 
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contains within itself the other forms. The second exper-
ience is "that of the nearly always unequal development of the 
tbl'ee forms with a marked tendency towards autonomy." (I.L. 26) 
In this instance two of the forms struggle with each other in 
aeeking their own autonomy, while the third is subordinate to 
•hem and develops within them. The third experience is "the 
semi-autonomous development of all three forms, with juridical 
ties, tending towards unification on a higher plane," either on 
the religious plane as in the Middle Ages or on the political 
level as in the modern period. (I.L. 2?) 
Several important conclusions can be drawn from this flue-
tuating movement of the social forms towards autonomy and reci-
procal interference. First of all, as each fundamental form 
achieves its own autonomy, this disengagement brings about a 
greater sense of autonomy in the others, with a clarification 
ot their own intrinsic value, organic structure and raison d'etre. 
But at the same time the tendency towards autonomy never attains 
the stage of complete independence or unrelatedness to the 
other forms. Even at the maximum degree of autonomy they ever 
achieve in the socio-historical procesa they are always rela-
tive to one another within the sphere of a collective conscious-
ness that is differentiated according to the exigencies of 
human nature. 
Even when the domestic form contains within itself 
all other forms, it remains inwardly bound and bounded 
by them, while the other two forms, tending in their 
turn to evolve and to assume their own structure and 
organs, permeate the further evolution of the domes-
tic form, with a mutual exchange of influence. (I.L. 
2?; cf. 93) 
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fbus, these forms at any moment in the social process never 
attain more than a relative autonomy. They form a complex 
network of relations with one another in which they give even 
turther expression of the inexhaustible oapac1t1es of the 
individual person. For, as the religious and political forms 
are articulated they develop a wider social complexua that 
weaves a web of relationships around and through these differ-
entiated semi-autonomous forms. This continuing process brings 
about a transformation in each while at the same time it 
receives from each its unique imprint in its always present 
autonomous movement. Therefore, the second general conclusion 
that can be made of this two-fold movement is that the funda-
mental social forms can never be merged, or one totally sup-
pressed or absorbed in another because even in their interrela-
tions and transposition of functions, each always tends towards 
its own autonomy. For example, even in the fiercest persecu-
tions of the religious form, when it is held in complete sub-
jection to one or the other fundamental form, its continuing 
trend to its own autonomy manifests itself in its eventual 
reemergence. A third conclusion that can be drawn from histori-
cal experience is that there is never a stabilizing balance or 
moment of perfect equilibrium between the three primary forms. 
Rather, one of the three always attempts to predominate over 
the others, to resolve them into itself and unify them. This 
produces either a temporary period of social stasis and reces-
sion or an immediate or eventual counter-movement by the others 
towards a reaffirmation of their own autonomy because one form 
cannot resolve into itsel£ the intrinsic value and raison d'etre 
'.1. 
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ot the other two. The reason tor this lies in what constitutes 
tbe central theorem of Sturzo's social theory, namely, that the 
one and only substantive principle or society is the individual 
person so that "it is the individual consciousness alone, that 
18 , rational man, that effectually resolves into itself every 
social form, and which in its autonomy unifies all the various 
elements of human sociality. It grades the ends of the various 
social forms within which it unfolds its activity, since meta-
physically it is the term and end of society itself"." (I.L.55) 
Although the fundamental forms express permanent and irre-
ducible dimensions of human consciousness, they by no means 
exhaust its power. depth and range. In addition to these 
tundamental social forms there are also other secondary or 
derivative forms. The term "secondary" as applied to these 
forms does not imply that they are not essential to the social 
structure or are not significant in the social process, but 
rather signifies that they are not original and irresolvable 
into the fundamental forms, from which they derive the elements 
tor their constitution and development. As a sociological clas-
sification, the secondary forms are reducible to the three fun-
damental areas. They function as a "structural nexus of society, 
develop its continguity, and create particular states of con-
sciousness ••• but as a whole they serve as a mediation between 
one form and the other, giving a fuller development to their 
dynamism." (I.L. 156; cf. pp. 15? and 129) They are vital 
ligaments that form the connecting tissues, as it were, between 
the fundamental forms, integrating them and conditioning their 
development. 
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Among the secondary .forae, one of the most important is 
economy of which Sturzo makes an extended analysis. Economy 
aaY be considered from two points of view, either as a condi-
tioning of social life or as a special social form. The first 
refers to its function of providing means of subsistence, the 
iecond to the communal labor and organization that is required 
to obtain the means of subsistence. This latter requirement 
1s part of the two-fold aspect of economy that transforms its 
crude materiality into a social value of unquestionable worth 
transcending its physico-hedonistic nature and becoming a moral 
factor of communal life. This two-told aspect of economy is 
that of solidarity, in that those who are able provide tor 
those who cannot, and this in turn leads to the second aspect, 
the tendency to establish an economy in common as a sharing 
in the material resources made available by communal living. 
These two aspects together "represent the ethieo-social ten-
dency of economics as such." (I.L. 9?; cf. pp. 95-?) .Economy 
is one or the immediate ends o:f all human activity, even reli-
gious, since the material means for living is obviously an in-
dispenaible aspect of any social form. Therefore, it is not a 
fundamental social form, for Sturzo, because it ''is not autono-
mous and has not a finalism of its own, but it shares in the 
nature and finalism of the fundamental forms of sociality." 
(I.L. 9?;98) It depends on the fundamental forms, but at the 
same time is a necessary element in them "as conditioning the 
manner in which these can develop and attain their end.n (I.L. 
26) It must be emphasized that economy is only "one or the 
immediate ends" or social activity. There is always the danger 
1 I 
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of an inversion of ends within a social form so that the quest 
tor and accumulation of material goods becomes the primary and 
prevailing end, in which is the negation of the very essence 
of the social form in which this inversion or ends occurs. 
As with all social structures, the economic structure 
should be organic. This means that within a given society the 
economic structure should be assimilated into the total com-
plexus of' the society so that in functioning through its or-
ganic structure the materiality of economics would be transformed 
into its ethico-social value, "through the creation of a com-
munion and soliqarity in the production and distribution of 
goods. 11 (I.L. 124) In doing this the economic organs function 
as instruments tor the social forms and as a co-ordinating link 
between them. At the same time the economic structure of a 
social form is closely associated to the autonomy of' the social 
torms since it is this that allows for an indispensible margin 
of freedom within each social form. For Sturzo, a margin of 
freedom is never lacking in any social form, "but the question 
is whether it be sufficient or not to create the necessary 
social dynamism." (I.L. 119) The economic structure helps 
proVide for this. 
Economy is so basic to individual and social life and its 
influence so pervasive, that the misinterpretations or its 
nature and role abound. Among these, two are of special theor-
etical and historical significance. One is the interpretation 
ot the economic structure as a tertium quid whose process is 
governed wholly by deterministic laws. Sturzo admits to the 
I: I' 
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causal role and influence that physical elements and forces play 
in economics, but there are also functioning such human factors 
as ethical, psychological and political considerations. The 
primary agent in economic causality remains the individual 
person who regulates it and makes it serve his needs. "The 
synthesis of the two factors, man and nature, gives us human 
economics neither wholly free nor wholly deterministic." (I.L. 
97) The other error, of which the historical materialism of 
Marx is representative. consists in making economics the single 
tundamental law of history, which means that all ethico-social 
tactors are materialistically resolved into the material fac-
tor, and thereby giving rise to a fundamental determinism. 
'!'his theory is a prime example of the fallacy of abstractionism, 
inasmuch as it presents "an interpretation of concrete reality 
which makes abstraction of its essential factors and their 
concrete syntbeses.n (T.L. 9) For what this theory does is to 
overestimate one of the factors--as important and indispensable 
as it ia--o! human life and to give it the value ot a synthesis, 
resolving in it all the complexity of human reality in its 
socio-historical process. Sturzo himself, as has been indi-
cated, emphasizes the economic influence on society, but he 
denies "that it forms the sole social, historical causality, 
and that it is a deterministic causality." (I.L. 101) 
Other examples of secondary forms besides economy which are 
considered by Sturzo are the international community, class 
organizations, political parties and religious sects, labor 
organizations, racial, national, or religious minorities, uni-
~ersities, the organs of local government such as villages, 
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cities, regions, federated States, all of which have their own 
historico-ethical personality, so that they are not just poli-
tical units of a State. "Their moral reality is greater than 
their political character. 0 (I.L. 154; ct. pp. 129-58) All o! 
these forms, with the exception of the international community, 
which is an amplification in extension and depth of the three 
tundamental forms, are either "intermediate forms between the 
totality of a society and the elementary nucleus, or remaining 
on the margins of the various forms, or grouping men together 
in special categories." (I.L. 153) 
All of these concrete social forms, both primary and 
secondary, can be considered in two ways: either in terms o! 
their individual character, which constitutes their positivity, 
or more importantly, as process, that is, the dynamic inter-
twining of relationships and activities by which they sustain 
a continuity and thereby establish a socio-historical complexus, 
which embraces all the social forms together while at the same 
time stretching beyond them. The term that Sturzo uses to 
explain this process whereby the primary and secondary forms 
are united in socio-complexus is "sociological synthesis," 
which itself constitutes a wider social unity in the context 
ot which all the social forms may be viewed in their relations 
to one another. (N. & I. 13) Sturzo also uses the term "syn-
thesis" to apply to specific synthesizing aspects of sociality: 
liberty-authority, law-morality, duality-diarchy. Each of 
these is a social force within the structure of a special form 
and in their dualistic polarization they bring about the social 
•Y?ltheses that give to the social forms their cohesion, movement 
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and oontinuity (I.L. 158; 189) In either use of the term, 
sturzo does not explicitly explain it nor does he coordinate 
the two uses. But in the present context its meaning is clear 
as referring to a wider social unity that embraces smaller 
social units while these maintain their own individuality and 
autonomy. 
Sturzo applies the term "society" to both the wider social 
unity and to smaller social units that compose it. One place 
where he clearly distinguishes these is in discussing the secon-
darY forms as "intermediate forms between the totality of a 
society and the elementary nucleus." (I.L. 153) The "totality 
of a society" is a higher social unity such as an ethnic group 
or nation •. He also uses the term "human society as a whole" 
or simply 0 human society" as distinct from its concrete expres-
sions in specific social forms or groups. For example, in dis-
oussing the alternation of dynamic and stabilizing currents in 
society, he states, "It is to be found in all social groups that 
are really alive; and it is in human society as a whole, in the 
continual movement or groups and development of activities.'' 
(I.L. 256) In International Community and the Right of War he 
distinguishes between "the generic concept of human society" or 
"human society in general" and its concrete materializations, 
i.e. family, city, nation, etc. (I.e. 36; 39) 
The social groups which compose this higher totality are 
not by this fact dissolved into the totality so as to form one 
overall homogenous society. Society cannot be interpreted in 
a holistic sense. The "totality of a soe1ety 0 that Sturzo speaks 
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ot 1s not any kind of closed totality, but rather is a tendency 
within a process. It is the constant process of the emergence 
of social groups each with the two-told tendency towards auton-
orAY and interference. "No one therefore, can doubt that outside 
the circle of his own particular nuoleus ••• there are relations 
perpetually developing in a two-fold sense, both individual and 
collective, which tend to acquire juridical status and to give 
birth to incipient institutions." (I.e. 39) They are not ab-
sorbed by the tendency to complexity and totality. Societ7, 
then, is structurally pluralistic, composed of a multiplicity 
or social groups each with their own individuality and ends. 
This structural pluralism contains within itself a principle of 
social organicity because a plurality o! social groups cannot 
exist without organic structu~al co-ordination.3 
But pluralism, for Sturzo, not only is an analytical for-
mula of the nuclear and organic structure of society, but also 
is expressive of "the need of individual initiative to form 
always a new series of nuclei, in agreement or in opposition. 
This is a centrifugal dynamism truly necessary to counterbalance 
centripetal dynam.ism."4 The character o! society, whether on 
the level of particular social forms taken singularly or on the 
level of wider social unities, "is not static and final, unable 
to overstep the limits of a determined order that in substance 
ia nothing more than the quasi-present, or that which we have 
3sturzo, "The Philosophic Background of Chris'tian Democ-
racy," p. 14; M. 121. 
4 Sturzo, "The Philosophic Background ot Christian Be moo-
racy," pp. 13-14. 
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pown and experienced." (I.e. 39) 
Since it is the individual person that is the efficient 
principle of society, this continual expansion of society indi- 1
1 
oates on the part of the individual person "a continuous 
aspiration to transcend the concrete experience of actual life 
s.n wider participations •••• 11 (I.L. 310) We have seen that the 
individuation of society is that aspect of the differentiation-
tn-synthesis relationship between the individual person and 
society that corresponds to the attaining of personal individu-
ality and autonomy. This aspect of the concretizing of sociality 
limits him to those determined societies to which he belongs. 
But that basic thrust of sociality, or the other side of the 
differentiation-in-synthesis relationship, by which the person 
attains his individuality precisely in and through relationships 
impels the individual beyond the limits of those societies. The 
reason tor this has already been suggested. The projection ot 
rational consciousness, although the generative principle of the 
concrete social forms, is not identical with these !orms whether 
taken in their specific and diversified positivity or in the 
fullness of their higher synthesis. It is the inexhaustible 
principle of these forms, which are expressive ot, but never 
adequate to, that fundamental act. The thrust of this act then, 
whereby the individual person and the social forms are consti-
tuted together, extends to an ever greater sphere of relation-
ships--greater not only in extension but also in intensity, 
whereby there is effected a higher synthesis of values--and 
by that very fact deepening the value of the individual person-
ality. 
_ _J 
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fb1s process constitutes a basic sociological law, the 
iaw of transcendence, which Sturzo formulated as "the transcen-
aence of a given social nucleus through the formation of a 
vtder collective consciousness." (T.L. 204) Tb.is law has 
aiready been indicated when we were dealing with the develop-
aent of collective consciousness and its unification. The 
term "transcendence" in this instance simply means "the proces-
sive passage to another term that elicits it,n or in other words 
"the overstepping ot the limits of one stage into another." 
fhis law encompasses several processes. It involves the ini-
'ial projection of the individual into society, the passage of 
consciousness trom one group to another, the interference 
among the social forms in the transposition of content and 
the formation of a wider social synthesis. The progressive 
passage from primitive man to ourselves is also considered by 
Sturzo as the process of transcendence. 
Primitive man is, for us, on the border of animality; 
the distance between him and ourselves is almost im-
measurable. The process between these two terms, a 
process made up of the strivings of ages, has been a 
continuous surmounting of the predominance of animal 
nature with its strong instincts so as to make possi-
ble life in common in kindred nuclei. In the face of 
primitive man, society presents itself as a transcen-
dence with intellectual and ethical characters. (I.L. 
309) 
It has already been established how this process has a 
reciprocating movement so that its outward current flows back 
upon the smaller social units to the source of its movement, 
the individual person, who is thereby able to further project 
himself. "The sphere of human personality may thus widen out 
into immense cycles which we call civilizations, transcending 
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single peoples, particular languages. geographical and politi-
cal barriers and even oceans." (T.L. 208) Sturzo, however, 
holds that the formation of ever wider social synthesis arising 
out of the process ot transcendence terminates "on the threshold 
of the society of mankind." (I.L. 21) The reason why Sturzo 
denies the possibility of a social synthesis that would embrace 
all of mankind is that on this level there would not be the 
differentiation that is the negative moment necessary not only 
tor a social unification. but also for the dynamism of the 
social process. Sturzo rejects any hypothesis that would 
bring the dynamism of the social process to any kind of teleo-
logical staticism. The theoretical basis for this rejection 
lies, as has been suggested, in his theory of rationality. 
Although Sturzo denies that a universal social synthesis is a 
concrete possibility, nevertheless, he recognizes the idea 
itself both as an efficacious ideal and as expressive of the 
actual orientation of mankind. 0 Within the active totality 
of men we may conceive of a web of individuated societies, with 
ever widening relationships, so as to touch the idea of univer-
sality, without ever wholly achieving it." (I.L. 21) 
The most concrete expression of this idea of universality 
was achieved with the advent of Christianity. The reason for 
this does not lie solely on its unique and transcendent charac-
teristics, although it is through these that the orientation of 
mankind towards universalism and solidarity above families, 
classes, nations, and races is actualized, but in the very 
nature of religion as a social form. In fact, it is religion 
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that is the moving force of sociality and its ultimate expres-
sion. It is both the presupposition ot the other social forms 
and an irreducible form in its own right. As mentioned previ-
ously, it was only with the advent of Christianity that there 
was a clearcut distinction between the three fundamental 
social forms. These factors make it imperative to present the 
role that religion plays in the structural proc~as ot society 
according to Sturzo•s social theory. 
The originality and irreducibility of religion as a social 
torm is indicated by the fact that whereas the family is rooted 
in man's affective procreative need and the polity on the need 
tor order in his social life and its defense, religion is groun-
ded in "the exigency of an absolute principle, and the conse-
quent projection of sociality towards the absolute which com-
mands the present reality.'' {I.L. 66) This exigency does not 
follow simply, or even basically, from the contingency of human 
existence, but rather is inherent in our very nature as persons. 
It is tor this reason that this need of the absolute is concre-
tized in a distinct and fundamental social form. If this exi-
gency were a consequence simply of the contingency of our exis-
tence, it would not give rise to a distinct social form that 
is common to every human society from the most primitive to 
the most advanced, while, yet at the same time, there is no 
analogue to it on any other level of reality. As John Macmurray 
has pointed out, this indicates that nthe universal, common 
root of religion in human experience is definitely personal. 
Religion is bound up with that in our experience which makes 
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persons and not mere organisms."5 
It has already been established that, for Sturzo, the 
process constitutive of the person is the concretizing of 
sociality, so that it is only in transcending himself that 
the individual actualizes his personal nature. This process 
finds the ultimate expression of its dynamism in religion. The 
constitutive principle of this process, as has been determined, 
is rationality. The interior necessity of rationality tor ful-
fillment generates a movement that draws in its wake the need 
tor the infinite and the absolute. The only spark that can 
ignite that movement·and haV,e the power to sustain it is the 
obscure, but concrete conscious exigency for the absolute. 
This relationship with the absolute reveals itself in the 
modality of our knowledge. In every act of knowledge there is 
an intuitional awareness of a totality that encompasses within 
itself both the subject and object while at the same time 
transcending them. This totality cannot be identified with the 
spatial-temporal whole that constitutes our existential world. 
Beyond space and time there is still a comprehensive 
and transcendental totality that calls us, ma.king us 
feel the finite place we occupy and the infinite towards 
which we ascend •••• Nor should it be said that we have 
no consciousness of such a religion as emergent with 
every act of knowing, because it is implicit in us and 
may become explicit whenever we attempt to search more 
deeply into the object known and the value of knowing. (T.L. 214-5) 
'When Sturzo states that the consciousness of our relationship 
with the totality is "emergent with every act of knowing," he 
is referring to the tact that it is not antecendent to the act 
5Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 156. 
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of knowing, nor a product or experience, but is present in and 
concomitant with every act of knowledge. Just as we only 
gradually come to an awareness or ourselves, so do we only 
gradually come to an explicit awareness of our relationship with 
the totality. 
But as we only achieve self-awareness in the presence of 
others, the primary and basic relationship must be 'o a Per-
sonal Absolute, so that a primitive awareness of this Absolute 
is the ground for self-awareness; it is within the ambit of 
the primary relationship to this Absolute that the relationships 
with other persons are established. Thus, this relationship 
to the Absolute, as intrinsic to the process constitutive of 
the person 
is connatural to the thinking subject in such a way 
that it must be attained in some manner or other by 
every subject in its intuition (or awareness) or it-
self. In such an act, the subject forms a distinct 
idea neither of the absolute nor of the contingent, 
nor of their connection; but it understands the neces-
sity of a stable reality to which it is related and 
in which in a certain manner it participates. The 
intuition or the "whole'• as we have explained and 
discussed it is a movement of interior necessity 
towards the absolute. (S.P. 39) 
It is precisely this movement that is the inner impulsion of 
rationality toward expression and fulfillment. It is this 
relationship with the Absolute that gives to the tendency of 
rationality its inexhaustible dynamism. 
With all its superstitions, aberrant and false beliefs, and 
perverse deviations in its historical realizations, religion 
is the social embodiment of this relationship with the Absolute. 
'l'he distortions and erroneous paths that the projection of 
: I 
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this need has given rise to are simply a manifestation of the 
constitutive tinitude that generates this need. By reason of 
this finitude the absolute "reveals itself to us gradually as 
the intellect understands particular reality in its essences 
and individualizations, in its systemizations and in its rela-
tions; it reveals itself gradually as the will and human action 
realize, in .faot, the truths which are known.n (S.P. 40) Reli-
gion, then, even in its primitive and instinctive forms in its 
aberrations and errors, is essentially, as a tendency in process, 
"the transcendent expression of the truth thought and ot the 
good willed." (T.L. 209) 
Since the irrepressible tendency of rationality is revealed 
to be essentially a movement toward the Absolute, religion is 
revealed to be the root and ultimate expression of this movement 
and thereby the concretization o! sociality. Religion, then, 
is the focal point of the unification of consciousness, both 
individual and collective, and of the convergent activity ot 
associated efforts, giving value and stability to the develop-
ment of collective consciousness. "At bottom, the elements 
that may draw the people together in mutual understanding and 
fruitful contact are only the ethico-religious; and on these, 
through practical collaboration, a historical consciousness 
and a wider civilization ma;y be created." (T.L. 211) Since 
religion is the focal and stabilizing point of the concretiza-
tion of sociality, human solidarity and universalism can only 
be realized and preserved through a universalizing religion, 
Which is Christianity alone. 
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In pre-Christian times the religious orientation of con-
•ciousness was expressed in attributing to the family, the 
tribe, the dynasty, the empire perpetuity and even an absolute 
quality so that they became divine manifestations. Although 
tbeY were not commensurate with religious consciousness, it 
was through these other social forms that it expressed itself, 
10 that they became the expression of religion. Religion, then, 
and the unification of consciousness was particularistic and 
iplit-up. The concretization of religious consciousness was 
always restricted to the collective personality of specific 
eocial groups, each with their own cult and gods. Religion was 
~onsidered to be the relationship between the particular social 
group and its gods, because there was no direct sociological 
resolution beyond the group itself. As sharing in and manifes-
ting the divine, each unifying group, whether it was the family, 
'b'ibe, or an empire, was looked upon as an entity complete in 
itself, the end of all collective endeavors. In order for there 
to be a universal religious social form whioh would transcend 
the boundaries of every group personality there had to be 
attirmed not simply the idea of one true God who supplanted 
all particular deities, but rather one God in whose presence 
all men stand in a direct and personal relationship. The Hebrew 
people arrived at the conception of one God but the religion 
founded on this belief did not establish a direct relationship 
between the individual and God, but between the Chosen People 
and God so that this relationship was exclusive to the chosen 
People. They, therefore, had no sense or solidarity with other 
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peoples. It is only in the direot and personal relationship 
with one God that men acquire the sense of equality, solidar-
1_, and universality above classes, nations, and races, because 
oonoomitant with the recognition of this relationship there is 
an awareness that all men stand together in the same order of 
)eing. It is precisely Christianity that effected this rela-
tionship and it is this that is at the basis of its originality 
trom the viewpoint or a social theory. ..The novelty ot Chris-
tianity, from the sociological standpoint, as compared with 
other religions, lay in its breaking down every obligatory 
s-elationship between religion and the family, tribe, or nation, 
toun.ding it on the personal conscience." (I.L. 81J Christianity 
has released the personal conscience from the external chains 
ot the family, tribe. caste, or nation, by giving to it the 
primacy of value and responsibility. This is a permanent and 
always present liberation placed at the base ot every liberty. 
lut at the same time it imposes on the individual the obligation 
to unite with others in a joint embrace or free men because all 
al'• bound by a mutual love, a single love with a two-told object: 
Clod, in Whose presence all stand together as brothers, and one's 
D.eighbor. 1'his shitting of the center of gravity ot religious 
experienae from the mediation ot other social'forms to the 
individual person is at the foundation or the slow penetration 
into the social structure of the spirit and ethics ot Chris-
tianity, which has left an indelible imprint on the socio-his-
torical process, t~anstorming and elevating it without any com-
P&rison to all preceding and concomitant social forms. (ct. c. 
& P. 61) 
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The universality of Christianity, which is another compo-
oent in its sociological uniqueness, logically follows from its 
foundation in a direct and inviolable personal relationship 
with an all-embracing God. As St. Paul states it, "For in 
Christ Jesus you are all sons of God through your faith. For 
all of you who have been baptized into union with Christ have 
clothed yourselves with Christ. There is no room for 'Jew• and 
•Greek'; there is no room for 'slave' and 'freeman'; there is 
no room for 'male' and 'female'; for in union with Christ Jesus 
10u are all one."
6 For Christianity, then, Christ has destroyed 
the ancient boundaries and divisions of religion or race or 
social stature and replaced them by Himself in Whom all men must 
come together. Only with the preaching of the Gospel was there 
a moral spirit capable of unifying different peoples and making 
effective the principles of human solidarity and universality 
to be extended to all classes, races and peoples. The unifying 
and transforming power of this Gospel lies in the spirit of 
love on which it is based as a personal religion. As such, it 
makes a direct appeal to men for an acceptance in the inner 
freedom of their own consciences. "In this inner freedom the 
aoral act and the religious act coincide and complete each 
other. Any external and imposed morality and any purely formal-
istic religion would never be able to reach man's inner life 
and bring the sense of universality." (T.L. 254) It is only as 
rooted in this inner freedom that the spirit of love can draw 
the strength and vitality to extend to all men. 
6Galatians, 3:26-28. 
I 
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It may be objected that Christianity itself does not over-
come the particularism of other social forms and previous reli-
gtons since it does not in fact embrace all men. But since the 
~•alitY of a social form consists in the associated conscious-
ness of its members, it is from this consciousness that it 
derives its characteristic features. Universality characterizes 
it "if the consciousness of the members of a society affirm it 
as a special characteristic, as a belief, as a mission. Such 
is the Christian consciousness; it is and cannot but be catho-
lic, that is, universal." {I.L. 89; ct. T. L. 247) It is a 
dynamic universality that is a tendency in process. It would 
not be brought to completion even if all men were in fact Chris-
tians because it has a two-dimensional directionality, not only 
extending outward toward all men in ever:y generation but also 
penetrating inward into the hearts of men. It is a universality 
that is open-ended in both directions because it extends outward 
only to the extent that it penetrates inward. 
A third social innovation etf ected by the advent ot Ohris-
tiani ty was the complete disengagement ot the religious torm 
from the other social forms, establishing a complete, permanent, 
and universal religious organization that is independent o! any 
and all domestic and political institutions. This does not mean 
that the pre-Christian religions had no autonomy or their own; 
tor this would run counter to the nature or religion as a funda-
mental torm. Even in the merging and superimposing of forms 
there is always operative an intrinsic tendency towards autonomy. 
What it does mean is that it is only with Christianity that the 
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religious form achieved autonomy in both its content and orga-
nizational structure. The reason for this lies in the same 
fact that gave all pre-Christian religions their particularis-
tic character: 
••• no pre-Christian religion, not even that or Israel, 
was founded on human personality in its spiritual 
value, so as to reach society as a unitary complexus 
through personality and only through it. On the con-
trary, all the pre-Christian religions were founded 
on society as a unitary complexus without any direct 
resolution into human personality. Such resolutions 
were always indirect and incomplete. (I.L. 85; ct. 81-2; 
C. & S. 21; T.L. 245-6) 
In the intertwining and compenetrating influence or the 
social forms, the positive actuation of Christianity with the 
uniqueness of its socio-historical features has worked a truly 
transformative effect on the entire structural process of 
human society and its relation to the individual. The first 
consequence of the advent of Christianity was the humanization 
or the other social forms. They were no longer considered as 
divine manifestations. and therefore, ends unto themselves to 
which the individual was subordinated. As they lost their 
religious expression in the light of Christianity, domestic 
and political forms were reduced to the level of purely human 
forms, becoming means for man and not ends unto themselves. 
Yet, while Christianity did remove all prestige of participating 
in the divine from the social forms, reducing them to their 
human relativity, it at the same time "gave them new life by 
its ethical inspiration and unified them in a religious spirit 
and purpose." (I.L. 83; ct. p. 82; o. & s. 21) 
This overthrowing or old social conceptions brought about 
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• fundamental revaluation of the human person as the center 
ot gravity o! the socio-historical process shifted from the 
iocial forms to the individual person. "Human personality, 
until then ignored or unappreciated, became the center and end 
o! all collective activity, in virtue of a religious recogni-
tion. It was called to reconstruct society from the beginning, 
as though by a rebirth." (I.L. 83; C. & S. 22) Since society 
is in fact grounded in the individual person toward whom all 
social values are ordered, the subordination of the individual 
to the social form, as in pre-Christian societies was a distinc-
tion of the social order. The reordering of society toward the 
individual person, then, was in effect a conversion and restora-
ti on. 
Through its religious elevation of the individual person 
and in establishing the equality of all men before a single 
God, Christianity effected a transformation in all social rela-
tionships throughout every level of society, modifying the 
entire social process. To point out a rew examples, beginning 
with that basic unit of every society, the family, Christianity 
removed the ethical basis of the polygamous family because 
such a family structure is based on the inequality of the sexes. 
Christianity made effective the basic equality of the sexes in 
their mutual relationships because it established it on the 
spiritual solidarity or every man and woman before God. If it 
bas taken centuries tor this equalitarian concept to take root 
in social consciousness and acquire an ethical and social effi-
cacy, it is because domestic, economic, and juridical traditions 
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and legislation have perpetrated the inferiority of women in 
all areas of activity. Christianity also cut at the root of 
~be notion that the inequality between different social orders 
was one of nature, gave the concept of justice its firmest 
toundation and widest extension, removed the ethical basis of 
slavery, although its economic basis remained, and every other 
torm ot social oppression or injustice (I.L. 46-?, 83, 112; 
o. & s. 22) 
Finally, another effect that resulted from the advent of 
Christianity was, as noted previously, the clarification of the 
specific functions, organs and ends of the fundamental social 
torms, bringing about an increased sense of autonomy in each 
ot them. "Sociologically, the disengagement of one social form 
develops a greater sense of autonomy in the others." (I.L. 93) 
Since it was only with Christianity that the religious form 
assumed its own autonomy, only then was there a clear-cut dis-
tinction between the three primary forms. As separated trom a 
religion or their own, the domestic and political torm.s were 
more able to define and develop their distinctive consciousness 
since their own content and organization were both more clearly 
distinguishable from those of the religious form. Also, in the 
Church's struggle for its own autonomy whereby its members 
acquire an ever clearer and deeper consciousness of it as such 
--which is precisely what constitutes its autonomy--this strug-
gle produces a similar result in the other forms from which it 
is disengaging itself. The fact that this struggle is never-
ending, especially with the political form, simply gives evidence 
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an autonomous religious form has arisen because, as such, 
in the counterpuntal movement of interference between the forms, 
it limits the political form and is itself in turn limited by 
the political form. {I.L. 88) 
In Sturzo's theory of the structural formation of society, 
then, the social forms are the concrete expressions ot the 
concretizing o.f sociality. As such, they express the individual 
person seeking to define himself in the multi-dimensional struc-
ture of his nature. Since they unfold together on the level of 
human activity, they are processual in nature, being shaped by 
their own inner dynamism as well as that of the other social 
forms and of the total socio-historical process. Therefore, 
in accordance with the fundamental cognitive orientation of 
his theory, Sturzo states that, "so long as we consider groups 
and groups or groups analytically as individualities by them-
selves, or as individualities in a conventional framework, we 
are simply dealing with an abstraction. The reality is other-
wise. We must consider them in their activity." (I.L. 255) 
Therefore, it is to their activity we must now turn. 
I 
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CHAPTER III 
SOCISTY IN DYNAMIC PROCESS 
An "open pluralism" is the phrase that best oharacterizes 
the structure of society. This holds true both in the consti-
tution of its totality as composed of a multiplicity ot social 
nuclei, with each conscious of its own autonomy and purpose, 
and in the make-up of its composing social forms. Collective 
consciousness of its very nature, is, !or Sturzo, intrinsically 
pluralistic, whether it is considered on the level or associa-
ted individuals or on the level of a higher social unity, com-
posed of associated groups. The principle of differentiation-
in-synthesis is a principal leitmotiv in Sturzo's theory that 
is operative on every level of society, from the individual 
person to the widest social unity because it flows from the 
very nature of sociality as an ontological structure of the 
person. As a result. the entire thrust of his theory runs 
counter to any monistic view of society in which the composing 
units, whether individuals or groups, are viewed as merging 
into the collectivity like drops of rain falling on the ocean. 
Nevertheless, the term "pluralism" carries a certain nega-
tive connotation in Sturzo's social theory. To view society 
as pluralistic is, for Sturzo, to view it abstractly, analytic-
ally, and statically because it denotes a static. "snapshot" 
Picture of society either of its structure alone as separated 
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from its process, or of its process as frozen in a moment of 
disintegration. Society in the concrete is set in the matrix 
o! a continuous process and is itself an expression of this 
process--the life of the individual person seeking to define 
himself, or, in other words, an expression ot the tendency 
towards rationality in time. We have already established that 
the processive and dynamic character of sociality flows from 
the inner urge of rationality for expression and fulfillment. 
The constant element in the historical process and 
in the social forms--the rationality that becomes 
collective oonsciousness--is never full and entire, 
never static and definitive; it is a trend towards 
rationality, the practical attainment of rational-
ity, the surmounting of the irrational, the correc-
tion of the pseudorational. (I.L. 216) 
Society, then, as the concretization ot this vital and 
dynamic trend, is itself a living being marked by its own rhythms 
of life, continually changing or renewing its vital energies, 
either perfecting itself or deteriorating in moments ot stasis, 
either progressing or regressing according to the given direc-
tionality or the social forces released by the activities of 
its vital components, the associated individuals. In this 
process there is a continuous polarization of the social forces 
at work in any given social form and between the forms, moving 
toward two antagonistic terms, either tor struggle or tor col-
laboration. This polarity of forces is not a mere transient 
stage in the social process, but is rather a constant social 
phenomenon. When we view society not analytically and abstractly 
but as it manifests itself in its concrete process, "then we 
shall see that in each group the forces coalesce into two, in 
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each association of groups the forces coalesce into two, and so 
on. until the widest ambit of society is reached. No individual 
can escape this continuous dualizing ot forces, through the 
rbYthm within which he lives." (I.L. 255-6) Consequently, 
polarity or duality, and not plurality, is the keynote to 
society in its concrete process. 
As the manifold forces on any level of society, and in 
every sphere of activity, becooe polarized in two directions, 
two focal points of power take shape around which the various 
social forces gather. This Crystallization of the social 
rorces into two focal points of power, which occurs both within 
each social form and in society as a whole, constitutes what 
sturzo calls "sociological diarchy." The word ''diarchytt is the 
most apt for expressing the idea of a social duality, finding 
concrete manifestations in two forms of power, whatever their 
sphere, whether moral, political or religious." (I.L. 249) As 
crystallized into diarchy the basic polarization of social for-
ces tend toward a further synthesie whereby one or the other 
forms of power becomes the unifying center, so that every society 
is always, at one and the same time, dualistic in the practical 
working out of its social process and unitary in ita direction-
ality. In the totality of its reality, then, as a structural 
process, society may be viewed "either as a plurality, in the 
multiplicity of social nuclei conscious of their individuality 
and purpose, or as a duality, in the affirmative and negative 
Positions taken up in the contest of action, or as one, in its 
unifying and transcendental orientation." (T.L. 248; ct. I.L. 
242) 
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Our task here is to trace out the main lines of this pro-
cess according to Sturzo•s theory, the sociological laws that 
are operative in the social process and the theoretical under-
pinnings of the laws. In order to avoid any misunderstanding 
here at the heart of Sturzo's proeessual view ot society, we 
must briefly clarify what Sturzo means by the term "lawn as 
applied to the social process. Sturzo is quite well aware of 
the risks involved in formulating laws that govern the human 
process, as the history of human thought is littered with their 
residue. Yet, at the same time, he recognizes that if we lack 
any kind of sohematization of the social reality ot man accord-
ing to rules, norms, constants, laws--whatever one designs to 
oall them--we would not be able to render this reality intelli-
gible to us. We would be limited to handling it only through 
statistical methods which tends to reduce:it to the level ot 
qu$ntitative tacts. But even these are not intelligible in 
and of themselves, but are rendered such only through evalua-
tion and interpretation, so that even the statistical method 
demands an underlying interpretative theory, at least in the 
form of working hypotheses. (M. 39) But Sturzo is convinced 
that in the flux of the social process there are constants that 
are operative. For if one considers the imposing complex ot 
social phenomena from the perspective of psychic-social move-
ments, there are some which are beyond individual free will on 
the one side, and the limitations of conditioning on the other, 
and therefore, appear as constant aspects of these phenomena. 
Sturzo uses both the term "sociological constant" and "sociolo-
gical law" in his writings and sometimes with a similar meaning, 
I 
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although generally• the term "constant" refers only to those 
perennial aspects or the structure of society, whereas the term 
"law" is reserved for the permanent regularities in the social 
process. For example, the familial form is a "constant fact" 
ot human life. (I.L. 31; 49) But he maintains the use of the 
term "law" rather than "constant" as applied to the social 
process in order to "indicate both a human fact--individual 
and associative--and a normative fact of an intrinsically final-
1stic order." (M. 37) 
Sturzo stresses that while sociological laws are analogous 
to physical or mathematical laws, they are not of the same 
nature. Rather, sociological laws correspond to historical and 
moral laws. They are based on the natur·e of man not in the ab-
stract, but in its processual realization as living and acting 
on both the individual and social level, as single and associa-
ted, tree and conditioned, orderly or tumultuous, intelligent 
or instinctive. These laws are not external laws that are 
imposed on man from the outside, but rather are the inner laws 
ot the associative nature ot men. (M. 26-7; 63) The interiority 
ot these laws cannot be over-emphasized because as such they 
cannot be viewed as subjecting the individual person and the 
entire human process to a deterministic pattern. It must be 
remembered that the function of freedom in the social process 
was one or Sturzo's initial concerns in the formulation of his 
social theory and it remained a dominant theme because it touches 
the human person at the innermost principle of his uniqueness 
and creativity. Any deterministic theory of the human process 
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deprives man or that very quality of his being that precisely 
J&B.keS bis process human. To insure this freedom, both theore-
tically and practically, was an integral part of Sturzo's 
effort to restore the individual person to his proper place 
in society, to reorient the direction of modern society. 
Every determinism, whether external and environmental 
or internal and instinctiviat, would reduce human 
society to a fixed agglomeration without self-determi-
nation, without creative activity, without intellectual 
and moral idealities. The individual man, dethroned 
by modern anthropological and sociological science, 
ought to be returned to his place as author and organi-
zer of society in which and through which he lives. 
(M. 33) 
As a result Sturzo is extremely careful to avoid the snares of 
a deterministic social theory. It is to be expected that his 
sensitivity to this problem is most obvious in the formulation 
of laws he discovers as operative in the social process. Mind-
ful that the laws of his theory may be interpreted as determin-
istic, he reiterates throughout the Inner Laws or Society, in 
which he presents his most extensive treatment of these laws 
that they must not be understood in this way, while at the same 
time insisting on their constancy as inherent in the nature of 
the human process. 
If the social laws, when examined in the abstract, 
may have an appearance of determinism, this should 
not make us falter in our judgment that, like econ-
omic and moral laws, they are laws expressed and 
actuated by men with their free nature and their 
necessary conditioning. It would be a mistake to 
think that there are no sociological and historical 
laws because man if free, or that such laws are 
deterministic because human con.ditioning is a neces-
sary datum. (I.L. 258; ct. 16; 90; 220; 241) 
As Sturzo himself also states, his concept and formulation of 
sociological laws must be viewed within the systematic complexus 
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ot his entire social theory, while keeping in mind the cogni-
tive orientations that animate it. From this perspective it is 
clear that Sturzo is not going to set up any barricades to the 
pl8Y of freedom. 
In fact, as the inner laws of man's associative nature, 
the sociological laws must not be considered in the same light 
as the limiting factors of freedom, such as the conditioning 
elements of hum.an experience, whether they are physical or 
historico-social. We have already examined the interplay 
between freedom and conditioning and have seen that while condi-
tioning factors do limit freedom, man at the same time can 
master them by his activity and make them his own. Now the 
sociological laws must be clearly distinguished from such 
factors because they do not mark the limits of freedom, but 
rather they mark the paths according to which freedom is enacted 
in the social process. Men do not suffer these laws which they 
therefore must strive to overcome, as they do in the case of the 
conditioning factors of their experience. They act according 
to these laws. This is the significance of the interiority of 
these laws. But this must not be interpreted as meaning that 
man's freedom consists in conforming his actions to these laws. 
It means, rather, that in their constitutive activity, that is, 
in the concretizing of sociality. men follow certain general 
trends that give rise to regularities of action in the social 
process. The sociological laws express these regularities. 
Sturzo emphasizes the distinction between sociological laws and 
conditioning factors when he points out that the conditioning 
factors of hum.an experience are not even regulated by the 
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.· ~ciological laws, but by physical and historical laws accord-
iDi to the manifold nature of the conditions which function as 
aaterial for human action. (M. 63) 
The interiority of the sociological laws reveals the chass 
that separates Sturzo•s theory from those that pattern the 
bUJIS.n process on the model of nature. The human process, for 
sturzo, is not governed by objective laws which are analogous 
to. much less identical with, the laws of nature, and to which 
man must submit. This would reduce history1X> a determined suc-
cession of events devoid of every human value. 
In addition to their interiority, another aspect or Sturzo's 
understanding of sociological laws is worthy of attention, and 
that is their practical orientation as rooted in action. This 
is evident from the fact that they are the laws of man's associ-
ative nature and this nature is realized only in and through 
action. It is for this reason that Sturzo states that "sociolo-
gical laws are always laws of action in society." (M. 6') They 
express the regularities and trends of the activities that are 
constitutive of this nature. 
This practical orientation of the sociological laws also 
provide a clue as to how Sturzo arrived at formulation of them. 
In his treatment of the sociological laws in Del Metodo Socio-
!ogico he states: 
In every scientific analysis, one always makes a dis-
tinction between the active element and the receptive 
or passive element and then puts in relief their reci-
procal reactions in order to determine their natures 
and characteristics. This must also be done in the 
investigation of society. It is known that the active 
and finalistic factor o! society is the individual man. 
And man is not an abstract idea but a living reality •••• 
(M. 28) 
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In Inner Laws he states that "ours is a sociological vision of 
-
iaws derived from human nature, from its rationality, from its 
aode of action, from its social effectiveness." (I.L. 258) It 
18 of extreme significance to note that Sturzo makes this state-
ment in couaidering the objection that his laws constitute an 
aprioristic pattern "into which we are trying to force all 
social phenomenology." This objection runs counter to the 
entire methodology of Sturzo•s theory. We have already seen 
that human nature for Sturzo is not an antecedent structure 
from which one can deduce the sociological laws. Rather, hum.an 
nature realizes itself only in action so that it is only in 
examining history that the laws of its constitutive activities 
become manifest. "It is precisely history--not the outer history 1. 
of the material facts but their inner reason, their logical 
connection, the metaphysic to which they give birth--that enables 
us to learn the laws of our social nature." (T.L. 5) This is 
in consonance with Sturzo's historical method and also provides 
an effective counter-thrust to the objection that he is present-
ing an aprioristic picture of reality. The risk of presenting 
a pre-established scheme is lessened according to the extent 
that those patterns which appear to be always present in the 
socio-historical process are presented in matrix of that pro-
cess. We find Sturzo carrying out this form is historical 
testing in his monumental work, Church and State. 
Given the open possibilities of human experience, due to 
the unceasing thrust of rationality; whereby man has the power 
to transcend his own history, Sturzo moves very cautiously in 
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assigning a definitive character to his sociological laws 
before there has been sufficient verification of them. Thus, 
be views them as working hypotheses or as points of orientation. 
As he states, "The search for sociological laws is a very deli-
cate task, given the lack of a clear scientific tradition and 
o! a rigorous methodology." (M. 63) Due to the tact that the 
sociological laws are based on the open-ended nature ot man, 
or what Vico aptly calls man's "indefinite nature," Sturzo 
warns that the i~ner laws of this nature as living and acting 
in society are so complicated and complex and have so many dif-
ferent aspects, that it is difficult to explain the bonds and 
coordination between them and to place their significance in 
proper perspective. (M. 2?) The cautious, open-minded spirit 
with which he articulated his own theory is revealed in the fol-
lowing statement he made concerning his basic theory on the 
polarization of social forces and their diarchic crystalliza-
tion. urn such terms, we analyze the reality, seeking its 
general lines, but the reality is very different from what it 
appears in analysis, nor does it lend itself to generalization. 
None the less. this attempted analysis helps us to form an 
approximate idea of it." (I.L. 252) It is this task that we 
now undertake. 
'l'he process that is at the base of all sociological laws, 
and is itself a fundamental law. is the movement towards ration-
ality. This is clear from the fact that this is the process 
that is constitutive of the person and society together. Ration-
ality is the moving spring of the social process because it is 
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the ultimate generative principle of the concretization of 
1001ality. As individualized in the concrete person, ration-
ality is marked by the inherent finitude or human existence, 
but it retains its orientation towards, and dynamic energy-
tor, complete and perfect realization. Since it is individual-
ized rationality that constitutes the essential nature of man, 
this means that man is fundamentally a being that not only 
opens out onto the absolute, but also tends towards it with 
the inner impulsion of his very being. In fact, it is pre-
cisely this movement that constitutes his being. 
But it is also a movement that contains within itself the 
principle of.its own contravening movement--the movement towards 
animality. This principle is the principle of materialit7. 
Rationality is the determining principle of human existence, 
but as it takes concrete shape it is limited by another prin-
ciple, the principle of materiality. These two principles 
together constitute the concrete individualized rationality 
that is the individual person, with the result that rational-
ity is touched in its very core by this limiting principle. 
This generates a struggle within the individual person that 
spreads outward throughout the entire ambit of society. For 
whereas our essential nature lies in the movement of rational-
ity towards completion, which is the realization of indivi-
duality in sociality, there flows from within this very same 
movement, through the principle of materiality, a counteracting 
movement toward self-contained egoism. These two principles 
Vie with one another for domination within the individual person. 
~ 
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file movement toward rationality is toward the affirmation and 
attainment of one's personality, the movement of materiality is 
toward animality and the negation of one's personality. 'Whereas 
the movement of rationality is outward and unifying, the move-
ment of materiality is inward and divisive. The movement or 
rationality is a centripetal force, generating a dialectic of 
differentiation-in-synthesis, in which our being is increased 
and deepened as we move toward convergence--Sturzo uses this 
term with all the richness of meaning it conveys in a Teilhar-
dian ~eltanschauung. The movement of materiality is a centri-
fugal force, generating an egoistic tendency that lessens and 
constricts our being as we move toward an antagonistic plurality. 
The polarization of forces, to use a physicist's image 
always takes place in social form. The syntheses are 
rational in character and indicate the movement towards 
rationality. The disintegrations are always in the 
domain of materiality, and indicate egoistic regression. 
There is a struggle which, from within the individual, 
develops in all the forms of sociality, even the lofti-
est, even those imbued with supernaturalism. (I.L. 12?) 
Although the movement of materiality is away from the ful-
tillment of our personal beingto its diminution, this does not 
mean that it is any less real than the movement of rationality. 
"The world of oppositions is as real, in ev&ry ~ense and on 
every plane of concrete existence, as the world of convergences." 
(I.L. 12?) The "world of oppositions" is simply the reflection 
of the finitude of our being, which ontologically is the limita-
tion of ~ationality by materiality. This limiting factor or 
materiality is as real as rationality itself, as the condition 
and modality of its being. Its reality is manifested in the 
field of the personal in both a negative and positive manner. 
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tor although it does generate a countervening movement to that 
ot rationality--a movement that results in now absence and 
alienation from oneself, now lack, insufficiency, defect--
nevertheless, as the limiting factor of rationality that marks 
it with a fundamental deficiency from within its concrete indi-
vidualized being, it is that deficiency that gives rise to the 
1nner dynamism of rationality to overcome it. This brings 
about within the process of rationality two dialectical moments, 
the negative and the positive. We have already dealt with 
these two moments, and the process as a whole, in discussing 
the concretization of sociality as the constitutive process of 
the individual person. Now the ontological basis for what 
Sturzo calls the sociological law of the trend toward ration-
ality lies in the ontological structure of the individual per-
son as rational; and it is in these terms that the law includes 
the constitutive process of the person. 
But this law also relates to this process in another way. 
Since it is the tendency towards absolute rationality in time 
that defines the person in the ultimate character or his being, 
in establishing the trend toward rationality as a law of the 
social process, Sturzo is also affirming not just that the 
person defines himself in the social process, but more funda-
mentally that he generates the social process in defining him-
self. This law, then, is also the formal articulation by 
Sturzo that the individual person is the efficient and final 
principle of the social process. 
There is another aspect to this law that manifests the 
' ~ I 
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depth and internal consistency of Sturzo's theory: its role as 
the fundamental sociological law. For in setting this law of 
---the trend toward rationality at the basis of all the sociolo-
gical laws, Sturzo is establishing not only the fact that the 
80010-historical process is rooted in the ontological structure 
of the person, and that its laws are generated in and by the 
constitutive activity of the person, but also, and ultimately, 
that the emergence of the person in the plentitude of his being 
is the final term of this process and the ultimate criterion 
of its rationality. 
In viewing the entire socio-historical process, Sturzo 
finds an ever rising level of rationality, which is the expres-
sion of the trend toward rationality on the social level. This 
trend toward rationality that originates in the individual 
person seeking to realize himself, reverberates throughout the 
entire temporal-spatial span of the socio-historical process, 
giving it in the entirety of its process the continuously 
upward movement toward an increasing personalization ot the 
process. That is, in the reciprocating and constitutive dia-
lectic of differentiation-in-synthesis that is operative between 
the individual and society, the overall socio-historical pro-
cess reveals an ever fuller and deeper amplification of the 
field of the personal, within which the social order more ade-
quately corresponds, and responds, to the drive of rationality 
for completion. 
The whole thrust of the human process is to transcend the 
limitations or the present in every sphere ot human endeavor, 
to overcome and eliminate the deficiencies and evils that are 
11 
I I 
163 
encrusted in the social order, to break through the bonds of 
oppression in any form that breaks the weak, deforms the strong 
and keeps whole peoples shackled to a state of remorseless 
squalor and constant human degradation. This unremitting 
!inalistic impulse awakens within any society or social form 
8 spirit of achievement, which is the vitalizing and unifying 
factor of the collective personality. This ever-present urge 
to achievement is itself a sociological law, the law of achieve-
ment or conquest, nwhich in.forms the co1:irse of a.11 history, in 
large or in little. But in large or in little, in every field 
and sphere, collective activity must either be directed towards 
achievement or fail •••• the renunciation of all conquest, insofar 
as it denotes pure acquiescence in the present state, petrifies 
and dissolves that personality." (T.L. 202-3) There have been 
and will be specific and short term failures. Particular soci-
eties may fall into such prolonged and widespread periods or 
stasis and inertia that the spirit of achievement atrophies and 
is finally extinguished, bringing about the collapse of that 
society; nevertheless, that spirit is still at work in the 
broad sweep of the socio-historical process, and its impelling 
surge will sweep over the ruins of that society, giving rise 
to another one. 
without actually designating it as a sociological law, 
we have already referred to this urge to achievement in explain-
ing Sturzo's theory on the development of collective conscious-
ness and the transcendence of social nuclei, which itself con-
stitutes a sociological law, as we have indicated in the pre-
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-yious ohapters. 1 These two laws are related on the social 
leYel, as has been noted, in a collective, finalistic impulse 
which takes concrete expression as the spirit of achievement 
and• as such, is the moving force behind the transcendence of 
iocial nuclei. This collective finalism is an expression of 
and is sustained by the trend to rationality that is operative 
on the social level. The laws of achievement and transcendence, 
then, are corollaries of the law ot rationality. They can be 
viewed either simply as expressions or the law or rationality 
as presented from different perspectives, or as means of sepa-
rating out and giving formulation to the various processes 
that are involved in the trend to rationality, 
But the law of rationality cannot be reduced to these two 
laws. For it includes the affirmation that in the striving for 
conquests. in the various processes of transcendence taking place 
in the social process, there is an actual increment ot rationality 
in the socio-historical process. 
Man as he gains in self-consciousness, in oonsclousness 
of the world and its causes, takes his own inward pro-
gress as the measure for a better estimation of humanity 
in its past and present. He thus rejects as repugnant 
and inadequate to human nature many practical beliefs, 
rules, and criteria that in another age or another 
environment, were judged to correspond to the greatest 
individual and social good, and hence to the intimate 
laws of nature. (I.C. 144) 
The entire endeavor of the human process has been to overcome 
the predominance of animality in social life, to storm the 
citadels of irrationality or pseudo-rationality that have held 
sway over the process as ingrained social phenomena. To men-
tion a few of the more obvious and notable conquests, there 
have been those over polygamy, the family vendetta, serfdom, 
- 1see Chapter I, pp. 84-85 and Chapter II, p. 133. 
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.nd slavery. 
conquests such as these have modified and uplifted the 
entire social process. sending shock waves throughout the 
remaining 'strongholds of irrationality in the social process. 
It may take generations for the effects of these reverbera-
tions to surface and shake the founda~ions of these strong-
holds, but once a practical, rational trend is set in motion, 
its finalistic impulse releases a dynamism which moves inexor-
ably towards goals not yet attained, and which gains impetus 
in the face of resistence, as it is now slowed down, now Vitia-
ted and turned aside. And "the more important is the practical, 
rational trend, the greater the reactions that it determines in 
the irrational substratum of human life.It (I.L. 146) A prime 
example in our day is the civil rights movement in America which 
is penetrating through the irrational incrustations of social 
consciousness that remain a hundred years after the abolition 
of slavery. But it will prevail because the gains it has 
achieved as well as "other moral conquests, which in our times 
trom the realm of ideals and theories have affirmed themselves 
in that of practice, becoming laws and customs, and from the 
domain of pure aspirations have passed into vast realizations, 
correspond to the unceasing trend towards rationality." (I.L. 
146) 
And so will the trend towards rationality prevail over such 
institutions now under attack, as for example, the death penalty 
and war. The possibility of eliminating the death penalty has 
already passed from "the stage of Utopian idealism to that of 
Practical realization"; that is, it bas become a ''sooiological 
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problem." "Sociologically, a problem is such when it is raised 
. bY the social conscience as a practical problem to be solved, 
or when, though it has been solved in one manner, it comes up 
again for discussion tor a further solution.n (I.L. 230)2 
The question of the legitimacy and juridical propriety of war, 
and thereby the necessity of eliminating it, is today in the 
process of transversing that passage in social consciousness 
troro the realm of Utopian idealism to being grappled with as 
a sociological problem. This is a step of the utmost importance 
because once a question becomes for collective consciousness 
"a practical problem to be solved 0 that signifies that the 
trend of rationality has already been set in motion in that 
direction. 
As in the case of the abolition of war, so in that of 
the death penalty, the public conscience is not yet 
formed and decided, and hence has not reached a com-
plete solution; it has merely covered the intermediate 
stages •••• Only the far-sighted, the bold, the reformers 
have the courage of great ideas, and outstrip the com-
mon world by tens of years or even by centuries •••• but 
it is impossible for the trend towards rationality to 
be wholly arrested. When the death penalty (like war) 
will have been abolished, then it will no longer be 
legitimate, nor will the attempt be made to present 
it as necessary. (I.L. 231) 
As these conquests of rationality little by little pene-
trate into human consciousness, there is a greater awareness 
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of, and sensitivity to, the intrinsic value of the human person. 1 1 
"The value of human personality is like a hidden treasure that 
must be sought, li~e a vein of gold that must be laid bare and 
purged of dross." (I.L. 21?) The needs of the person, therefore, 
2cr. also Sturzo•s "The Influence of Social Facts on Ethical 
Conceptions," Thought, 20 (March, 1945), 103. 
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~ecome more strongly felt, the social customs and institutions 
are continually reformed to meet the demands of these needs, 
and thus the potentiality that is in the human person is able 
to reach out to higher levels of achievement. 
Even where some institutions are only tolerated in order 
that some ethical norms are functioning to bridle the forces 
of animality released by the principle of materiality, the 
slow and laborious process towards rationality is not lacking. 
It extends into every sphere of social activity, bringing 
about what Sturzo terms "the pseudo-rational or semi-rational 
institutions" towards a deeper rationality. (I.L. 101) For 
example, the material basis of society, its economic structure, 
is formed, continually modified, and reformed by the trend 
towards rationality, always pointing towards--even when not in 
practice actually moving towards--a better distribution ot the 
material goods of the society. 
The optimistic hue of Sturzo•s theory is clearly tempered 
by a vivid pragmatic realism, shaped on the anvil of practical 
experience. In tact, it is precisely by reason of the diffi-
culties involved, the efforts exerted, and the obstacles to 
be surmounted in attaining the gains of rationality that Sturzo 
calls them "conquests." "Any creation of welfare insofar as it 
implies activity, efforts, failures, crises, the overcoming of 
difficulties, cannot but be called a conquest." (T.L. 203) 
For Sturzo, social progress is born in struggle, conflict, 
opposition. But even here, Sturzo does not view the forces of 
opposition to social progress as having only a negative func-
tion in the social process. This they do have in a very real 
, I 
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sense, but they also play an extremely positive role. For one 
thing, their very resistence to the trend of rationality is a 
generating factor in the dynamism of the social process, whereby 
this resiatence is overcome. It is conflict that polarizes the 
social forces, giving rise to the progressive movement of the 
social process. "Without conflicting finality there would not 
be struggle, and without struggle society would never overcome 
the pluralistic stage which is chaotic and non-progressive." 
(M. 17) Also it s through struggle with the moral and material 
obstacles to a social transformation that this transformation 
takes root in the social consciousness with an ever clearer and 
deeper consciousness of it. 
Sturzo was personally aware that the conquests of the 
trend toward rationality are slowly and laboriously achieved. 
The pace or achievement more often than not must be measured 
not by years, but by generations and even centuries. The 
achievements of rationality do not take root everywhere at 
once. There always remain the backwaters or the human process 
which the currents of rationality reach only tardily and with 
diminished force. It is only with great difficulty that the 
gains of rationality are preserved and equally herculean is 
the effort required to attain the full import of their social 
effects. 
As any form of welfare won (freedom, for instance) must 
be guaranteed, defended and re-lived, so its conquest 
is always a becoming, in the continuity of action •••• 
The achievement of welfare is always partial, never en-
tire. It is precarious, never conclusive. To be defen-
ded, it must be renewed, augmented, restored. In a word, 
the good won must be continually re-experienced so as 
to ensure its existence, continuity and development. (T.L. 203) 
I I 
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Any stable ethico-civilized achievement of its very nature 
aust be rooted in the collective consciousness. In accordance 
with his relational, integral realism, Sturzo stresses that any 
change in the orientation of collective consciousness calls for 
concurrent changes in all the conditioning and shaping factors 
o! consciousness, social, political, and economic "because the 
factors of our everyday lives are deeply engraved in the mind 
o! each one of us." (N. & I. 26?) Sturzo lists four require-
aents that are necessary to bring about, maintain and make 
effective the conquests of rationality: an educational prepara-
tion and formation to open the way for it and establish its 
foundations; a political order to recognize it and guarantee 
its stability; a social maturation in which it takes root; 
and a continual process of acquisition and readaptation whereby 
it is maintained in and responds to the changing conditions of 
the social process. These tour requirements, each and all 
together, indicate the difficulty and slowness with which gains 
in rationality are achieved. These factors also point to the 
very real sense in which Sturzo grounds the achievements ot 
rationality in the total matrix of socio-historical process. 
Thus, for example, in regard to the overall human process, that 
which is seen to be less rational, auch as the polygamic family 
as compared to the monogamic, may be relatively more rational 
as set within the total context of a particular environment. 
Sturzo states that "this fact may be noted even today in semi-
barbarous countries when Christianity is introduced. It is 
here not enough to prescribe that the family should be mono-
gamic, but it must be given an enabling environment by an 
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adequate transformation of political and economic society." 
(I.L· 18) 
sturzo's law or the trend toward rationality seems Erima 
taci~ to align his position with theories of progressivism, 
-
which hold that there are linear and inwardly determined trends 
unfolding in time towards ever higher forms of human progress. 
As will become clear in the next chapter, Sturzo's theory is 
far removed from a strictly humanistic progressivism in which 
there is no principle other than men operative in the human 
process, so that human rationality would be considered to pos-
sess within its own power the resources needed to overcome the 
contravening force of materiality in attaining its ideal and 
actualization. Although Sturzo does posit the need of a trans-
cendent principle operative within the human process, neverthe-
less, be that as it may, the fact that Sturzo views the trend 
towards rationality as a law of the social process in which 
there actually is an ever increasing realization of rationality 
seems to indicate a movement that is intrinsically progressive. 
It must be acknowledged that the radical optimism of Sturzo 
does verge on overflowing into progressivism. In fact, in his 
early writings he views the human process more in terms of its 
progreBsive character than its processual flow. He speaks of 
"humanity in its historical ascension towards progress," and 
even of "the historical law of progress." "Human thought does 
not stop before any obstacle; it is the law of progress, which 
pursues us even if we are unwilling, which drags us along even 
if we want to resist, or it at least moves on over us. This is 
history. fl (L.C. 207, 203) 
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One of his major early essays is 
entitled, "Social Cont"lict as a Law of Progress." (c.f'. S.S. 24-
56) What prevents the optimistic orientation of Sturzo's thought 
from actually falling into any form of progressivism is the 
determinism that underlies such theories. And any form of 
determinism is radically opposed to the fundamental thesis of 
sturzo's social theory: that the efficient principle or the 
social process is the autonomous, free individual person, 
whose freedom is rooted in the ultimate quality of his being, 
rationality. Since the individual person is the sole substan-
tive principle of the socio-historical process, just as freedom 
stands at the heart of human action on the individual level, 
so must it necessarily characterize the human process in its 
collective activity. In tact, it was Sturzo's concern to avoid 
any deterministic overtones of his theory that led him to shift 
the emphasis of his early speculation on human reality from the 
notion of progress to that of process. It is for the same 
reason that he purposely avoids using the term "evolution," 
substituting in its place the term "development" as character-
izing the historical becoming of human reality. "Human reality 
is process. We say process, that is, succession, and not pro-
gress, nor evolution, because all human activity is individual, 
even if developing, as it does, collectively or by groups." 
(I.L. xvii; ct. M. 14) It is significant to note that 8turzo•s 
adversion to a deterministic theory or the human process lies 
in the fact that it undercuts the historical efficacy of per-
sonal experience because it shifts the locus of the dynamism 
ot the process from the individual person to the deterministic 
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forces ot the process. This in turn ultimately undermines the 
reality of the individual, submerging it in the deterministic 
r1ow ot the process itself. 
Just as human process cannot be called progress, so 
it cannot be called evolution in the sense ot a real-
ity contained in a germ and developing from it accord-
ing to a law of maturation and continuity •••• But, 
underneath, both ideas of evolution and progress pre-
suppose a deterministic conception. This as such denies 
the idea of individuality and of personal experience, 
and, hence, the idea of liberty, reducing the whole of 
human activity to a more or less unconscious necessity. 
(I.L. xix; ct. T.L. 198) 
This does not mean that Sturzo does not admit to the evolu-
tionary or progressive character ot the human process. He 
clearly does, as has been indicated, although 11not indeed a.s 
deterministic and absolute elements, but as relative elements 
of appraisement of the pa st and orientation of the future." 
(I.L. xix) "While we cannot admit a deterministic human pro-
gress, we must grant the fact that humanity makes progress in 
its experiences."3 In a continuous flow of intertwining per-
sonal experiences there is a rising level of rationality that 
becomes the common patrimony of succeeding generations, so that 
"the new men who come forward in making their own experiments 
start from a determined common level, which they insensibly will 
have reached." (I.L. xviii) Yet, given the limited and proces-
sual nature of human experience, as well as the relative char-
acter of the gains in rationality and their tenuous and precar-
ious foothold in the onflow of the human process due to the 
counteracting forces of materiality, each generation must make 
its own achievements of the past to insure their continuity and 
development. And it does this only on the individual level by 
3sturzo, "The Roman ~uestion Before and After Fascism,n 
Rev~ew of Politics. 5 (Oct •• 1943). 504. I 
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reason of the personal character of experience so that it is 
tbe individual person alone that is the "undying fount of vital 
reality." 
Thus, in associated life there were contemporaneously 
developments, arrests, renewals, involutions, all the 
stages that experience implies. Hence, there is not 
always progress, never a real regression, but in a 
relative sense both progress and regression, that is, 
experimentation and achievement. (I.L. xviii) 
Sturzo also argues against a constant, progressive motion 
to the trend of rationality by reason of the relative character 
of rationality. 
Between the idea of a constant rational becoming and 
that of a process not intrinsically progressive, there 
might seem an irreducible conflict. But, once the 
purely rational and the purely irrational are excluded 
by concrete reality, the movement falls within relati-
vistic lines, in which, besides the true rational, what 
we have called the semi-rational and the pseudo-rational 
have their function, now positive, now negative. (I.L. l?) 
Thus we may conclude that although Sturzo is clear in his 
affirmation of the ultimately progressive movement or the socio-
bistorical process, he is equally clear in affirming that it is 
not a direct, linear and inwardly determined movement, but 
rather it is marked by uncertain steps, with regressions, devia-
tions, and periods of immobility. There is always and only 
particular and relative progress, now in one direction, now in 
another. 
The trend of social consciousness towards rationality 
is not direct, nor swift, but slow and uncertain, with 
pauses and with baokslidings. Today, through the ad-
vent of the authoritarian governments, in this matter 
as in many others a backward step has been taken, but 
it is impossible for the trend towards rationality to 
be wholly arrested. (I.L. 231; cf. 16-?, 36, 90, 220; 
M. 104) 
Before we conclude our exposition of the trend towards 
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~ationality, we should note several· other aspects of this trend 
in order to avoid any mi~interpretat1ons of this most basic 
sociological law. First of all, the trend towards rationality 
can be conceived of as a continuous surmounting of the prin-
ciple of materiality, with its contravening movement towards 
animality, which is an egoistic disintegrative force within 
the social process. Yet, the movement towards rationality must 
not be understood as an escape from materiality, but rather as 
its fulfillment and spiritualization through a higher finalism 
and inner purification. Since the individual is composed of 
both material and rational principles, the purification and 
apiritualization of the material principle are essential fea-
tures of the concretization or sociality and therefore "aspects 
of rationality that give meaning, end and unity to all human 
activity." (I.L. 36) This does not mean that in stressing the 
predominant role of rationality in sociality Sturzo ignores or 
even undervalues the positive function of the sensible and emo-
tional substratum of human experience. He clearly acknowledges 
this substratum as an integral part in the fabric of communal 
living. For example, he states that "since we are sensible 
beings, it is the life of feeling that makes a community effec-
tive and practical, increasing acquaintanceship, stimulating 
affections releasing energies and helping to give the spiri-
tual basis of society the natural means of affinity and consoli-
dation." (T.L. 63) 
It is this bipolarity of the spiritual and the material 
which constitutes the nature of man that is the metaphysical 
basis for the incessant polarizing or forces in every sphere or 
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activity. For this bipolarity constitutes the radical f1nitude 
of concrete individualized rationality, always aborting its 
•ovement towards absolute rationality. The concrete realization 
o! rationality is always partial, insufficient, and marked by 
an inherent deficiency that is an urge for us to overcome it. 
There is always a gap between the concrete realization or ration-
ality and its ideal actuation in every sphere of human endeavor 
on both the individual and associated levels. This divergence 
between the ideal and the real is a metaphysical, ethical, and 
intellectual vacuum that draws rationality on to overcome it, 
oreating in the social process currents of reform and renewal. 
Within the present temporal-spatial sphere, our efforts to over-
come this vacuum, the limitations, evils and errors of the 
present will always be only temporally and partially successful. 
The resulting and alternating ups-and-downs of life are formu-
lated by Sturzo in the law of "critical cycles." "What we may 
call a 'critical cycle' is overcome by passing to a higher 
'critical cycle' and so on, in a continual relationship between 
individuals in the singular and society in the whole •••• Mankind 
and its history cannot be conceived outside pain and limitation, 
in the continual effort of confronting them." (T.L. 16?) The 
"critical cycle" Sturzo is referring to here is the dialectic 
in the trend toward rationality between the negative and posi-
tive moment, or, in other words, between the deficiency of 
achieved rationality and the effort to resolve it. The synthe-
sis achieved is never definitive, but is itself insufficient, 
giving rise to a dialectic on a higher level, which in turn 
Calls for a further synthesis. 
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Whatever the limitations, whatever the sphere of activity, 
vbether the."critical cycle is confined to the individual parson 
or involves an entire people, what is constant in the dialectic 
18 the polarizing of forces reaching for a resolution of the 
critical cycle. Although the duality will take a variety of 
forms, it fundamentally "presents itself to us as an oppoa.tion 
between the ideal and the real, between the spiritual and the 
Jll,8terial." (I.L. 240) It must be reiterated that this is how 
the duality presents itself in its fundamental form. We must 
avoid a simplistic interpretation of it as though it always took 
shape in such clear-cut terms, any more than that it always in-
volves a conflict between good and evil. In the manifold forms 
it takes in every sphere of human endeavor the polarization can 
take on a myriad of shadings, and is seldom, if ever, tree from 
ambiguities. The polarization of forces may not even be simply 
one of antagonistic opposition, conflict, and struggle, but may 
even enter into collaboration. Therefore, to say that the 
polarization is fundamentally an opposition between the ideal 
and the real, between the spiritual and ttie material simply 
means that "the forces of consciousness and of individual 
activities become oriented towards one of two terms in such 
fashion that the one may represent the rational, spiritual and 
ideal element, the other the practical, the material, the real-
istic. u (I.L. 240) 
This basic duality is always tending towards unification, 
reaching out for a "further resolution, a further synthesis, 
otherwise it would be barren." (I.L. 240-1) This tendency 
iowards unification is rooted in and is an expression of the 
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~erY ontological structure of the person. his sociality, and 
therefore constitutes a fundamental sociological law. It, too, 
is a corollary of the law of rationality, since itis'~hrough 
rationality that unification comes. There can be no unifying 
element that does not resolve itself into rationality." (I.L. 
xxiii) In fact, the tendency towards unification ultimately 
reduces itself to the tendency towards rationality, as viewed 
from the perspective of its finality because the end to be 
attained is the unifying term and this end is always represented 
in terms of its rationality. More precisely, it is a unifying 
term to the extent that it conforms to absolute rationality. 
It is clear from the preceding exposition of sociality and 
rationality that the unification sought is at one and the same 
time inward and social, but it is fundamentally personal since 
the person is the term of every social resolution. This means, 
then, that all social values resolve themselves into the indi-
vidual person. 
It is also a unification that is at the same time immanent 
and transcendent, since the tendency towards rationality that 
constitutes the person is a tendency towards absolute ration-
ality. Therefore, the thrust of our own being towards comple-
tion never finds pacification short of this unification with 
absolute rationality. It is only there that the movement of 
our being finds that higher unification that comprehends, and 
pacifies it, while still transcending it. "This unification in 
rationality. which is immanent in us, would lead us to an exas-
perating rational anthropocentrism (pseudo-humanism) if it were 
not for the unification that makes us transcend it in the 
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absolute, the unification of' the human in the divine." (I.L. 
xxiv) This unification of the human in the divine, and its 
implications will be the area of our concern in the next chapter, 
because, as Sturzo himself states, "since this unification, 
though essential in the idea of creatureliness, in order to 
find fulfillment with its cognitional value in each man, must 
in some way be inserted into the human process, it will be well 
first of all to make it clear what human process means." (I.L. 
xxiv) And this is the aim of the present chapter as it has 
been in the two preceding ones. 
The tendency towards unification manifests itself in the 
concretizing of sociality whereby social life always tends 
towards a spiritual unification on a higher plane than that of 
particular economic and political interests and aspirations. 
The movement toward a transcendent unification in absolute 
rationality reflects itself on the social level, in "the 
rational movement towards order and peace, and the need, inher-
ent in nature, for human, peaceable and useful relationships 
between peoples. This tendency actually is elaborated through 
the unifying tendency of every civilization, which is what gives 
the moral structure to any international community, transcending 
particular, economic and political egoism and the intolerance 
of castes, classes or national religions." (I.L. 141) 
Just as the tendency towards rationality is frustrated by 
the contravening movement of materiality, so is the tendency 
towards unification. The unification achieved, both personally 
and socially, are always partial, temporary, and contested. 
Thus it must continually be augmented, restored, and defended. 
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~e therefore find in the tendency towards unification a tendency 
that is always more or less unsatisfied. It is always a case 
of a unification in process, never final, but always a tendency, 
a dynamism. (I.L. xxiii) Thus, "every society that grows up 
out of human relationships is always practically dualistic and 
tendentially unitary." (I.L. 242--italics in the text; c!. xxiii) 
When Sturzo states that society is always "practically 
dualistic" he is pointing up not only that its movement actually 
is so in fact, but also that the dualistic orientation is a 
practical orientation, rooted in action. It is only in action 
that society takes shape, develops and continues, and it is 
only through this action that social forces are generated. It 
is precisely in their generation that they are polarized in a 
two-fold directionality. What allows for the polarization of 
forces in action is that which is at the source of all action 
that is human: freedom. "For me, the first element of indivi-
dual and social dualism is free will." (M. 100) It is personal 
freedom that makes possible for the free play between the prin-
ciples of materiality and of rationality, which gives rise to 
the fundamental option that orients individual activity, and 
the~eby social life, towards the materializing of life or of 
making it ever more rational. It is interesting to note that 
Sturzo places freedom at the source of the dualistic nature of 
the social process because it is precisely this which others 
maintain calls for, and results in, the pluralistic nature of 
society. Sturzo's rejection of this theory has been indicated 
and his reasons will become manifest as we elaborate his own 
theory. 
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This polarization of forces, both within the individual 
throughout every aspect of social life is inherent in the 
creative process that gives rise to the continuous development 
of the individual person and society together. and it is this 
polarization that generates the dynamism necessary for the 
process. 
In no moment of history, in no social concretization 
whatever its aspects, religious, political, juridical 
or cultural, shall we fail to find not only traces of 
a duality of grouped forces, but also the dualistic 
elements of the different social syntheses. Ir this 
were not so, the 3piritual process of mankind would 
stagnate, motionless, the movement towards rationality 
would stop short at the irrational, ethical values, 
law would lack its historical relativity, and institu-
tions would not be able to take form. (I.L. 245-6) 
It is well to note that the dualistic polarization ot social 
forces which must develop dynauically in the realization of 
social forms, providing for their continued development and 
movement, occurs not only within the particular social torm.s, 
but also in the relationships between them in their movements 
towards autonomy and interference, which we examined previously. 
The entire range of the social process then, reveals a constant 
dynamic pattern of moveoent--a pattern that is generative of the 
continuous dynamic movement--"the dualization of forces, in the 
name ot one or the other social form, the unifying tendency, 
expressed in the prevalence of one form over the rest, the 
falling asunder of such unification, making a new duality, the 
drop into temporary pluralities, which will be polarized anew 
in a two-fold sense, and tend towards a oneness never perfectly 
to be attained.tt (I.L. 245) 
Although this polarization does generate a powerful dynamism 
I 
ii 
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on every level of human experience, the most significant and 
basic expression of this polarization of forces is in the moral 
sphere. This follows from the fact that all human activity can 
ultimately be reduced to morality, since mo~ality is simply the 
actuation of rationality in human action. Thus, "man acts 
ethically whether his purposes are economic, political, artis-
tic, cultural, recreational or what not. The ethical urge, 
that is to say, simple moral reason in action, is inherent in 
all human behavior and is revealed in every social fact. 114 But, 
given the negative moment in the achieving of rationality, 
there is always a disparity between the ethical ideal and its 
social realization of such a distance as to justify a continu-
ous revision of traditional norms and to call for an unrelenting 
advancement of "the frontiers of reform."5 
The whole of human activity may be said to be a contin-
uous process of reform, correction and integration of 
what is by what should be. The should-be (the deontolo-
gical) presses upon us in the guise of rationality, that 
is, of a laudable, desirable, attainable ideal. The 
should-be is the spirit that quickens the letter and the 
reality having become open to criticism, is the letter 
that has lost part or the whole of its spirit. Hence 
the dialectic of the negative and positive moments 
gains an endless potentiality. (I.L. 15) 
In the movement of the social process the most fundamental 
and concrete expression of the polarization of the social forces 
is that between the forces directed toward the conservation of 
the status gu9 in the social order and the opposing forces 
directed toward the transformation of the social order. The 
4 sturzo, "The Influence of Social Facts on Ethical Ooncep-
tions," p. 110; cf. I.L. 212. 
5 Ibid.' p. 112. 
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tormer are a reflection of the social process in its crystalli-
zation in stable social institutions while the latter manifest 
its unceasing becoming even within its already established 
institutional forms, impelled onward towards a better future 
by moral and matertal exigencies. These two asynchronous rhy-
thms of the social process give rise to two broad currents of 
social forces which Sturzo calls, respectively, the organiza-
tional and the mystical. Two currents, then, are always at 
work and interacting with one another, both within the complexity 
of the individual social forms and throughout the entire social 
complexus: the reforming and renewing mystical current and the 
stabilizing and consolidating organizational current. 
These two currents constitute the fundamental and perennial 
polarization of social forces for three reasons. First or all, 
they reflect two opposing tendencies within the person. One 
flows from the inner urge or rationality for completion which 
gives rise to the inherent sense of process and o! the urgency 
for further actuation. An opposing tendency· is derived trom 
the limiting principle of materiality which defuses the thrust 
of rationality and manifests itself within the person in an 
innate dread of change and a need tor resting in the reality 
attained, which is viewed as definitive: hie manebimus optime. 
(I.L. 221-2) Secondly, they reflect the two asynchronous 
rhythms that are inherent in the social process, that of the 
collective consciousness and that of its structural concretiza-
tion in social forms. The movement of collective consciousness 
continues to !low at a faster pace and is much more mobile and 
flexible than that of its structural concretizations. Collective 
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consciousness, then, tends to outdistance the developmental 
process of the social forms which, as the stabilizing factors 
of a reality in process, have to overcome more resistances 
before it can be transformed. (I.L. 221) Finally, the organiza-
tional current tries to establish and concretize ideal values 
and the benefits accrued to the social process in social insti-
tutions; but since this will be only partially successful at 
any given time, the mystical current will always be at work, 
pushing towards renewal and the realization of a better future. 
Sturzo indicates three liberating or reforming currents 
which are operative in every society and which, needless to say, 
can be expressed in a multitude of ways: the rational which is 
the natural movement from an established past and deficient 
present towards a better future; the artistic which gives 
expression to beauty containing the true and good and as such 
directs the spirit of man towards the true and good; and the 
religious current without which "it would be impossible to 
restore the human solidarity shattered by the spirit of evil •••• 
In it the rational and artistic currents are completed and 
transformed •••• " (T.L. 190-l) Of the interaction between these 
reforming currents that between the rational and religious is 
of the utmost importance. 
The point at which rationality and religious feeling 
converge lies in the condemnation of evil;' the point 
at which evil may be overcome lies in the legal recog-
nition of given acts as evil, and therefore punishable; 
and social progress consists in the effort to eliminate 
evil. But till rationality and religion unite in recog-
nizing that a given social fact is evil, the elimination 
of that social fact is impossible. Religion is neces-
sary as a social premise and as the ethical application 
of rationality on a plane of obligations transcending 
ethics and society. (I.C. 203) 
184 
There are several miscellaneous aspects of these currents 
that should be clarified in order to avoid misinterpretations 
of sturzo's position on them. There is, first of all, the ter-
minology involved. Sturzo was dissatisfied with the appella-
tion of mystical for the reforming current, but he preferred it 
to the term, ideal. "Whereas the word, ideal, generally signi-
fies something intellectual and rational, perceived as an idea, 
the word, mysticism, has a sense of faith, adherence, affec-
tion, and, at the same time, hints at something mysterious, like 
a higher force with a compelling power." (I.L. 247) But Sturzo 
did refer to these currents in one of his writings as the "orga-
nizatory" and the "idealistic."6 When he first formulated his 
theory on these two trends in society, he called them, respec-
tively, the conservative and the progressive currents. This is 
also the terminology he used in one of his last writings. (M. 9; 
ct. also S.S. 48) He has also spoken or the static and dynamic 
phases of the social process, which correspond to the two cur-
rents. (I.L. 16; 221-2) In summation, we can conclude that 
Sturzo remained generally dissatisfied with his terminology for 
these two currents; but since he uses the terms '•organizational" 
and ''mystical" most frequently in his writings. we will also. 
Also, one must be careful not to identify these two cur-
rents with the negative and positive moments in the trend towards 
rationality. Both currents represent the trend towards ration-
ality and there is always a negative element operative in both 
currents. In regard to social progress, the roles of these two 
currents should not be categorized in negative and positive 
termeG with the orianizational current playing the negative 
Ibid.' p. 115. 
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role and the mystical the positive role. Only a superficial 
analysis of the socio-historical process could lead to this 
conclusion. Both are equally necessary tor social progress and 
both perform positive functions, while at the same time either 
one may impede progress or even cause a backward step to be 
taken. "Both among conservative organizers and idealistic 
reformers there are always some who are moved by selfish inter-
ests or false conceptions; but equally in both there can always 
be found a fundamental ethical drive urging them in the direction 
of the common good.,,? In fact, their roles may actually be 
reversed, "so that the organizational current expresses itself 
in mystical terms and the mystical current in organizational 
terms. 0 (I.L. 247) This is not surprising since the two cur-
rents do not represent two logical positions, but are composed 
of individuals, "both sides expressing what they can of ideal 
or organizational .factors, in order to resist and conquer." 
(I .L. 248) 
The essential fact to remember is that unless both of 
these currents are efficaciously operative within a society, 
there cannot be orderly, constructive and lasting progress. It 
is the organizational current that coneretizes the ideals ot 
the social process into the institutional structure of society, 
consolidates the benefits accrued to the social process, and 
conserves what has been achieved and constructed in the past. 
It also functions as a stabilizer for social transformation so 
that it remains an orderly process and a lasting achievement, 
deeply rooted in the collective consciousness. "In this sense, 
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even so-called 'reactionaries' can fulfill the necessary ethical 
.runction of serving as a bit and bridle to a 'changing' world• 
provided only they do not try to rein back all social progress 
by putting a soulless, formalistic Pharisaic ethic in the sad-
dle.118 It is the mystical current that makes the social insti-
tutions living and dynamic, taking on _the rhythm of progress. 
renewing the ideal values of society and rending them fruitful 
when they cease to be efficacious, orienting the collective 
consciousness towards reform by arousing it to a lively aware-
ness of the incompleteness, deficiencies and evils of the exis-
ting social structure. 
Given the differential velocity of the two currents, and 
the unifying tendency of dual forces, there is constant tension 
and interference between them. But if there is not an active. 
fluctuating equilibrium between the two currents. the social 
process either on the one side falls into stagnation and becomes 
sterile 9 or on the other is ripped asunder by the convulsive 
crises of revolution and war. In their extreme and perverted 
forms, the organizational current becomes a stultifying reac-
tionary force in society, trying to hold back all social pro-
gress, while the mystical current becomes a violent. revolution-
ary force 9 seeking not to renew and reform the existing social 
structure, but to destroy it. Sturzo compares the interference 
between the two currents to the interplay between the motor and 
the brake. 
There must be a margin !or movement unimpeded by the 
brake. If this margin is harmonic, the movement 
8 Ibid. t p. 116. 
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proceeds regularly, that is, it becomes rational. If 
it is restricted, at the expense either of the dynamic 
or of the static side, then we find either immobilized 
situations, as in regimes of closed castes, or revolu-
tionary or disorderly ones, aa in all periods of great 
upheavals. (I.L. 222; cf. M. 9) 
Since every form of duality always tends toward unifica-
tion, either in the direction of one or the other of the dual 
factors, depending on which one is able to predominate, the 
same unifying tendency applies to the polarization between the 
organizational and mystical currents. At one time the organi-
zational forces will prevail so that the stabilizing forces of 
the institutional side of the social complexus will mark the 
rhythm of the social process. At another time it will be the 
mystical current, pushing ahead for reform and the transforma-
tion of the present social structure. It is the variance of 
these organizational and mystical forces, as the concrete expres-
sion or the tendency toward rationality, in the ebb and flow 
of their reciprocal influence that produces the dynamism of 
the socio-historical process, making of it a continual and 
creative process. "It is inevitable that in this rhythm or 
mutual contact or conflict there should emerge those decisive 
'movements' that make for the progress of humanity."9 
It is of the utmost significance to note that, for Sturzo, 
in order for these currents to be effective within the social 
process, at whatever level of society and in whatever sphere of 
activity they are operative, they must take up a position "in 
the realm of organizational reality." (I.L. 248) That is, they 
must take on an organized form in such a way as to both enter 
9 Ibid., P• 115. 
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into and share in the power structure that forms the active 
foundation of a social complexus and the institutions within 
it• It is precisely through the autonomous participation in 
social power by the forces that compose the organizational and 
mystical currents that a sociological diarchy is formed. By 
diarehy Sturzo means the more or less stable organization of 
the dualistic polarization of social forces into two concrete, 
contending principles of power. All the manifold social forces 
within a social complexus overcome their chaotically non-pro-
gressive state, acquire a continuative stability, and become 
effacacious factors in social life only by passing through a 
dualistic polarization to its diarchic oonoretization. "The 
emergence of the diarchy may be considered as the consolida-
tion of the dualistic movement. The organized diarchy should 
stand for order, the duality for its dynamism.'' (I .L. 252) 
What are the conditions that account for the transition 
from the relatively unorganized duality of social forces to 
their diarchic systematization? Whatever form the diarchy 
takes, the important fact to remember in explaining this tran-
sition is that the basic polarization of social forces is into 
the organizational and mystical currents, so that the sociologi-
cal diarchy is always the organized concretization of these two 
currents. The two powers forming the diarchy, then, will always 
manifest themselves as the focal points of the two currents, so 
that they must be considered, ''the one as the guarantor and 
defender or the status guo, the other as the motive-power of 
changes." (I.L. 251; 249) 
The essence of diarchic power lies in its organico-social 
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tunction, so that it must have an autonomous participation in 
the social power structure. There is no difficulty involved 
for the organizational current assuming "its position in the 
realm of organizational reality,n and becoming a principle of 
power in the power structure of society. or its very nature it 
1s already functioning within the existing social structure, 
with its forces actually dominating, or even in some instances 
constituting, the power structure. Therefore, the clue for 
accounting for the transition form duality to diarchy lies with 
the mystical current. This transition, then, actually occurs 
when the mystical current is so penetrated by ration-
ality (or pseudo-rationality) and responds to such 
needs, spiritually felt, as to form the consciousness 
of power. Only then is an antagonistic power created, 
and given a certain structure. Placed face to face 
with the reality, the new power limits that which 
already existed and forces it to share with it or to 
oppose it. The diarchy has been formed. (I.L. 254) 
There are several noteworthy factors that must be emphasized 
in this process. First of all, this transition to a diarchic 
power by the mystical current does not necessarily mean that it 
actually becomes an internal part of the power structure, in 
an authoritative and juridical form. It may legally remain 
extraneous to the power structure and yet function as an effec-
tive diarchic power. For "the reality of power resides less in 
the form than in the consciousness of possessing it. The diar-
chy is above all a consciousness of the social duality and of 
the power which it releases." (I.L. 253) An example of this 
would be the diarchic power of the Church that continues to 
function in a totalitarian regime that seeks to become, and 
is actually conceived of as the absolute, unlimited, absorbing 
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power of the State. The Church may continue to exist and func-
tion only in the consciousness of the faithful without any 
institutional structure. Yet, as long as the faithful maintain 
a consciousness of its autonomy and power, it continues to 
exert an ethico-social limitation on the power of the State. 
Also, this process of the dualistic polarization of forces 
and the formation of a diarchy must not be interpreted as con-
sisting in a linear movement; neither is it contemporaneous in 
all the branches of social life, nor is its pattern rigorously 
fixed. It may happen that unification would precede the diar-
chy or that a diarchy would subsist during the process of dis-
1' 
integration. "Tb.ere may be periods in which the consciousness 1' 
of power has not awakened or bas not fully found its orientation 
in the two dualistic terms. There may then be a prolonged 
lethargy, or else disorderly and convulsive agitations." (I.L. 
253; M. 99) The polarization of forces and the formation of a 
diarchy occurs in that sphere of social life and over that area 
of concern that sufficiently moves the collective consciousness 
to act on it. Generally, the dualizing forces arise out of the 
existing social institutions and struggle within the framework 
of these institutions, although this is not always the case. 
New social organizations may take shape by extraneous forces 
which assume the aspects of a reforming and liberating current. 
The Reformation and French Revolution provide historical exam-
ples of this phenomenon. Once the diarchic powers are formed, 
they must keep pace with the orientation and needs of the collec-
tive consciousness. "Otherwise there will arise a third force 
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in opposition to them which, creating a new duality, will pre-
pare the advent of another power." (I.L. 251) 
The tendency towards unification takes on the character 
of an irrepressible, powerful drive in the diarchy, because 
npower by its nature is a unifying force." (C. &. s. 560) .&ich 
of the two powers tries to unify in itself the other diarchic 
power. But this attempt is always only partially and temporar-
ily successful. It may give rise to cooperative action on the 
part of the two powers, or result in a bitter struggle for 
control. What generally occurs, in either case, whether it is 
collaboration or conflict, is a gradation of powers. "In these 
various stages, the unification often comes about in a practi-
cal fashion, now through one, now through the other of the two 
diarchic centers, now in legal form, now in ethical form, now 
on the political plane, now on the religious or social one." 
(I.I.J. 252) 
It may happen that a given diarcby collapses, through a 
variety of reasons. Another one will rise in its place, either 
directly through another polarizing of forces, or indirectly 
and in another form when there is such a crisis of power that 
the entire power structure of a social complexus disintegrates, 
dissolving into a semi-anarchic pluralistic state of social 
forces. These in their turn will develop other effective dual-
ities, creating new diarchies with their own unifying tendency. 
But in whatever way the unifying tendency manifests itself, 
and whatever its outcome, the diarchy is never completely sup-
pressed. "In history. we find neither the pure suppression of 
the diarchic antagonist, nor an ironic immobility in cooperation. 
~ 
192 
On the contrary, what happens is that the victor undergoes a 
dichotomy, or the vanquished regains strength, or a third cur-
rent supervenes when the diarchy has collapsed. (I.L. 256) 
Even the modern tyrannies of the right or the left fail to 
achieve a definitive unification of the social powers. Even in 
the most rigorous and oppressive of such regimes there are 
1nterior forces of opposition at work that produce margins of 
evasion and resistance to the attempted unification of the power 
structure • 
. 
We say that the attempt is made to cancel this polari-
zation because actually it is impossible to do so •••• 
What happens in the totalitarian State cannot be more 
than a phase of reaction, which will last as long as 
the outward movements that accompany it withstand in-
ternal criticism and the expenditure of the centraliz-
ing forces, and as long as the successes which excite 
the popular imagination have not shown their vanity or 
a cost in excess of social capacity. The passage from 
the totalitarian State to normality may come either by 
an evolution or in a catastrophic manner, but it can 
never fail, whatever the conditions in which a modern 
totalitarian State has come into being. (I.L. 189) 
Whatever the nature of these forces, whether they are moral and 
religious, or whether they are intellectual, they diminish the 
ethical, social and political effects of such regimes, stir up 
healthy reactions and keep alive a current of .opposition that 
sooner or later will regain a social and political efficacy. 
The Middle Ages is oftentimes presented as an example or an 
historical period ot social unification, in which Western civi-
lization was unified into the politico-ecclesiastical unity of 
Christendom. Sturzo points out that in actual fact there was 
not complete unification on any level of society, whether it be 
ecclesiastical, political, social, moral, or juridical unity. 
(M. 101) 
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Another factor which must be mentioned that is involved in 
the transition of the social forces from a chaotic pluralistic 
state to its dualistic polarization and diarchio crystalliza-
tion is the process of mediation. At each stage of transition 
there is a mediating element functioning that actually effects 
the transition. This mediating element is one of the social 
currents, which may be or become a member of the duality or 
diarchy. In the process of the diarchic crystallization of a 
duality, which we described above, it is the mystical current 
that is the mediator. Once a diarchy is formed, the mediator 
will usually be that current of protest or renewal arising 
from within either one of the diarchic powers or outside or them. 
It will either just stir up the two powers or cause a shift in 
the balance of power and then lose its efficacy, or replace the 
one which is absorbed by the other in a power struggle or 
supplant one of them 9 or bring about a complete collapse of the 
diarchy. In all of these possibilities the essential fact to 
keep in mind, so far as Sturzo•s theory is concerned. is that 
"the mediating element cannot be considered as a third, coexis-
ting factor that will remain such, forming a permanent triad •••• 
It is always a mode ot transition from one combination of the 
prevailing social forces to another." (I.L. 256-?) 
This aspect of the mediating element in the social process 
is extremely important in Sturzo•s theory on the diarchy of 
Church and State. As opposed to Sturzo's theory, some inter-
pret the movement of Western civilization in terms or three 
focal points of power: State, Church, and People. This inter-
pretation gives the impression that the Church and State are 
I 
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themselves substantive principles of power, independent of the 
citizens and faithful that compose them. This, of course, runs 
directly counter to Sturzo's theory in which the social forms 
are the outcome and objectivation of the projection of the 
individual person. The widest dimensions of this projection 
are covered by the diarchy of Church and State. Therefore, 
in accord with this basic thesis ot Sturzo's social theory, 
the people cannot be considered as "a third force between State 
and Church, tor we cannot conceive of either State or Church 
without people, that is, of a State without subjects and a 
Church without faithful. Nor can the people act, as such, 
without either resting on a social structure or creating a fresh 
one." (I.L. 257) 
It is in his historical and sociological research on the 
relations between Church and State that Sturzo derives much of 
the concrete historical and experimental data in the formulation 
of his theory of diarcby. At the same time it is in this area 
that he makes the most thorough and significant application of 
his theory, as the one most in keeping with the reality of the 
socio-historical process. The State and Church, ever since the 
appearance of Christianity, constitute a permanent diarchy in 
the socio-historical process. For the Church is the positive 
actuation of Christianity and the entry of Christianity into 
the socio-historical process released within this process a 
fundamental and indissoluble duality of forces. It brought into 
"the social-organic plane the dualism between the kingdom of 
this world and the Kingdom of God, which is not of this world 
yet is in the world; for the Church is a social organism, 
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standing by itself, speaking in the name of God and as the 
visible embodiment of Christianity through the ages." (T.L. 246) 
Underlying the experience of Western civilization lies the 
admonition: "Render unto Caesar the things that; are Caesar's 
and unto God the things that are God's." By the very fact of 
its existence as a religion which is based on personal oonsoious-
ness and which becomes concretized as an autonomous and inde-
pendent social form. the Church, Christianity limits the power 
of the State and in turn has its own social power limited by 
the State. Whatever form the relations between Church and State 
take on the juridico-political plane, and whether society tends 
to be unified now in the Church, as in the Middle Ages, now in 
the State, as in modern times, this mutual limitation of powers 
persists. For the Church-State diarchy has roots extending to 
a level deeper than that or politico-legal bonds: the individual 
consciousness which projects itself simultaneously into the 
Church and State and is the substantive principle of both. "It 
is not a case of political and juridical relations between two 
entities, nor of an interference of content between the reli-
gious and political forms of sociality, but of the formation of 
an individual consciousness which expresses itself simultaneously 
in both Church and State, in accordance with the ends of the two 
organizations.n (I.L. 260) 
Therefore, even in those states where the Church has no 
juridical personality and has lost all organizational autonomy. 
or where there is a complete separation between Church and 
State, the diarchic power of the Church remains operative in 
that State through the individual consciousness. As long as 
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the faithful retain a consciousness of the autonomy and power 
of the Church, this consciousness effects an ethico•social 
limitation on the power of the State. Even if the Church retains 
onlY her spiritual means of exerting her influence within a 
given State, nevei·theless, the moral efficacy of her diarohic 
power remains intact. "And no one can doubt that such effi-
cacy has social and political effects." (C. & S. 548) 
It consists in the individual diarchy which prevails, 
in the persuasive power of consciences which carries 
weight in the efficacy of the Christian citizen who 
succeeds in bending the power of the State, or else 
in opposing it in the name of Christian morality, that 
is, in the name of an ethical principle that touches 
collective life and which cannot be other than inward 
and conducive to a State with a Christian civilization. 
(C. & S. 551) 
The more active and effective this consciousness is, the more 
efficacious is the diarchy. Sturzo calls this type of diarchic 
position of the Church "individualistu or "indirect" because the 
diarchic power of the Church is expressed as a moral and reli-
gious power over its members as individuals, and not in an 
authoritative and juridical form over the states. (C. & S. 54?; 
T.L. 262; I.L. 26?) 
There is between the diarchic powers of State and Church 
a continuous and irreducible tension which is now latent, now 
open, breaking out into violent conflict. The significance of 
this tension extends beyond the power structure of society, 
because it reflects a fundamental tension within the individual 
person, of whom the State and Church are dual projections. The 
conflict between State and Church signifies not merely a strug-
gle between diarchic powers, but rather it more basically 
Points to a permanent and irreducible opposition between two 
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principles, the material and spiritual, "the imt'.lanent and the 
transcendent, the naturalistic and the supernatural, with their 
mutual influence and mutual strife, not formal but substantial, 
taking place within our very consciousness." (C. & s. 556; cf. 
p.P.I., Vol. I, 10?; I.L. 262) These two principles reflect 
tbe presence of Christianity in the socio-historical process 
and, as projected into the State and Church, they generate a 
permanent duality of forces in this process. 
'Every duality tends towards unificat~on and the same law 
applies to the duality released by Christianity in the dialec-
tic of history. But Christianity contains within itself a 
unifying principle that is able to effect a unity that extends 
beyond the limits of every social and political unification in 
a personal and transcendental unity. 
The very expression of the socio-historical process in these 
laws, rooted in and expressive of the tendency towards absolute 
rationality, reveals that the social process ia not a dialectic 
closed in on itself, exhausting its dynamism within itself in 
a kind of cycle of blind forces without interior finality. (M. 
14) Rather, the socio-historical process reveals the urge of 
individuals to transcend this very process in a personal and 
transcendental unity. But at the same time they reveal the fact 
that without the introjection of a transcendental unifying 
principle within these processes, not only would the !inalism 
of these processes never be fulfilled, but there would be no 
intrinsic meaning to the processes themselves in their very 
actualization. These laws point to the tact that the processes 
of themselves do not have the means immanent to them to ever 
1 I 
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attain the ultimate fulfillment of their drive. There would be 
the "continuous immanent repetition of human activity without 
resolution. 11 (T.L. 231) But the fact is that these human pro-
cesses have been Christianized and, touched by the transforming 
power of Christianity, they now contain within themselves the 
power to transcend themselves and attain ultimate completion. 
This transcendent element must be accounted for within 
sturzo's theory of socio-personalism. In fact, it can be said 
that Sturzo's theory is an articulation of the plentitude of 
personal existence, and it is this transcendent element that 
makes manifest this plentitude. 
CHAPI'ER IV 
HISTORY: A DIALECTIC OF IMI1ANENCE-TRANSCENDENCE 
Just as it is history, as the constitutive activity of 
man that manifests the inner laws of man's associative nature--
laws which reveal that man in and of himself cannot effect a 
totalizing and conclusive pacification of the tendencies that 
give rise to the laws--so is it history and history alone that 
reveals the presence of a personal, transcendent, unifying 
principle within the historical process. Therefore, not only 
is Sturzo's theory of history the foundation of all his thought, 
but it is also the culminating point of his thought wherein he 
works out and brings together the implications o! his integral 
social theory in all of its aspects. 
It is in the long introduction to his major work, The Inner 
Laws of Societz, that Sturzo initially describes the historicist 
system that is the matrix of his social theory. In his presen-
tation, he makes it clear that his aim is to base his theory 
on an open-ended historicism that is able to account for both 
transcendent and immanent factors within the historical process, 
to preserve their intrinsic unity within a single process, and 
yet uphold the substantive reality or each. In this way he 
sharply distinguishes his historicist system from both an imma-
nentistic theory which a priori rejects the possibility of 
any transcendent factor in history and any transcendental theory 
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~biCh either undercuts the reality of the immanent factors or 
subordinates them to transcendent factors, or else dismisses 
the notion of historicism altogether as being immanentistic 
1 b1 definition. Sturzo's theory, which he does not hesitate 
to term "historicism," is, by contrast, immanent-transcendent. 
Be defines his historicism as 0 the systematic conception of 
history as human process, realized by immanent forces, unified 
in rationality, yet moving from a transcendental and absolute 
principle towards a transcendental and absolute end." (I.L. xxx) 
The first task in elucidating the full meaning of this 
definition, its place and implications within Sturzo's overall 
theory, and the consequences that follow from it, is to deter-
mine the meaning of history within Sturzo's system. Sturzo 
begins his own exposition with a clarification of the different 
meanings that can be attached to the term "history,. by delineat-
ing its various meanings which refer to the basic idea of human 
process. These are: 
1) history as the sequence o! events; 
2) history as the rational systematization or remembered 
events; 
3) history as the recollection or the collective past or 
a particular human group. (I.L. xxvi) 
The second meaning is the basic denotation or the term from 
which the first and third are derived. Therefore, it is more 
precise to use the adjective "historical'' when referring to the 
first and third meanings, signifying in the first case, an 
1cr. Sturzo, "Historical Sociology," p. 332; "History and 
Philosophy," p. 55. 
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historical process, and in the third, historical consciousness. 
This provides a clue as to how the three meanings are uni-
fied. In distinguishing these denotations of the term "history 9 " 
sturzo does not mislead one into thinking that the factors they 
refer to are, just because they are separable, in reality sepa-
rated. They are in fact inseparably united. This is an extremely 
iJDportant point and calls for a careful analysis because the 
three meanings are in fact expressive of the dimensions of the 
synthesizing process or rational consciousness and so become 
concretely uni!ied "in thought, which is the rationality of 
action; in action, which is the realization of thought, and in 
consciousness, taken as the presence of rationality and activity 
to themselves. '' (I. L. xxix) As we have seen, this process and 
its unity is absolutely fundamental to Sturzo's theory and an 
analysis of his treatment of it from the perspective of history 
will reveal both another.facet of it and the convergence ot his 
insights into a coherent theory. 
Of the three meanings of history it is in the second mean-
ing that they are ullfied. The first, the process of events, is 
the material element of history and actually becomes history 
only as it undergoes a rational systematization. The key word 
in this first meaning of history as "the course of events" is 
"events." Sturzo is using this term with the same pregnant 
significance that John Dewey does in Experience and Nature. 
Notice also that Sturzo says "the course" and not simply "a 
course" of events. Human happenings are history not simply 
because they are external occurrences but because they are 
occurrences-animated-by-thought, that is, events. History is 
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not made up of a bli.nd flow of happenings but rather consists 
in a clear-sighted and ordered flow of rational acts, or events 
--clear-sighted and ordered to the extent that the acts are 
rational; acts that are the incarnation of ideas and ideals. 
"No historical fact is a purely external matter; facts have 
tor their soul that element or rationality which men, acting 
and reacting in the external world that surrounds them, have 
put into the facts as a reflection ot that consciousness which 
their actions have actualized."2 "Every material datum of his-
tory resolves itself into a complex of thoughts, sentiments and 
purposes •••• "3 For the processive and living reality of human 
activity, which, once accomplished, becomes the material element 
of history, to maintain the impact of its concretized ration-
ality and not to petrify as a fossilized residue ot the past, 
it ''must undergo a spiritual elaboration through the convergent 
and divergent thought and feeling of a group of persons, and 
penetrate not only into their memory but into their convictions 
and sentiments." (I.L. xxvii-xxviii) It is only in this trans-
formation effected through consciousness that past events, as 
reconstructed by consciousness and thereby revitalized, live 
on in the present. In other words, they are historicized to 
the extent that they enter into and constitute the on-going 
awareness of a given historical consciousness. 
2sturzo, "The Influence of Social Facts on Ethical Con-
ceptions," p. 110; ct. "Theory of Knowledge in Neo-Synthetism," 
p. 290. 
3sturzo, "History and Philosophy," p. 60. 
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In this way, then, the first meaning of history as "the 
course of events" is intrinsically connected with the third 
•eaning of history as the consciousness of the past as well as 
being a derivative or the second and essential meaning. The 
third meaning that Sturzo gives for history flows from the second 
as expressive not only of the recalling and reconstruction ot 
events but also of their inner and continued efficacy among 
determined groups in building the present and directing the 
future. The significance of this understanding of historical 
consciousness will become clearer with an explication of the 
fundamental meaning of history. We can see, then, the inter-
twining connection between the three meanings, rooted in the 
basic denotation, the rational systematization of remembered 
events. An amplification and explanation or what Sturzo means 
by this will reveal a further unification or these meanings and 
draw us into the core of his historicism. 
At first sight; in view of Sturzo's stress on the histori-
city of human reality, it would seem logical that the first 
meaning of history as simply the historical process would be the 
basic meaning of history for Sturzo, because the historical 
process is for him that through and by which man defines his 
own being. Thus, reduced to its simplest significance, history 
is nothing other than simply man's coming to be. It is expres-
sive of the total, processive, multidimensional reality of human 
existence. As Sturzo reiterates throughout his writings, 
"h:tstory is not extraneous to our 11.f'e ••• it !!. our li!e. 114 
4sturzo t 11Historicist Sociology' If p. 334; er. s.P. 8 and 
T.L. 232. 
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Robert Pollock, in analyzing Sturzo's theory, remarks that 
bistory is "a manifestation, always in becoming, of an interior 
reality, that of man himself. 115 In pointing to "an interior 
reality" Pollock indicates precisely why the historical pro-
cess itself is not the primary designation ot the term "history" 
tor Sturzo. Sturzo himself states, "history is not to be con-
founded with human process, but brings its experiences into a 
rational system." (I.L. xxix) It is the interior dimension of 
man's being that is the locus for his most significant and 
specifying feature, rationality. As a rational being man is 
distinguished from non-rational creatures not only in terms of 
his relationship with the rest of reality, but also and more 
specifically in his relationship to himself. Not only is his 
surrounding reality present to him, but he himself stands in 
his own presence. The locus for man's own being stands at the 
interface of this twofold directionality ot his rational con-
sciousness, projecting outward and turning inward, in its drive 
for realization and completion. As we saw earlier in develop-
ing Sturzo's notion of the person, it is this thrust of the 
individualized rationality toward the plenitude of its being in 
absolute rationality that defines man's coming to be. Also, 
since this act which is man's being never exhausts the power 
that generates it, it never is, but ceaselessly becomes. It 
is this incommensurability of the human spirit with itself, in 
seeking itself, that is the generative principle or history as 
process. Since history is expressive of the coming-to-be of 
5Pollock, "L'uomo nella sooieta e nella storia, '' p. 225. 
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•an•s interior reality, his rational consciousness, the fact 
tnat this interior reality is rational means that the full sig-
nificance of the term "history" does not lie in just designat-
ing the actual becoming of individualized rationality, but also 
must include the presence of rational consciousness to its own 
becoming. 
By his reason, man is aware of outward reality and in-
ward consciousness, both of which are formed out ot 
the accumulation of a past that has realized itself 
in them. The connection between these two aspects or 
being, outward reality and inward consciousness, is so 
close that the more we know of reality which reveals 
itself as the persistence of the past in the present, 
the more we deepen our own inner being, which is, as 
it were, rooted in a past liVing within us and yet 
mysteriously remote. (S.P. 10) 
It is the orientation of his theory around the key concept 
of rationality that underlies Sturzo's insistence that it is 
not the simple flow of the human process that constitutes his-
tory, but rather the ~ational systematization or that process. 
The individual concrete rationality that is the constitutive 
principle of man does not, in realizing itself, produce simply 
a series of external facts, it produces itself. And as spirit, 
the measure of its own reality is precisely the extent to which 
it is present to itself. Therefore, in its most profound signi-
ficance, history is man's presence to himself. In this under-
standing of history, then, the extent to which man is ignorant 
of the past, to that extent is man absent from himself. And 
he will be absent from himself not only in the existential 
concreteness of his present existence, but also in the ideality 
of his nature. "Actually, we should never be able to understand 
our own reality if we could not relate it to the spiritual great-
ness which mankind has achieved in the course of history." (T.L. 
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Two significant themes in Sturzo•s position are indicated 
in this passage. One is that although history ultimately re-
solves itself into the individual person as the sole substan-
tive principle of history, the making of history is the doing 
of collective consciousness. The other theme is the contempor-
aneity of the three moments of the temporal process, past, pre-
sent, and future in a multidimensional present. 
The self-awareness that history gives rise to is not that 
of the isolated individual self, but of the self in the fullness 
of all its dimensions, or, in other words, of the person. Thus, 
it is not the truncated awareness characteristic of egocentri-
city, which is a denial of the self in its personhood, but 
rather is the open-ended awareness of the social self, which is 
the enrichment and enlargement of the self in its personhood. 
It is this expansion of the self into solidarity with the col-
lectivity that history in the fullness of its meaning gives us. 
It must not be forgotten that this expansion o! the self into 
the collectivity is not a merging of the self with the collec-
tivity, but the further deepening and enrichment of each in the 
differentiation-in-synthesis dialectic at work between them. 
In substance, history is consciousness of our own being 
and of our own continuity--a continuity not merely in-
dividual but collective, so that we feel ourselves parts 
of a whole, living elements in a life surpassing the 
individual, common sharers in something that will con-
tinue when we are no more ••• We feel that the more our 
knowledge widens and our feelings deepen, the greater 
the enrichment of our being with what was not ours and 
has become ours. Consciousness of our own being trans-
forms itself into consciousness of human solidarity and 
of spiritual co.mm.union. This forms in us a present that 
may repeat itself indefinitely in our spirit, in a striv-
ing toward a continuity that will have no end. (S.P. 4-5) 
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It may initially appear inconsistent for Sturzo to insist 
on the individual person as the animating principle of history 
and at the same time equally insist on it being a tact of col-
1ecti ve consciousness. But in view of his theory of socio-
personalism it is not. In the intrinsic, reciprocating inter-
dependence between the individual person and society that is 
constitutive of each and both together, just as the individual 
begins to exist in his personhood in the transcending of himself, 
so that his very individuality as a person is intrinsically 
social, so it is in this 11moment of sociality" that history be-
gins. "For ours is not an isolated, narrowly individual life, 
but an associated life, that is, a life by nature sociological. 
Our individual continuity is intrinsically social." (S.P. 3) 
Since the ontological structure of the individual person incor-
porates sociality within itself, historical reality, as the 
processive realization of that structure, is itself intrinsi-
cally social.6 Consequently, the historicization of the mater-
ial elements of history, human events, is a process engaging 
collective consciousness. Sturzo's statement on this social 
character of historicization deserves to be quoted in full. 
The historical datum, even if expressed by a single 
individual, in order to be historical must find its 
repercussions in an ever-widening circle of indiv1du-
als and assume a collective character. The historical 
datum becomes a social element, inasmuch as either 
actually or as symbol or attribution it represents 
that human experience and activity which once posi-
ted, continues to be experienced and reexperienced by 
a group in its further process. Every happening is 
in itself cap·able of being historioized, but such 
historicization is the doing ot the collective con-
sciousness. The historicization of a happening will 
6cr. Sturzo • "History and Philosophy," pp. 55-56; "Some 
Notes on the Problem of Education," p. 113. 
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last the longer, the deeper the repercussion of the fact 
in the collective consciousness and the wider the circle 
of those who feel its effects. (I.L. xxviii) 
The theoretical basis for Sturzo•s position expressed in 
this passage lies in his theory on the projection of rational-
itY as the constitutive activity of the person.? The indivi-
dualized principle of rationality, which is the essential prin-
ciple of man, achieves reality only by being incarnated within 
the world through the mutuality of thought and action. The 
modes of this fundamental drive of rationality for expression 
are variable and innumerable, but they all together make up the 
process we call history. But precisely because of the intrinsic 
historicity of rationality as individualized within man, ration-
ality as realized within the expressions or man remains imma-
nent within these expressions only if they are incorporated 
within the on-going realization of rationality. (I.L. 15) 
To be historicized means to be caught up in the continuing 
and processive becoming of rationality so as to become a part 
of the present experience of man. It is consciousness, and more 
specifically, collective consciousness that connects the past 
to the present. It is well to recall here that collective 
consciousness for Sturzo does not indicate a reified entity 
substantively independent of those individual consciousnesses 
that go together to make it up. Rather, it is the consciousness 
...... 
of each member of a given group which is reflected in the con-
sciousness of others in a mutual process of determining and 
realizing a common end. (M. 19) Historical consciousness, then, 
?see Chapter I, pp. 61 ff. 
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is of its very nature collective consciousness and vice versa. 
Here, in the integral realism of Sturzo's theory, we find a 
dovetailing of perspectives. Both historical and oollective 
consciousness are rooted in and expressive ot the projection 
ot rationality, with the first giving emphasis to the intrinsic 
temporality of the projection and the second denoting its in-
trinsic social character. 
It is significant to note that the specific element in the 
trend to rationality that actually gives rise to both an histor-
ical and collective consciousness together is the emergence on 
the social level of a collective finalism that unities the con-
vergent activity of associated efforts "in a higher affirmation 
of collective life." 
The history, written or oral, which we know as such is 
made up of events that concern not this or that family 
or economic craft or trade group or class or tribe, as 
groups living their own particular life, but that part 
of the population, however it may be grouped or organized, 
which has gained consciousness of its personality over 
and above domestic and economic contingencies, in a higher 
affirmation of collective life. It is the transcendent 
and unifying personality that history alone reveals to 
us. 'What has been already noted as collective purpose, 
as spirit of achievement, as welfare to be won, is here 
presented from another angle, as the transcendence of 
the social nuclei through the development ot the collec-
tive consciousness. When this transcendence begins, 
history begins •••• (T.L. 205) 
The importance of this lies in the implications that follow from 
it in Sturzo•s historicism, With his view of history as the 
processive emergence of rationality it is natural that finality 
should weigh heavily in his theory. What is noteworthy is the 
way in which he handles this finality. As will be further 
explicated, it is an open-ended finality that leaves the direc-
tionality, possibilities and scope for the future completely 
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open• In terms of the concreteness o! Sturzo's thought it 
should be noted that it is more precise to speak of open-ended 
finalities rather than finality in the singular, because Sturzo 
does not allow for a single finality in the concrete that would 
encompass all of mankind. A single concrete finality would 
give rise to a universal history of mankind, which Sturzo rejects. 
"There is no true universal history; but only particular his-
tories of different social groups. What are called universal 
histories are nothing more than collections of particular his-
tories, combined together from a given angle, which can never 
unify them •••• Every history indicates the consciousness of a 
group in the concrete." (I.L. 21) Sturzo's rejection of the 
universal history relates to his denial of the possibility of 
a universal society, which we dealt with earlier.8 A single 
finality would undercut the open-ended possibilities of history 
and defuse the dynamism of the historical process which is 
charged by the myriad diversities of these possibilities. 
This view of finality and its implications gives to Sturzo's 
theory a definite futuristic orientation. It also allows tor 
both the genuine emergence of completely new forms of human 
expression in the present and the inexhaustibility or the past 
which makes for an open, never ending systematization or the 
past. However, these features of Sturzo's theory are dependent 
upon his understanding of the contemporaneity of the past, 
present and future. 
The contemporaneity of the temporal moments of history is 
8see Chapter II. p. 134. 
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iJlplicit in the description or history as the rational systema-
tization of remembered events. The clue to these implications 
is contained in two further statements Sturzo makes about his-
torY in discussing the convertibility of history and philosophy. 
"History is the rationality of existing reality, systematized 
according to the general laws of human thought and action." 
or again, history is human activity "systematizing reality in 
accordance with ideas." (I.L. xxix) These statements are signi-
ficant because they clearly indicate two important features of 
history that point to the synthesis of the moments of time. 
The first of these features is that the doing of history 
is not an academic and theoretical enterprise, but is rather 
a practical and concrete endeavor that has to do with life it-
self, the systematizing, ordering, or, in other words• the giving 
ot shape to reality. When Sturzo speaks of "systematizing" 
reality he is not referring to the formulation of a theoretical 
system about reality, but the actual "making" of reality, the 
rationalizing or "historieizing" of it. The term 11 systematiza-
tion, 11 as Sturzo uses it here, must be interpreted in light of 
one or the basic meanings he gives to rationality: thought it-
self inasmuch as it is systematic. (I.L. xxxvii) This is indi-
cated in the above quotations by the fact that Sturzo first 
states, "history is the rationality of existing reality, ••• " 
and then, a few lines later, saying it is hum.an activity "syste-
matizing reality •••• " In other words, Sturzo's use of the term 
"systematization" does not refer to any purely theoretical 
Process of "system" building in the classical meaning of the 
term. Rather, he is using it in reference to the essential 
212 
character of thought as rational, that is, as ordered. To know 
something is to systematize it. To systematize something is 
to make it rational, that is, to order or structure it by bring-
ing it within the light, or structure, of rationality. In this 
way man "makes it his own" and it, in turn, is "hiatoricized." 
"The non-human, when it is made human, is 'hietorized'; it 
becomes history. The discovery of electricity by the effort of 
human science transported that natural force into the common 
life of man. Electricity entered the stream of history; that 
is, it became all that man has been able to make of it. And 
thus with all discoveries." (S.P. 8) 
The second aspect of history, which follows from the first 
and is also indicated by these statements is that the "Archime-
dian" or reference point for this systematization is the concrete 
present and not the past. In the light of these quotations, 
then, we see not only that the doing of history, i.e., ttthe 
rational systematization," is a present activity, but also that 
the subject matter of history, i.e. "remembered events," is 
not the past as past, but the past as present. For Sturzo 
directly relates history to "the rationality of existing reality" 
which "reveals itself as the persistence of' the past in the 
present." (S.P. 10) Sturzo exhibits the same perspective on 
reality, and history, in his statement that "there is no living 
reality which is not at once concreteness and process, that is, 
history." (I.L. xi) Now, the "concreteness and process" of liv-
ing reality, referred to in the second quotation carries the 
same meaning as "the persistence ot the past in the present." 
Viewing the moments of time in terms of their reality, it is the 
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present alone that exists. And it is the continuation of the 
past into the present, i.e. "process," that gives to the present 
its structure, form or content, or to use Sturzo•s term, its 
"concreteness." 
Every moment of the process is reality inasmuch as it 
is present. The past is merely the accumulation of 
human experiences which give value to the present. 
The present is therefore, the existence or coexistence 
of beings; the past is the process which has brought 
them to existence in the concreteness of their real-
ity. (I.L. xxv) 
In order for the past to enter into and constitute the con-
creteness of the present it must be ordered to the present. 
That is, the past is history and can only be history to the 
extent that it participates in the concerns, needs and issues 
of the present. To the degree, then, that the past resolves 
-itself into the present, to that degree it is historioized and 
continues to exist. H'What went before resolves itself into 
what comes after, the present always being enriched by the past. 
Hence, the past may be said to exist after its fashion in the 
present, forming one with it in a kind of simultaneity." (S.P. 6) 
The presentness of the past as history is indicated by 
Sturzo when he refers to the subject matter of history as Hthose 
events that are known,n (I.L. xxvi) because he states elsewhere 
that "the past is, and is known, in so far as it is actualized 
and conceived in the present. 1• (S.P. 10) In interpreting Sturzo, 
I prefer to use the tero. "remembered'' rather than simply "known" 
to more clearly indicate the acknowledged pastness of the event 
and yet its connection to the present. It brings out more ex-
Plicitly the synthesis of the past with the present in history. 
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}. "remembered" event is one which, although having occurred in 
the past, remains tied to the present, whereby it is released 
from the mere facticity of its pastness to share in the life of 
the present. This connection can be maintained in any number 
of ways, either directly through traditions, written or oral 
records, individual or collective memory, or indirectly through 
related evidence that points to a given event as having occurred. 
In any case, it is the presentness of the event that is impor-
tant and that constitutes its historicity, not the particular 
way this presentness is maintained. 
Sturzo sums up these ideas by stating that history involves 
"two things in synthesis: the reality of the past in the present, 
and actual, present memory of the past." (S.P. 4) The histor-
icity of its pastness as having occurred and the reality of 
that pastness in the present. It must be emphasized that Sturzo 
views these two elements "in synthesis" so that from the perspec-
tive of his integral realism the categories of object, i.e. 
"the reality of the past in the present," and subject, i.e. 
"the actual, present memory of the past" are not adequate to 
the synthesizing unity of this situation. The synthesizing 
factor in history, or more precisely, the historicizing factor 
that renders the continuity of the temporal process always 
present, is the inward synthesis of consciousness. In fact, 
it is consciousness that constitutes the present. "The present 
then is nothing other than consciousness itself. Without this 
there could be no present and no history, only the materiality 
of crude facts that in themselves are neither consciousness nor 
history." (S.P. 9) 
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It is here, :from the point of view of the present as con-
sciousness, that the theoretical basis and full force of the 
contemporaneity of the past, present and future come out. We 
have already seen that time is the rhythm or the inner movement 
of consciousness, as "the presence of' rationality and activity 
to themselves," toward realization and ooncretization.9 Within 
the inward synthesis of consciousness, the moments that mark 
this rhythm are not separate and autonomous, but intrinsically 
imply each other in a specific order. It is precisely in the 
contemporaneity of these moments that consciousness generates 
its own presence to itself, which constitutes its reality as 
spirit. "Insofar as men live simultaneously these three moments 
of their existence, in 'Unceasing process, insofar have they 
consciousness of their own reality." (I.L. xxvi) It is the 
living synthesis of the present, as consciousness, that the bond 
between these moments is forged. "Only the present exists, 
that in which the consciousness of each may feel the throb of 
the life accumulated through the ages and may divine the throb 
that will continue in the future. There is nothing else, as 
living consciousness, than the temporal present." (T.L. 224) 
The actual movement of rationality toward realization con-
stitutes the historical present that distinguishes the human 
process from the process of nature on the one hand, and from the 
eternal "now" of infinite consciousness on the other hand. The 
process of nature is simply a uniform sequence of natural occur-
rences made up of a series of neutral "now•s." Although each 
9see Chapter I, pp. 100-101. 
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neutral "now'' may be distinguished from 1 ts "before" and "after," 
each is qualitatively indifferent to its "before" and "after." 
It opens out to neither one in its presentness. (I.L. xxvi) 
'?he eternal "now" of infinite consciousness is one of pure actu-
e.li ty, a total and simultaneous pres.ent, embracing within itself 
the absolute immediacy of its complete presence to itself. (S.P. 
6) The historical present arising out of the successive and 
always partial realization of rational consciousness is multi-
dimensional, taking up within itself both its past as its con-
stitutive and sustaining element and the future as its inherent 
drive tor further realization. We must examine more carefully 
the synthesis of these moments within consciousness in the con-
stitutive activity or the person. 
History, in Sturzo•s view, is the actual becoming ot the 
constitutive principle of the human person, his rational con-
sciousness. It is the concrete, processive occurrence of the 
projection of rationality in the mutuality of thought and action. 
As the immanent principle of history, rationality is not in any 
way extraneous to the historical process, but is the process 
itself in both the multiplicity of forms it gives rise to and 
the full range of its movement. Since the reality of rational 
consciousness as spirit and subject is commensurate with its 
presence to itself, it is precisely in rendering present to it-
self its own becoming that it attains the fulness of its reality. 
Thus, the reality of rationality will be commensurate-with the 
totality of its becoming in the synthesis of its past and pre-
sent. and future too, because, as we have already seen, the 
self-generative dynamism of rationality tor realization, in its 
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opening out onto the infinite, is never commensurate with the 
concrete forms in which it expresses and, in expressing, real-
izes itself. Its present actuality, then, contains within 
itself its future as the efficacious beginning of further 
realization. 
And the future world? And the after life? For human 
thought and activity these two constitute a present, 
The significance of the future for a man depends on just how far he feels the effective reality of that 
future within himself, that is, on how far he believes 
and feels his existence to be projected into the tu-
ture •••• The future therefore finds realization in the 
present as effective beginning. Otherwise it would 
not exist for man; it exists only in so far as it is 
transformed into thought and activity, that is, in so 
far as it becomes for us a present. Only then can we 
achieve it. The man without faith in himself, the 
man who does not think, has no future; fo~ the future 
is in ourselves. (S.P. 10-11; cf. also T.L. 215, I.L. 
xxv) 
What the multidimensional present of human consciousness 
is expressive of is the dialectical tension between the negative 
and positive moments of the process of rationality.lo This 
tension is ontologically grounded in the finitude of rational 
consciousness and it is this finitude that gives rise to the 
factors in the becoming of rationality that makes the past a 
necessary, integral dimension of its present. These factors 
are the processive, transitive and material features of human 
activity through which rationality is realized. The negative 
aspect of these factors is related to the tact that rationality 
is entirely immanent to its own becoming; and these features of 
human activity are disruptive of that immanence, because each 
cuts across that immediacy ot presence through which that 
10see Chapter I. pp. 9?-100. 
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iJnI11anence is preserved. 
Since rationality can realize itself only through a suc-
cession of acts, a continuity must be maintained in such a way 
that its accumulated achievement in which it is expressed will 
be resolved into, thereby constituting and enriching, what comes 
after. Due to the fact that rationality is incarnated within 
a body to form a single personal principle, it can therefore 
realize itself only in dialectic with material reality, within 
which it is concretized. Given the transitive character of the 
activity that is necessary to transform material reality into 
the embodiment of rationality and the material character of this 
objectification, the immanence of rationality is precariously 
relational and transitory. The material features of embodied 
rationality can maintain their existence independently ot the 
activity that produced them. But not its spiritual, or rational, 
dimension. If these products of human activity are to remain 
expressive of the spirit that produced them, their lifeline to 
that spirit must remain intact. In other words, concretized 
rationality must be continually reexperienced so as to maintain 
its continuous existence and development. 
The orientation of rationality in maintaining this contact 
with its becoming is not towards the past as given, but the 
present. 
To attain this spiritual continuity we ourselves need 
to be initiated into a sure grasp of the present in 
which we live and in which the whole of the historical 
past is reconcentrated and exists as its fruit ••• , so 
that we can ask of the present the title-deeds of its 
reality, the meaning or its existence, and bid it unveil 
to us its mysterious face. The answer, if it is entire 
cannot but illuminate the whole of history •••• (T.L. 229) 
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Jiistorical consciousness, then, is not so much directed toward 
the systematizing of the past, as it is toward the synthesizing 
of the present with the past and future. 
The act of penetrating into the past by which the encrus-
tations of age are scraped off the achievements of rationality 
to restore and renew the light of rationality within them is 
not one of simple recall or reproduction, It is a constructive 
aet, bringing about a deeper and more complex realization of 
rationality. There are two reasons for this: first, because 
the original impulse of rationality is not immediately given in 
its objectification; and second, because the reference point of 
this recovery of the past is the present, namely, the reality 
that forms the present actualization ot rationality. Therefore, 
although the form of rationality already objectified may appear 
fixed and static, the light or rationality refracted from the 
present rather than the past will reveal another facet of its 
content. This will at the same time deepen the present content 
of rationality as the well-springs of its own vitality are tapped. 
Suoh contact with the past is not a repetition or a 
copying; it is a rebirth, a creation of the spirit 
reintegrating what others produced under different 
circumstances--a rebirth which at a given historical 
moment responds to the need of the collective con-
sciousness. (T.L. 208) 
This passage points to the problem of what makes the past 
present. To state the problem more fullyi In the process of 
reconstructing the past, through which man makes his own being 
present to himself, historical consciousness clearly does not 
integrate into the present every event and tact o! the past. 
On the part of past events and facts, what is there that some 
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are historicized, that is, live on in the present, while others 
tall into oblivion, either temporarily or possibly permanently? 
on the part of historical consciousness, what criterion is at 
work to distinguish between them? The problem under considera-
tion here is not !!.2:!! a past event or tact is historioized--this 
occurs through collective consciousness--but whz one and not 
another. What makes one fact historically relevant and another 
not? Clearly, for Sturzo, whatever enters into the matrix of 
the concrete living present, or consciousness, is historicized. 
"Inasmuch as it is historicized, it is telt in the historical 
consciousness of the time." (I.L. xxviii) But just as clearly, 
there is for him no effective practical criterion operative at 
the level of reflective consciousness to determine in any given 
moment exactly what or the past is truly historicized, or crea-
tively synthesized with the present, and what remains a residue 
of the past and possibly an obstacle to the possibilities of the 
present. \./hat facts are not directly or explicitly operative 
within consciousness, whether individual or collective, at a 
given stage in history, does not exclude the possibility ot 
their having "practical effects in the formation of the concrete 
and processive reality, for in human consciousness everything 
has its repercussions as language, custom, tradition, institu-
tions, religion, art and so on, in continual becoming." (I.L. 
xxviii) The basis for Sturzo's position here is the intrinsic 
socialization of consciousness in its origins and the on-going 
dialectic between consciousness and every torm of its objectifi-
cations whereby from these latter, the products of consciousness, 
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there is in turn a feedback into the continual structuraliza-
tion or consciousness. Or as Sturzo puts it, they "often form 
strata in the consciousness or associated members." (I.L. 4) 
In other words, these "strata" are located within the prereflec-
tive level ot consciousness, which in turn arises out of and is 
grounded in the infrastructures of a given collective conscious-
ness. Sturzo therefore draws the following conclusion: 
It is difficult to take a true inventory of what lives 
and what dies, so closely is all that forms the present 
knit with a long historical continuity. If we go back 
and back into the furthest-known centuries, we find in-
delible traces of the reality living and throbbing today. 
It is our way of understanding the past of our briet 
personal experience that we think the greater part of 
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it is dead. We forget much. or think we have forgotten, 
because much of our past is no longer actual to our 
memory. And yet that past is so transformed into our 
present, so actual and so intimately belonging to us, 
that it cannot be distinguished from what we are today. 
(S.P. 2-3) I ' 
What historical consciousness does become aware of in its recon-
struction of the past will depend on its practical needs, inter-
ests, and emotional and cognitive orientations of the present. 
(I.L. 4; S.P. 3) 
The other side or this question of the rebirth of the past 
in the present is that status of what is not in accord with the 
present state and needs of consciousness. This issue revolves 
around the fact that the crystallizations of rationality, once 
formed through human activity. acquire a reality of their own 
distinct from the original impulse of rationality that gave 
shape to them. They thus tend to persist within the flow of 
history whether they remain expressive of rationality in its 
historically advanced forms or not. In view of this fact, 
there are two possible theoretical paradigmatic situations 
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~hiCh cover the relationship or these persisting residues to a 
collective consciousness. There is, first of all, the situation 
in wbich a collective consciousness in no sense remains in vital 
contact with these residues and so either implicitly, on the 
operative level, or explicitly, on the reflective level, 
acknowledges that they are no longer consonant with its present 
1mpulse and form of rationality. Then there is the situation 
in which, of the differing currents of thought within any 
given collective consciousness, some are directed toward main-
taining or reasserting these persisting residues, even though, 
or more accurately, because the present direction of collective 
consciousness is moving ttaway from 0 or, from the perspective 
of other currents, "beyond" the values of rationality contained 
in these residues. This is a general situation within any 
active, complex collective consciousness and is another aspect 
of Sturzo's theory of the polarization of social forces into a 
duality of organizational and mystical ourrents. 11 In regard 
to this matter of historical residues, it can often be a polar-
izing issue between the two cur~ents, generating a tension that 
will vary in intensity according to the value assigned to the 
residue and the organized vigor of the two currents. 
In both instances it must not be thought that the residues 
themselves, in whatever form they are, are inert and passively 
slip into oblivion. No, even when detached from the lifeline 
of rationality, they remain active as conditioning factors, 
determining the course and mode of the further realization of 
11see Chapter III, PP• 179-185. 
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rationality. As with all conditioning factors of human acti-
vity, the historical conditioning ot these residues can function 
as either impulse or check to either tac111tate or hinder, 
spur-on or retard the continuing process of rationality. In 
either case, by reason of his fundamental view that the histori-
cal process is the becoming of rationality and therefore intrin-
sically tree, Sturzo emphasizes that the conditioning is never 
deterministic. These residues fall within the setting of all 
conditioning, which is necessary for all human activity. 12 They 
do not lessen the autonomy of man, who, as the individualized 
principle of rationality, is the principle of history and always 
remains a self-determining force. 
Historians often call such antecedents causes. but they 
are not true causes at all. There are no determinist 
causes or our action outside ourselves; we are the cause 
of our own activity. Every physical or moral reality 
in existence and the mode of our apprehension of it, con-
ditions our activity, helping or hindering it •• ,.Man 
alone, therefore, with his mind and will, is the true 
author of the historical process. (S.P. 8-9)13 
This whole discussion of those forms of the past that are 
revitalized in the present, as opposed to the residue which is 
not, points to the ambiguous and complex character of the past-
present relationship. If at a given moment in history a higher 
form of rationality is attained, in this enlightened state ot 
collective consciousness aspects of the past which were formerly 
held to be rational will now manifest themselves as the pseudo-
rational. Also, since the realization of rationality is often 
partial and marked by deficiencies, even those historical forms 
12see Chapter I, pp. 65-68. 
13To see what a recurring theme this is in Sturzo'a writings, 
ct. also I.L. xix, 89-90, 220; C. & P. 18; T.L. 198-99; M. 63. 
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that embody a genuine spark or rationality will in many instan-
ces have to be purified of these blemishes, or, more simply, 
"updated•• in their historicization. It is thus neither possi-
ble nor desirable to resolve the entire past into the present. 
Not only if there has been a genuine growth of rationality, 
but also to nourish it, the extirpation or the unauthentic 
expressions of rationality, or aspects thereof, is as equally 
important in the reconstruction or the past as the reintegra-
tion of its authentic expressions. Since both kinds o! expres-
sions have followed together from the drive of rationality to 
realize itself, the task of exorcising part ot its own becoming 
is very seldom easily accomplished by collective consciousness 
and is one calling for an effective and highly critical acumen 
at work within it. Thus, Sturzo's position on the relationship 
of the present, or consciousness, to the past is neither revo-
lutionary, insofar as this is not sufficiently discriminating 
in its eradication of the past, nor progressive, since the move-
ment or history is never linear, but reflectively critical. 
Before concluding our treatment or the relationship between 
the past and present in Sturzo's theory of history, it is impor-
tant to point out another aspect of it that follows from what 
11 
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has already been explicated about it. This is the unconditional ! 
openness ot the past which makes the systematization of it 
open-ended. Many contemporary thinkers are insistent on the 
unconditional openness of the future, being careful in the 
development of their theories to preserve this openness and 
categorically rejecting anything that may endanger it. Sturzo's 
theory allows !or the same view of the future, but he views the 
past in the same way. 
This is a corollary of the contemporaneity of the histori-
cal moments, and for several reasons. In the first place, it 
follows from the fact that in their contemporaneity the past, 
present and future remain irreducible historical moments. We 
have seen tha·~ their contemporaneity consists in the tact that 
it is actual and processive consciousness that constitutes the 
present, so that the inner synthesis or its actuality, the pre-
sent, takes up the past and future as the irreducible, positive 
dimensions of that actuality. Since the past and future are 
irreducible dimensions for Sturzo, this means that in positing 
their contemporaneity he does not mean they are absorbed into 
the present. Although they do exist only in the present. they 
retain their own integrity which is in no sense restricted to 
or exhausted in their actuality within the present. Therefore, 
when Sturzo states that ''past and future do not exist in them-
selves, but in the present," (I.L. xxv) he does not mean they 
exist as the present. They exist as the past and as the future • 
....... 
It is precisely this "real" or specifying dit!erentiation or the 
past and future within the present actuality ot consciousness 
that distinguishes the consciousness of finite temporal being 
from that of infinite being. The absorption of the past and 
future into the present constitutes the 0 total and simultaneous 
present, pure actuality" of intinite consciousness. {S.P. 6) 
In regard to the relationship or the past to the present, 
a similar situation holds as that between social facts and values 
and the individual person. In the latter instance we have seen 
,, 
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that Sturzo explains the intrinsic dialecticity between society 
and the person in terms of "a continuous succession of resolu-
tions," setting up a reciprocating vital process in which the 
reality of each is constituted together. 14 It should be ob-
served that Sturzo uses the same term, "resolve," in describing 
the actuality of the past in the present. "~e past resolves 
itself into the present. and becomes present to us through that 
of which we are conscious." (T.L. 215) "What went betore 
resolves itself into what comes after, the present always being 
enriched by the past." (S.P. 6) In using this term he is indi-
cating that the past, though actualized in the present, is not 
dissolved into the present--just as society is not dissolved 
into individual eonsciousness--but retains its specifying qual-
ity as the past. And just as there are always remainders in 
the process of sociological resolution, so in the historiciza-
tion ot the past only a portion of the past is revitalized in 
any given present, "and this never accurately and never complete-
ly, so that critical revision is continuous and necessary." 
(I.L. xxvii) As already indicated, this reconstruction varies 
according to the present needs, interests and orientations of 
consciousness. Since these are always undergoing modification 
and revision, so, too, does the interpretation and systematiza-
tion of the past. "Thus, history is always being made and re-
made, its material is always being elaborated and refashioned, 
and it is always being tested by existing reality and its final-
1sm, ever reborn in the various phases ot human process." (I.L. 
14see Chapter I, pp. 104-106. 
XJCViii-xxix)15 
Another aspect of the contemporaneity of the historical 
moments that makes for an open-ended and on-going reconstruc-
tion or the past is that the unconditional openness of history 
in one direction, the future, opens it up in the other direction, 
the past. For within the synthesizing matrix of the present the 
past is reciprocally linked to the future. They are "recipro-
cally linked 11 in that the past is known and actualized in the 
present from a position of openness to the future, the specific 
directionality of which is in turn determined by the past. A 
knowledge of the past, then, can open up new possibilities for 
the future. Sturzo does not allow for a radical discontinuity 
between past and future, such as would characterize a revolu-
tionary stance toward the past, because both arise out ot and 
are expressive of the tendency of rationality toward absolute 
rationality. It is precisely through the continuity estab-
lished within the synthesis of consciousness that the thlnlst 
into the future is generated out of the achievements or the past 
in the one movement toward absolute rationality. 
It is also by reason ot the fact that the historical moments 
are expressive of the becoming of rationality that the tuture 
is the focal point of history, and the ultimate locus of its 
meaning. It is the frame of reference from which we understand 
and evaluate the past and present. Since it is a rational 
process, it is only in the light of its overall finality that 
the meaning of its particular events is made manifest. Its 
15ar. also "History and Philosophy," p. 48; I.L. xxvii. 
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iater development unveils the hitherto unperceived connections 
o£ the earlier events and thereby uncovers their meaning. The 
pull of this finality as felt within consciousness is what 
constitutes the future. "The human present, however, is not 
something static and definitive; it is, on the contrary, dyna-
mic. It projects itself into the future, which presses on to 
become present and lose itself in the past. The dynamism 
towards the future in human process translates itself into 
£inalism ••• " (I.L. xxv; cf. also s.P. 10-11; T.L. 215) It is 
the ever-receding temporal horizon of rationality's drive tor 
completion that comprehends the entire span of its realizations 
and provides the backdrop that reflects their meaning. It is 
"ever receding" because it stretches out to contours of abso-
lute rationality, which is never attained within the confines 
of the historical process. If it were, this would transform 
"the dynamism of human process into a rationalistic staticism 
which, being against nature, is fundamentally irrational." 
(I.L. 16) This means that the meaning of the past is in turn 
never closed off •16 
16F.dward A. T1ryakian has recently expressed a similar posi-
tion: "The historian's fundamental endeavor is to make visi-
ble anew that present which once was visible but which tends 
to become invisible once it is engulfed in historical time. 
The historian, thus, may be properly called the discoverer of 
the past. The act of historical discovery is one or meaning-
ful perception •••• For the past to be exhausted as an object 
would necessarily imply that the future is exhausted, that is, 
that historical time would no longer have any possibilities of 
becoming. The ultimate meaning of historical events, therefore, 
can only be transhistorical, that is, it can only be perceived 
after all historical possibilities have been actualized and 
that can only be after there is no more history." "Socio-his-
torical Phenomena: The Seen, the Unseen, the Foreseeable," 
mimeographed paper, prepared for a meeting of the American 
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It is here in the linking of the past to the future through 
the present that the range of Sturzo•s historicist system is 
encompassed. 
Therefore, when we wish to make a thorough study of the 
elements of human activity, no matter trom what stand-
point, while starting from the present. that is, from 
the reality that forms our personal experience. we seek 
in the past the laws of formation and development, and 
try to fix for the future the ideal, deontological ele-
ment. the 'should-be', that corresponds to human pur-
poses. On this conception of human process and or its 
substantial comprehensiVity is based what we call the 
historicist system. (I.L. :xxvi) 
The futuristic stance of Sturzo's historicism is explicitly 
brought out in his treatment of the historical sense within a 
given people. He states that ''if history is the consciousness 
of collective and processive existence, and this consciousness 
seeks a unification in rationality and in religion, then to 
have the historical sense is to reflect on this consciousness, 
to bring it out, to make use of it in all its bearings and all 
its complexity.n (T.L. 220) The historical sense, then, is an 
active, and practically oriented, reflection on the historical 
!' ! 
:i 
,, 
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consciousness of a people. It is important to note that within 1 
this description ot the historical sense. as practically oriented, 
Sturzo includes the teleological orientation or historical con-
sciousness, its seeking "a unification in rationality and in 
religion. 0 Now, since the historical sense is the reflective 
and practical working out of the historical consciousness of a 
people, obviously a people without a history will be without a 
historical sense. Significantly, Sturzo allows for this possi-
. 
Historical Association, Dec. 1966. pp. 8-9. Quote trom Henry 
s. Kariel's Open S~stems: Arenas tor Political Action (Itasca, 
Ill.: F. E. Peacoe PUb., Inc., I<JG9), P• 123. 
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bility. His statement on this is worth quoting in full as it 
sums up the themes we have been discussing. 
It (the historical sense) is not found in a people that 
has no history, but if a people has no history it is 
not because it has not had important events in its past, 
but because it has not felt the fundamental unity between 
the present and the past, and has not arrived at creating 
a course for the future. Thus we find the historical 
sense more highly developed in prophetic Hebraism, which 
lived by the thought and expectation of the Messias, 
than among other people ot the time. We find it in 
Rome at the height of her grandeur, and therefore con-
scious of the roads traversed and of her mission in the 
world. In both peoples the past was linked to the 
future, and the historical sense reflected the motives 
of expectation and or action. (T.L. 220) 
The perspective of history, then, is not one of looking 
back over one's shoulder nor even simply of peering beyond the 
immediate horizon, but in its fullest sense is one of actively 
moving towards and giving shape to that horizon. Within this 
framework of histor,' the historical sense ceases to mean adher-
ence to the past and becomes a liberating power; it means not 
conformity but transformation, not the old but the new, not 
custom but progress. Through an historical sense we do not 
merely preserve our world, we create a new one. It is not a 
mere accumulation of knowledge whereby we are enabled to meet 
with a situation; it is a power whereby we can anticipate the 
istuation and transform it. The basic posture of man in his-
tory, then, is one of "creative expectation," engendering 
action in the present to fashion his tuture. 17 
Another passage that brings out the futuristic slant of 
Sturzo's position is one in·which he is considering what it is 
1?see Harvey Cox's "Forward" to Ernst Block's Man on His 
~ (New York: Herder, 19?0)• P• 10. 
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in the flow of events that constitutes them as history. It is 
not simply their significance within the affairs of men, such 
as the succession of rulers. We have already seen that an event 
is historioized inasmuch as "it is felt in the historical con-
sciousness of the time." (I.L. xxviii) Although, as has been 
indicated, Sturzo holds we cannot on the reflective level deter-
mine what is "felt"--that is, operative--in a given historical 
consciousness, nevertheless, the question remains as to what 
sturzo means by the term "felt." In other words, in what manner 
are events operative when they are historicized. Sturzo answers: 
The changes that have been mentioned will become his-
tory when they come to reveal fresh aspects of lite, 
to create new spiritual exigencies, to arouse the 
feelings of social groups and stir them to action, 
to feed revolution, first in the mind, then in events. 
Why are the historieized elements effective in this way? Because 
"there is no history without the manifestation of a truth to be 
actuated, and without the impulse of a love to be communicated •••• " 
{'l'.L. 22?) The wording here, 110! a truth to be actuated ••• o! 
a love to be communicated," clearly indicates the practical, 
futuristic thrust of history. 
We have indicated that Sturzo is at pains to preserve the 
open possibilities of the future. Since he does emphasize the 
finalism ot history and positively designates the goal, we must 
carefully determine how and for what reasons he works this out. 
It is of the utmost importance to correctly understand Sturzo's 
position on the form and nature of the tinalism of history be-
cause it is here that the final rectifying principle of the 
drive toward absolute rationality, which defines the person in 
i1 
: I~ .1 
232 
biS most intimate character, is made manifest. 
Since history is a rational process, its movement must be 
teleological. The future will then resolve itself into the 
,telos or aim of the human activity making up this process. 
(S.P. 11) Yet, for Sturzo the very notion of finalism is an 
open concept because for him it "implies tree initiative and 
co-ordination to a further reality."18 
Tb.ere are two fundamental reasons which are intrinsic to 
sturzo's whole theory that require the tuture to be uncondition-
ally open in its possibilities tor determination. The first is 
the dynamism of the human process arising out of the tinitude 
of man•s nature and its drive for completion. If the future were 
not open, this would imply that the human process, and man 
within it, is able to realize itself fully. With the completion 
of its being there would then be no exigency for further reali-
zation. Tb.is would result in an antivital stasis. which is 
contradictory to the inherent dynamism of the human process, 
and of all reality. "In every concrete reality there is always 
something wanting; and by this want it is incessantly impelled 
to fresh realisations. 1119 
The second and most important reason is that man is the 
sole substantive and efficient principle or history. which is 
the coming-to-be of his own nature. And since this nature in 
its most intimate and fundamental character is an individualizedc 
18sturzo, "Maurice 
'L'elan spiritual,'" p. 
19 Ibid., p. 347. 
-
# Blondel's La Pensee: the Philosophy of 
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principle of rationality seeking realization, man, although 
limited by the physical, moral and socio-historical condition-
1ng factors of his existence, is an autonomous, selt-determin-
1Ilg creator of his own life. 
Man could not act were he not physically conditioned; 
such is his nature •••• But geographic and physical con-
ditions will reveal themselves as such when man makes 
them an element in his life, when he transmutes them 
from something purely material into a spiritual factor, 
an object of knowledge and action, thus creating his 
human environment out of the very conditions offered 
him by the physical world. But man's creative act--
and we may call it creative by analogy, in so tar as 
he makes his lif e--is nothing other than a continuous 
activity of his mind and will. It is this only that 
produces the process that we call history. (S.P. ?; ct. 
also P• 9) 
Since this autonomous self-determining activity, or freedom, is 
ontologically rooted in and expressive of rationality, it is not 
characterized by chaotic, arbitrary and total indeterminancy of 
expression, but rather is patterned according to the laws and 
limits of the rationality of which it is expressive. And when 
Sturzo, in his statement of the historicism at the basis of his 
theory, describes history as the human process "realized by 
immanent forces," the immanent forces he is ret'erring to are 
the inner laws of man's nature, individualized rationality. 
One commentator on Sturzo's thought has already pointed this 
out. "Thus those immanent forces that propel the march of 
humankind are to be identified only within the deep and inti-
mate laws of spiritual being which can have only a moral, not 
a physical character, consonant with the spirituality and 
rationality of the subject."20 Thus to say that the future is 
Ii 
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completely undetermined in its possibilities does not mean it 
can be realized in any possible way and still be expressive ot 
the becoming of rationality. What it does mean is that there 
are no determining factors extrinsic to the subject and effi-
cient principle of history, man himself. Ir man is to be true 
to himself in the realization of himself, the pattern of his 
life must conform to the inner laws of his nature. And it is 
only in this sense, that is, normatively, that these inner laws 
are the determining--determining in the sense of regulatory--
factors in the shaping of his future. For as operative from 
within a rational subject, their enactment remains dependent 
on the freedom of that subject. The complete autonomy of man 
in the realization of himself is manifested in the tact that 
be can operate, and therefore shape his future, even against 
the laws or his own being. (I.L. xxxii) 
It is the autonomy of ·man and the subsequent originality 
of individual experience as the basis of history that underlies 
Sturzo•s rejection of every deterministic view of history. In 
summation he states: "The fundamental error of determinism lay 
in seeking the unifying force of the historical process outside 
the makers of history, that is, outside men themselves, and in 
envisaging nature as a purely material force." (S.P. ?) The 
logical consequence of every deterministic view, whether mater-
ialistic or spiritualistic, is the placing of the locus of 
reality iL a principle outside of man and of which man and his 
world are but the mere phenomena. 
' illl (' 
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In both cases, we could no longer speak of human process 
as the experience of free and reasonable individuals, 
~ut of a succession of either material or spiritual phe-
nomena which would present none of the originality of a 
human personal cast, and none of the value of experience 
as we conceive of it for ouraelves and through history. 
{I.L. xxi) 
This result would be the same i.f--we accepted the idea 
of immanent Spirit or universal M'i.nd as the sole conscious 
reality, of which individual men were but the phenomena; 
it would be the end of the personal individuality of 
each, which is what constitutes the originality of human 
life and experience. (I.L. xxii) . 
At the same time, the logical consequence of the autonomy 
of man and the originality of his experience is the openness of 
the future. For since the immanent forces by which history is 
realized are self~determining forces, genuine self-determinancy 
is possible only when the future is not fixed a priori. Since 
freedom is intrinsic to the nature or rationality, the attain-
ment of rationality can only be through the expression of tree-
dom in activity. The very possibility of free decision and its 
enactment includes within it openness for the future. With 
freedom at its core, then, the movement towards rationality 
cannot be a movement towards some more or less clearly discern-
ible goal which is fixed prior to the movement itself. 
Sturzo does point to a definite unifying principle of his-
tory, rationality, both as immanent in human rationality and 
as transcendent in the Absolute f'iind. This two-told unifying 
finalism of history must be viewed in the light of the very 
nature or history, which is man in search or himself. Thus, 
the goal of history is the very nature of the subject of history 
considered as an exigency to seek realization and fulfillment. 
And since Sturzo views man as an open-ended or "unfinished" 
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creature, he does not assign a predetermined form or facticity 
to the unifying principle of rationality as immanent, inasmuch 
as this is the specifying element in manis nature. The specific 
concrete content or facticity ot rationality must be determined 
through each person's own experience and personal activity. "It 
1s always a case of a unification in process, never final, but 
always a tendency, a dynamism." (I.L. xx111) The reason for 
this, which is the theoretical basis for man's open-ended 
nature, is that the thrust of the rational principle of man's 
nature for completion extends to unification in absolute ration-
ality. Although Sturzo does hypostasize absolute rationality 
into the Christian notion of God, this still does not close off 
the possibilities of the future because here too the relation-
ship between man and the transcendent unifying principle of ab-
solute rationality is intrinsic to and grounded in the ontologi-
cal exigencies of man's own nature. We must now carefully 
elaborate Sturzo's position on this relationship. 
In the definition of his historicism Sturzo states that 
history moves nrrom a transcendent and absolute principle 
towards a transcendental and absolute end." He states elsewhere 
that history, "whatever history it be ••• carries us to the funda-
mental problem of living and journeying humanity in relation to 
its unifying finalism." (T.L. 214) As we have traced the main 
lines of Sturzo's theory, we have frequently referred to man's 
orientation towards absolute rationality. It is within his 
theory of history that Sturzo draws out the full implications 
of this, both in respect to the orientation itself and the form 
Ii I 
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of absolute rationality as it has presented itself in history. 
Th·..is, we must now examine the full scope of the relationship 
sturzo finds betwP.en a transcendent and absolute principle and 
man as it arises within history. 
The question of the absolute arises from the pressure of 
man's search for himself in the present historical moment, be-
cause it is a question that has its ground in the very structure 
o! man's being, his sociality and its consequent projection, 
which extends "towards the absolute which commands present 
reality ... (I.L. 66) It is precisely from within the actuality 
of its own experience, the present, that the human spirit 
grasps the root of its own actuality, its tendency towards an 
absolute in the torm of absolute rationality. "But the present, 
that of our living experience, is not at all an •ourselves,• it 
is not our knowledge of it, but it is a totality that absorbs 
us and transcends us in a striving towards the infinite." ('1'.L. 
215) 
'l'he key concept in Sturzo's historicism that brings to the 
fore the full range or implications in the concrete relationship 
that he finds between the question or the absolute and the ques-
tion of man as it arises in history is the notion of ~ranscen­
dence. For in the concrete eraplo;yment of this concept by Sturzo 
it is expressive both of the tendency within man toward the ab-
solute and the absolute itself. In the most generic meaning 
Sturzo assigns to the term, transcendence means "the processive 
passage to another term that elicits it" or "the overstepping 
ot the limits of one stage into another." (I.L. 308-9) 
I 
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that constitutes the nature of the person, the person 1s trans-
cendent in the interiorit~r of his own nature. In view of the 
generic meaning of the term, this transcendence as inherent in 
the nature of the person may still be interpreted as a wholly 
immanent process, that is to say, as a continual passage from 
one stage of realization to another in an on-going overcoming 
of limits, but all within the immanent order of man's own becoming. 
However, as Sturzo applies this term to the concrete becom-
ing of the person in history, several specifically different, 
but interrelated meanings become manifest which rule out the 
wholly immanent interpretation. The term "transcendence,. refers 
to the dynamic openness-towards-absolute rationality, which 
ontologically constitutes rational consciousness, the actual 
process of "going beyond" oneself, or more accurately, one's 
given state of actuality generated by this dynamic openness, 
and the goal of this process. "Men, taken as an historical 
whole and in their process, feel, more or less intuitively, 
that the urge to a transcendence in a rational ideal, an ideal 
of goodt will not be arrested until a goal is eached that com-
prehends everything and transcends everything." (I.L. 312) 
We must bring into clearer focus the features of this goal 
because here in his historicism within the dynamics of the notion 
of transcendence, Sturzo moves from an abstract metaphysical 
f'inalism to a concrete historical finalism. In the concrete of 
history, the absolute rationality towards which the person tends 
reveals itself as a personal absolute, "a God with whom it 
239 
(society) can enter into communion through knowledge and love.'' 
(I.L. 313) The total context of Sturzo's theory of socio-per-
sonalism provides the theoretical foundation for a personal 
absolute. We have already mentioned one feature of Sturzo's 
theory, the social grounding and context of self-awareness, 
that points to a personal absolute. 21 But even more basic than 
this, since this transcendent principle enters into the ontologi-
cal structure of the person both as its underived source and 
ground and its ultimate unifying finalism, it, too, must be 
personal. For in both aspects it is an imnanent constituent of 
the person as such and consequently must itself be personal. 
This could be demonstrated in terms of several fundamental fea-
tures of the person. The most basic one within the framework 
of Sturzo•s theory is that of consciousness. 
A conscious being such as man cannot be resolved into 
or unified with anything but another conscious being, 
so that ultimately either we think of a personal God 
or of a universal consciousness, whether this be the 
logos of the Platonisf:., the potential intellect of 
the Iverroists, the Mind of the Idealists, or other 
1
1 
similar hypotheses. Yet which is the more contradictory, 
an infinite personality or an impersonal consciousness? 
If personality is consciousness of self, impersonality 
is incompatible with the concept of consciousness. A 
personality that has consciousness of its infinite con-
tains nothing contradictory. (S.P. 62) 
To avoid any misinterpretation of Sturzo's position on 
personal absolute, or God, it must be made unequivocally clear 
there is a basic and essential difference in his use of the 
term ''transcendence'' as applied to the constitutive process of 
the person and the finalizing principle of this process. God. 
21see Chapter II, pp. 136-13?. 
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'l'he difference in his use comes down to one between absolute 
ontological transcendence and relative processive transcendence. 
The former refers to the absolute ontological transcendence of 
God's activity and the latter refers to the various processes 
of transcendence that flow from and are constitutive of the 
ontological structure of the person. Thus, in view of the abso-
lute transcendence of God's activity, the concepts that are used 
to designate the reality that is one with that activity, such 
as conscious and personal, are applied only in an analogous 
sense. What the human person is through a dynamic tendency and 
partial attainment, God is as complete and perfect actuality. 
In Sturzo's own words: 
A personal God is in no wise an anthropomorphic con-
ception, but a superhuman one, beyond the bounds ot 
our comprehension. We can only lay hold of the nega-
tive elements of this infinite existence and express 
them in a positive mode so as to affirm their reality. 
We do not reduce the personality or God to a human 
mode, but transfer to God a predication of conscious 
man, inasmuch as we wish to deny that God is either 
an impersonal universal consciousness, or a non-con-
sciousness. We mean to affirm that God is the real, 
absolute, infinite, super-existence; of a thought and 
a will always in act, entirely; pure and without inward 
or outward limits. (S.P. 63; or. p. 61) 
The reasoning behind Sturzo•s diversified use of the term 
"transcendence" must be clearly understood. It does not signify 
a careless or indifferent use ot a culturally freighted term 
that is itself highly ambivalent in its historical significa-
tions. Rather, the diversified meanings he attaches to the 
term have a signal function within his thought: they convey the 
full significance of the ontological tension that constitutes 
the person. As Sturzo himself states, "We use the word, 
241 
transcendence, which inspires so much mistrust among experimen-
talists and positivists, not assuredly from a wish to bring con-
fusion into our terminology, but because we find no other word 
that renders the meaning we seek to convey.'• (I.L. 309) 
A preliminary fact that should be kept in mind in consider-
ing Sturzo'a diversified use or the term is that this occurs 
within a relational, processive perspective. Thus, transcendence 
must be interpreted not substantively, but relationally. The 
underlying concept that unifies the divergent use of the term. 
is that of relation. It is within the one world of relation 
that transcendence takes place. Transcendence is a single term 
covering a variety of relational activities, all of which, trom 
the perspective of man, involve "the processive passage to ano-
ther term that elicits it." It is from the view of His rela-
tional activity with man in history that God is said to be trans-
cendent. And since the relational activity of God is at one 
with His being, from the level of man's perspective, God!! 
transcendent in His being. In contrast, man is a transcending 
being. Also, whereas in the transcendent activity ot man there 
is a reciprocating interdependence between that activity and 
its term, God's transcendence is such that His activ1ty touches 
man's life but man's activity cannot of itself alone touch His. 
In other words, God's activity within history is beyond all that 
is possible to man through his own power. 
One of the reasons Sturzo uses the same term for two tunda-
mentally different significations is to point up that man in 
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realizing himself must go beyond himself in an upwardly--with 
no spatial connotations, of course, but ontologically "upwards" 
towards a higher grade of being--directed finalism that opens 
out onto the infinite horizon of absolute transcendent being, 
which, being the goal of a relative transcendent movement, con-
tinually remains unattainable. In this way, Sturzo clearly 
preserves the essential otherness of God which differentiates 
His being from everything in the world and within history, and 
yet at the same time points to a genuine transcendenae that 
takes place within history, or more exactly, IS history as con-
stitutive of man in the plenitude of his being. 
In the single designation of a relative and absolute reality 
Sturzo is able to emphasize the intrinsic constituting--tor the 
relative reality--relationship between the two and, at the same 
time, the inherent and fundamental tension in the ontological 
structure of the relative that this relationship generates. This 
tension marks the incommensurability between the positivity of 
this structure and its ideality. Since this incommensurability 
cannot be surmounted by man himself, in order tor there to be 
an actual movement towards the ideality or his own being, there 
must be a power present capable of spanning the magnetic field 
between the poles of man's being. Only then is it possible for 
the movement towards the absolute to be initiated and sustained. 
Thus, the very designation of the movement of man's being toward 
realization as transcendent points to the presence of the trans-
cendent principle within man's nature that generates the trans-
cendent movement of his self-realization. 
r 243 Another reason why Sturzo applies the term "transcendence" 
to the various phases of man's becoming is that it underscores 
the efficacious reality of the immanent order of man's own nature, 
and attributes full value to its prooessive character by calling 
attention to the fact that there is a genuine emergence of 
higher levels of being within that immanent order. Robert Pol-
lock, in his usual trenchant manner, has commented on this 
aspect of Sturzo•s thought: 
Limitation is intrinsic to the idea of creature; never-
theless, within the immanent order there is always the 
stimulus to overcome it, by passing continually from 
one limit to another. But each new position attained 
is not simply a manifestation of that which pre-exists 
in germ; it is not only the moment of an intrinsic 
dialectic, or merely the phase of a process of 'selt-
realization'; it is a real transcendence, manifesting 
the relation which exists between the immanen
2
t level 
of development and the transcendental Being. 2 
We have said that God is both the ontological ground and 
ultimate unifying principle of the ontological structure ot the 
person, so that we must conclude that He is both immanent and 
transcendent to the becoming of man. lle is immanent in His ac-
tivity, or at least in one dimension of it, and transcendent in 
the modality of that activity. This immanence of God within 
history must be more fully elaborated. 
That God is the ontological ground of the person can be 
seen in the inexhaustible dynamism of the person's constitutive 
principle, rationality, for completion, which is expressive of 
"a movement of interior necessity towards the absolute." (S.P. 
39) That God ontologically grounds this inner dynamism follows 
22Pollook, "L'uomo nella societ~ e nella storia,n pp. 
241-42. 
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f'rom the tact that the person cannot of himself alone originate 
or sustain the thrust of this dynamism towards the absolute. 
The person cannot of himself alone even initiate the actual 
movement of his being toward tultillment because there is an 
ontological inoommensurability between the constitutive prin-
ciple of his being and its own inner exigency for completion. 
This incommensurability is experienced on the conscious level 
as an ever present disquiet, which points to an insatiable void 
between the positivity of its present actualization and the 
fullness ot its ideality towards which it tends. In the face 
of this void and the intrinsic limitations or his own being, 
man experiences a profound disquiet and dissatisfaction with 
himself rising up from the depths of his own being, taking on 
and manifesting itself in a variety of forms. 23 
23In view or the complexity of this phenomenon and the 
great variety of interpretations which have been given to it, 
the reference to it obviously does not mean to imply that it 
necessarily, in and of itself, verifies the argumentation here. 
Marx's interpretation of this experience of disquietude, to 
name one prominent example, stands in direct opposition to the 
one given here, namely, that there is a fundamental anxiety 
arising !rom the ontological structure of man and as such ines-
capable, which may be termed "the appeal of transcendence.n 
Also, as Gabriel Marcel warns, if "the need for transcendence 
presents itself above all ••• as a kind of dissatisfaction," not 
every kind of dissatisfaction "implies an aspiration towards 
transcendence." or. The ~ste;yof' Being, Vol. I: Reflection 
and ~ste;y; trans. by G. aser (Chicago: Hen17 Regnery Co., 
19$!~ p. 42. Therefore, granted that the interpretation here 
demands, and merits, more attention and oaretul analysis than 
the scope of this essay allows, nevertheless, it clearly does 
remain a viable position with a vast body of literature suppor-
tive of it, the essence of which Henri de Lubac epitomizes when 
he states, "It would be a very poor observer who thought that 
it was just an anomaly, a passing disease, a sort ot excres-
cence which could be removed altogether one day, a phantom of 
the mind which could be diss~pated , a strange voice which could 
be reduced to silence. It would be most unrealistic to imagine 
that physical or social health or the progress of science were 
245 
The power of a finite being is proportionate only to a 
finite term. {T.L. 30; S.P. 41) Therefore, the activity of a 
finite being can explicitly be directed only toward a finite 
term. If there is an actual movement of man toward the ideal-
i ty of his nature, this would be indicative or the operative 
presence ot a transcendent principle, which is not subject to 
the limits ot finitude, within the depths ot man's own being. 
For Sturzo, the actual movement of history testifies to this 
presence. It has been the effort of his thought to document 
this movement. "After studying the unification in rationality 
in all the stages, and in all the guises of sociality and in 
its process and resolution, we cannot but reach a transcendence 
towards an absolute end." (I.L. 313) It is precisely the 
grounding ot man's nature by God that makes the immanent reali-
zation of that nature an inherently transcendent movement. 
Just as man alone cannot be the initiator of the movement 
toward the fulfillment of his nature in the absolute, so .. ither 
is he of him.self alone able to maintain it in a sustained devel-
opment of bis being. This tact, too, has its root in man's own 
being in the principle of materiality with its movement contra-
vening that of rationality. The dynamism of rationality toward 
completion in absolute rationality is the immanent source ot the 
transcending movement towards God in man. But as we have al-
ready seen. the specifically human rationality is not pure 
the cure. That would be to misconceive all that is most human 
in the human being and which 'makes him more than man.• 11 de 
Lubac, The Discoverz of God (New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 
1960)~ p. 116 LTrans. or: Sur les chemins de Dieu (Paris; Aubier, 
1956)..J. 
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rationality; it is limited by the principle of materiality, 
whose natural movement is towards an individualistic self-con-
tained egoism. Consequently, the movement ot rationality 
towards completion, which is a natural and spontaneous con-
verging projection of the self outward in unifying association 
with others--a projection extending to what Sturzo calls a 
"communicative union" with God--contains within itself a coun-
teracting movement. 24 
The concrete individual rational consciousness, then, is 
a consciousness in tension between the polarizing forces of its 
constitutive principles. Since this polarization arises from 
its own immanent constituents, it is complete and unavoidable. 
Inasmuch as the two principles together constitute the seamless 
reality of theego, the movement toward the ideality ot man's 
nature does not involve a denial or rejection of the pull of 
materiality, which is an impossibility, but does call tor a 
conscious redirection and spir1tual1z1ng of it by ordering it 
towards a higher collaboration with and integration in the move-
ment of the rational principle, so that there is achieved 11the 
obedience of the lower faculties, their docility, their adapta-
bility, their decisive subjection to spiritual impulses." (T.L. 
41) It, too, must be caught up in the movement of rationality 
for completion if this movement is to be maintained. Otherwise, 
its equally compelling pull within the individual consciousness 
will cut across the path of this movement, short-circuiting its 
24
see Chapter III, pp. 15?-158. 
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thrust and deflecting its flow into a regressive slide towards 
a constricting egocentricity. It is this equally compelling 
pull ot materiality that is the root ot man's incapacity for a 
sustained movement toward absolute rationality. There are no 
resources wholly immanent to the person that would provide him 
with the means for permanently reordering its natural movement 
toward coordinating with and reintoreing the movement of ration-
ality. The principle of materiality obviously does not provide 
the means for subverting its own natural movement; and the tact 
that individualized rationality is itself limited by this prin-
ciple means that it cannot completely dominate the force of its 
own intrinsic limiting principle. Thus, if man is to be actu-
ally successful in realizing the exigencies of his own nature 
tor completion, the fulfilment of the conditions that make this 
possible is not immanent to that nature. There must be a prin-
ciple of reconciliation between the principles ot his being if 
1 
• 
the demands of their contravening movements are to serve as a 
stimulus for a transcending development and not be lost in a 
sterile inner struggle. This principle of reconciliation will 
have to be both immanent and transcendent at once. It will be 
immanent in that its conciliating activity will be indissolubly 
woven into the fabric of man's becoming and it will be transcen-
dent in that it itself, as its conciliating activity testifies, 
will be beyond the limitations of that becoming. 
Here, ot course, within the context ot this specific dis-
cussion on the conditions necessary for sustained development 
on the part of man, the logic of Sturzo's position only points 
i 
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to the inherent need for such an immanent-transcendent principle 
but not its actual presence. This must rest on an appeal to 
facts that would verify that the sustained development has or 
does take place. In this particular issue of sustained develop-
ment there is no direct empirical way or substantiating its 
actuality. Nevertheless, in drawing from the evidence culled 
from other features of man's becoming that do indicate the ac-
tual presence of this transcendent principle within man's becom-
ing, we can at least affirm that the conditions for its possi-
bility are actually present and that in terms of these condi-
tions the transcendent principle is operatively present as a 
principle of reconciliation between the contravening movements 
of man's own being. 
The tendency towards unification is a law of life. 
We seek it all the more in that, formed of sense and 
spirit, we have within us two laws that are otten in 
conflict, disturbing even natural activities. A prin-
ciple that pacifies the finite with the infinite is 
in itself vital and unifying; it is the new order, 
penetrating the spirit and reverberating through the 
whole of human activity. (T.L. 41) 
There is another aspect of God's immanence in history that 
must be considered. This is as the ulterior unifying principle 
:I ·~ 
of man's becoming. Viewing God from the aspect o! man's final- 1, 
ism also provides another approach for demonstrating that the 
absolute towards which man tends is in tact a personal absolute. 
At first sight it may not seem correct to speak of God's imma-
nence in history in terms of man's unification with Him. It 
would seem that precisely as the ultimate goal of ma.n's final-
istic striving God transcends history. In the definition of " ,,, 
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bis historicism Sturzo says that history moves "from a transcen-
dental and absolute principle towards a transcendental and abso-
lute end." Thus, the primordial source and ultimate end of the 
human process "are not historical, but extra-historical." (I.L. 
xxx: and xxxiv) Sturzo also appears to rule out any immanence 
to this unlf'ication when he compares it with the unification in 
rationality. "In our personal experience, the udtioation in 
rationality is inward and immanent; the same could not be said 
of the unifying relationship between the contingent and the 
absolute.'' (I.L. xxxi) And again, "this unification in ration-
ality, which is immanent in us, would lead us to an exasperating 
rational anthropocentrism (pseudo-humanism) if it were not tor 
the unification that makes us transcend it in the absolute, the 
unification or the human in the divine." (I.L. xxiv) Thus, it 
would seem that whereas the unification in rationality is imma-
nent, the urU'ication in the absolute is transcendent. Yet, 
Sturzo goes on to sa:y that in the unifying relationship between 
man and God, "we find an initial immanence that suffices.tor uni-
fication without falling into immanentism." (I.L. xxxi) 
In view of the absolute ontological transcendence of God, 
a question more pressing than that of the immanence of any uni-
fication between man and God would seem to be how any such uni-
fication is in any way possible, given the ontological incommen-
surability between the two. Even if one admits to the possibil-
ity of a unifying relationship between man and God, at least as 
a hypothesis, in view of their ontological incommensurability 
there is the added difficulty of how it could be effected without 
,, 
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the total absorption of the finite, the individual person and 
the human process as a whole, into the infinite reality of God. 
Actually, all three difficulties stemming from the question 
of God as the finalistic principle of man•s becoming and of the 
historical process as a whole are closely intertwined because 
the solution to them lies within the context of Sturzo's theory 
of the person. In explaining this theory we arrived at the 
basic definition of the person as "the tendency towards abso-
lute rationality in time. 1125 We can now more accurately and 
concretely designate the objective or the tendency that consti-
tutes the person as a personal absolute, or God. And we have 
seen that since the person cannot initiate this tendency, God 
is operatively immanent with the ontological structure of the 
person as its source and ground. This is the "initial immanence" 
Sturzo referred to which "suffices for unification without fall-
ing into immanentism. 11 (I.L. xxxi) The other aspect ot this 
divine activity within man's becoming is that now under consi-
deration as the ultimate unifying principle of that becoming. 
Actually, in distinguishing between God as the creative ground 
or the person and as the finalistic term, we are assuming two 
different perspectives on the single operative presence of one 
and the same principle. From the perspective of man this lat-
ter divine activity relates to his finalistic striving, of which 1 
God is the unifying principle. 
It is important to clarify here that we are not considering 
God as an extrinsic final cause, but as the unifying principle 
25see Chapter I, p. 101. 
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of a finalism that is not external to the person but rather is 
11the very nature of the subject considered as a tendency or 
exigency to seek fulfillment and perfection." (I.L •. xv) As the 
unifying principle of this tinaliam God is an inner constitutive 
~ 
1'\ 
I 1 
dimension of the person. Before we experience the tullness of 
1
11 
the unification within us as reality, we experience the force 
of its pull as the finalistic demand of our nature. This is 
the sense in which God is immanent as the finalistic term. '?he 
extent that we respond to this pull by striving to actualize 
the finalistic drive of our nature is the extent to which the 
unifying presence of God is actually historioized. Emphasis 
must be given to the fact that the individual person must ot 
himself respond to this pull. It is not an extrinsic, determin-
ing force, but is intrinsic as the finalistic demand ot a 
rational nature. As such, it operates not merely in accord 
with, but from within the instrumentality of human freedom. 
We mentioned above that it is within the total context of 
his theory of the person that Sturzo theoretically works out the 
problem of the unifying relationship between man and God. To 
properly comprehend the full force of his position it is well 
to recall that the basic metaphysical categories in his theory 
are relation and process. The person in his ontological struc-
ture is relational and processual. It is this that brings out 
the full force of both the immanence and transcendence ot the 
unifying relationship between man and God. Robert Pollock has 
also suggested these implications for the processive character 
of human reality. 
'I 
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Once there is given to contingency its full value of 
process and it is studied integrally, it is impossible 
to abstract it from its concrete relation with trans-
cendental Being. This affirmation is also valid for 
those who, while affirming transcendence, do not appre-
ciate the concrete and vital character of the relation 
which ties the finite with the infinite. To those we 
say this happens because they, by considering contin-
gency too abstractly and statically, make the distinc-
tion between Absolute Being and the contingent so rigid 
as to end in separation. We should not minimize con-
tingency by stopping there in its processual character; 
and if we conceive it adequately we should see that it 
is not otherwise intelligible than in terms of the 
dialectic ot immanence-transcendence.26 · 
What we have here in the human-divine relationship is the 
grounding and vertical component of the basic differentiation-
in-aynthesis dialectic that constitutes the field of the per-
sonal. This is the primordial relationship that grounds and 
subsumes under its scope the total range of all horizontal rela-
tionships in the personal field. (T.L. 9?)2? This is so because 
it is the relationship that most intimately and constitutively 
establishes the basic ontological structure o! sociality. As 
26Pollock, "L'uomo nella societ~ e nella storia, 0 pp. 240-41. 
2?Aga1n, the spatial imagery of the terms "vertical" and 
0 hor1zontdf" is not to be interpreted literally, but f'iguratively 
to denote, in the first instance, a relationship between dif-
ferent levels or being, and in the second instance, relation-
ships on the same level of being. The imagery is not entirely 
precise because even in the establishing of "horizontal" rela-
tionships is an "upward" movement ontologically for the persons 
concerned in the increase of the depth and extension ot their 
personbood. Nevertheless, relatively speaking, the imagery does 
connote the qualitative difference between the two kinds of rela-
tionships. As with all concepts applied to God, the vertical dif-
ference-in-synthesis dialectical relationship is only analogous 
to that operative between human persons. In its vertical dimen-
sion it takes on a different character in that it does not work 
itself out in a reciprocating interdependent dialectic. The 
ontological deteroination and dependence is only on the side of 
the human person. 
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a result, the constitutive activity of the person is directed 
in principle towards God. The determination and individuality 
of the person, then, is by definition established in direct 
proportion to the movement or his being towards the transcen-
dent being of God. The apex or that determination and indivi-
duality is reached in union with God. Thus, it is by reason 
of the fundamental ontological structure of the person that the 
reality of the person is not submerged into the higher reality 
of God but rather is accentuated and further differentiated 
according to the closeness of the union with the divine reality. 
This is the precise point in Sturzo's theory that forms the 
basis tor his opposition to any immanentistic theory of history. 
Such theories, by seeking all spiritual values and meaning in 
the historical realization of human activity as a strictly 
immanent process, depersonalize the process and consequently 
the values and meaning that are realized in it.28 
Sturzo terms the kind of union attained between man and 
God a "communicative union" (T.L. 98), which consists in a con-
tact of presence between persons. This is in tact the only 
kind of union that is constitutive of the person because in it 
alone is there a contact of spirit to spirit of which the in-
communicable reality of the person consists. The only way in 
which the vital and synthesizing center of the person can be 
touched, and thereby further deepened, is in and through a "com-
municative union," namely, one that is effected through the mode ! i 
28sturzo, "History and Philosophy," p. 53. 
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o! being proper to the person as such. presence. Only in this 
mode ot being is there the two-way kinetic transparency or 
being--directed inwards and outwards--that proVides that imme-
diacy of being in which spirit is able to touch spirit. 
It is by reason of the conditions necessary tor this union 
that the contact between man and God in the historical realiza-
tion of man's being is a contact of freedom. The very nature 
of presence as expressing and revealing the inner dimension of 
the person. which is the locus of his reality, demand that it 
arise from within the person through the autonomy of his own 
being. Although the operative presence of God is necessary to 
initiate and sustain the constitutive activity of the person. 
the power of this presence only talces effect through the auton-
omous activity of the person. 29 As Robert Pollock has pointed 
out, it is necessary for us to consider the relation between 
man and God "more concretely as a real eooperation."30 This 
cooperation, as constitutive of the person, or lack thereof, 
marks the rhythm of history. 
The contact between man and God is a contact of freedom. 
Without freedom there would be neither the quest for 
truth nor the union through love, there would not be 
lite. A deterministic. compelling force exercised upon 
us would not be a contact of spirit between us and the 
29If we emphasize the role of freedom trom the side of the 
human person in effecting this union. it obViously follows that 
equal stress must be given to the play of divine freedom, so 
that whatever in this process flows from the divine dispensa-
tion, whether in the order of nature or the theological doctrine 
of grace. clearly does so through divine freedom, allowing for 
whatever theological distinctions must be made in each order. 
30Pollock, uL'uomo nella societa e nella storia, 0 p. 241. 
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Godhead •••• On the same principle, history is our free 
activity, it is human realization, though it is the 
result of the initiative and intervention of God. It 
represents the alternatives of aeeeptanoe or rejection 
of the divine which come to us and which dwell within 
us. (T.L. 232) 
This passage indicates the way in which the contact ot 
freedom between man and God is historically effected, and the 
communicative union established insofar as it depends on man's 
own endeavor, namely, through "the quest tor truth" and "the 
union through love." The full sentence reads, "Without freedom 
there would be neither the quest for truth nor the union through 
love, there would not be lite." The "lite" Sturzo is referring 
to is that of personal selfhood. Only through knowledge and love 
is this life realized and in being realized moves towards God. 
Since the communicative union between man and God is a contact 
of presence, it is clear, from our previous analysis of pre-
senoe,31 that it can be achieved only through the reciprocally 
interdependent activities of knowing and loving. Since both 
knowledge and love are the principle and condition of the other, 
Sturzo explains our relationship to, movement towards and union 
with God in terms of both, giving emphasis to one or the other 
depending on the formality of the perspective. 
!l'hat Sturzo would explain the historical working out of our 
relationship to God under the formality of knowledge and tX'Uth 
is clear from his position on the participatory and creative 
nature of knowledge with its theoretical basis in his central, 
and integral, concept of rationality. In the synthetic process 
31see Chapter I, PP• 51-53· 
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o! its realization the intentionality of knowledge embraces the 
finalism of the will. Consequently, knowing encompasses the 
personal field as completely as loving. We have already seen 
that within the personal field this works itself out as a reci-
procal dialecticity of knowledge and love. How much more this 
holds true when the relationship is with God, who is the true-
good I "Knowledge is a principle of love; the knowledge ot the 
true good, insofar as it is real and tull knowledge, is undoubt-
edly love. To know God is equivalent to establishing a rela-
tionship with Him, inasmuch as we recognize Him as our Creator, 
our first principle and our last end." (T.L. 86) 
The concrete and particular truths that we actualize in 
the realization of rationality participate in Truth itselt who 
is God, so that the movement of rationality towards the true--
that is, towards its own realization--is at the same time a 
movement towards, and participation in, Truth itself. For Sturzo 
this implicitly expresses itself in every act ot knowledge as 
an intuitional awareness of an all-embracing totality that trans-
cends the duality of subject and object.32 It is also manifest 
in every act or knowledge in that in the actual process ot mas-
tering a given truth, which as known is only relative, we grasp 
it under the formality of absoluteness--this despite the tact 
that we are not in a position to coordinate it, as a relative 
truth, to absolute truth. (S.P. 45-6) 
Sturzo calls this "the mystical" dimension of the striv1ngs 
32see Chapter II, pp. 136-3?. 
257 
of our spiritual life because "it is a drawing near to and al-
most a partaking of the absolute, which, through the values of 
truth and goodness, comes into communication with us." Even 
when there is a falsification of values, this contact with the 
absolute cannot be evaded because the concrete and particular 
values are still sought under the formality of truth and good-
ness. In addition, by reason of God being the creative ontolo-
gical ground of all reality, ''there shines out from the various 
forms of the contingent an unseizable element, which is the 
imprint of the absolute, the mark ot the creative force, the 
value of the thought o! the Spirit, the supreme reality which 
is God." Sturzo therefore concludes, "It is impossible to live 
our relative, contingent life, and to live it as knowledgeable 
beings and not as brutes, without feeling the reality of the 
Absolute as present." (S.P. 46) 
In accounting for the communicative union between man and 
God, Sturzo gives emphasis to love. There are several reasons 
for this. The most significant one is to emphasize that the 
absolute towards which we tend is, and has to be, a personal 
absolute with whom there is a genuine communion, or touching of 
spirit to spirit. In other words, it highlights the "communica-
tive" aspect of the union because communion can occur only 
between autonomous centers of presence, namely, persons. Commu-
nion involves a reciprocal dialecticity with love in that each 
is the principle and term of the other. Out of this reciprocal 
dialecticity a communicative union is established. Correlative 
to these constitutive activities of the person, then, "in the 
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spiritual and historical life of man, God cannot be other than 
unfolding truth, compelling, winning love." (T.L. 225) This 
clearly removes man's relationship to God from the abstract 1\i' 
and metaphysical realm in which the relationship is reduced to I 
I 
a metaphysical dependency and God to an abstract metaphysical 
principle, and sets it in the concrete process of history in 
which the becoming of personal selthood is realized through an 
existential relationship to a living, personal absolute. 
Those philosophers who conceive ot a strictly rational 
God, as prime mover, as creator or rather as architect 
of the universe, reduce the relationship ot man with 
God to a metaphysical dependency. This relationship 
is stripped or any cleaVing will, ot ~ sense ot love; 
there is no communion in it. (T.L. 86) 
The true absolute is God. I! he were merely a physical 
or metaphysical principle, the logical primary, the 
unmoving first mover, we should have no communion with 
him that could induce us to love, no love that could 
arrive at communicative union. (T.L. 98) 
Giving emphasis to love also calls attention to the intimacy of 
the union by indicating that the union attained by man with God 
unites, and in uniting further deepens, the innermost depths or 
man's being to the ineffable center or God's being. As Teilhard 
has so incisively expressed, "Love alone is capable of uniting 
living beingsin such a way as to complete and fulfil them for 
it alone takes them and joins them by what is deepest in them-
selves. 033 
When we began our treatment· or God's immanence in terms of 
man's tinalism, we mentioned that this aspect ot His relationship 
33Teilha.rd de Chardin, The Phenomenon ot Man (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1961), p. 265. 
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to man demonstrates that the absolute rationality towards which 
the person tends is in tact a personal absolute. In view of 
what we have already said, we can summarize the main lines of 
the argumentation. Finalism is the nature of the subject con-
sidered as a tendency towards fulfillment. But the fulfillment 
of the person can be achieved only through a communicative 
union with a personal absolute. It must be a communicative 
union because only this is constitutive or the person. It 
must be with an absolute by reason of the unconditional nature 
of love through whieh a communicative union is attained. "Love 
by its very nature seeks to become absolute, and for that very 
reason it seeks God, is transformed in God, has peace in God 
alone. 'When God is lacking we seek the absolute love in our-
selves or in something extraneous to complete ourselves. But 
any such attempt must fail." (T.L. 9?) It must be with a Eer-
sonal absolute because a communicative union can only be estab-
lished with another person. 
In view ot the absolutely transcendent character ot God's 
being, the human-divine union remains "something towards which 
we tend, and the experience we may have of it is not direc~ and 
intuitive." (I.L. xxiii) Since the being of God transcends 
history, the full actualization ot man's union with Him will 
also transcend history as its transcendent end. With the ac-
tive presence of this transcendent principle as an inner consti-
tutive dimension of the person, history, whether viewed as the 
concrete becoming of the individual person or in its totalit7 
as embracing all of mankind, can not be conceived as a wholly 
I 1 
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immanent dialectic which is able to find realization within the 
contours of its own process. It is this ontological relation-
ship to God as an inner constitutive dimension of his being 
that makes the person, and history, open-ended realities. 
Nevertheless, to say that the unification with God is 
"something towards which we tend" and is actually achieved in 
its fullness only in some sense "beyond" history, whatever 
light this may shed on the nature of man and history, it does 
not add any clarification to its nature and place rithin his-
tory. It this unification with God does pertain to history, 
and Sturzo very definitely holds that it does. the di!tioulty 
still remains of determining further in what sense and how it 
is effected within history since it is with the transcendent 
reality of' God. Although of its very nature this unification 
can be achieved "in its fullness" only "beyond" history, Sturzo 
still maintains that it must at the same time be hiatoricized, 
or to use his words, "inserted into human process." Thia is 
necessary in order that the unification will "f'1nd fulfilment 
with its cognitional value in each man." (I.L. xxiv) What 
Sturzo means by this is suggested in another passage where he 
discusses those who "have had only a glimmer of' the divine 
idea in the world." "Indeed it is a spiritual necessity to 
f'ind a historical center that will give an orientation towards 
truth. A subjective idea is not enough. the voice of' conscience 
is not enough; we need in addition something that has f'ound 
realization in life--that has been embodied, 'incarnated,' as 
some say in the widest sense of the word." (T.L. 226) The same 
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"spiritual necessity" applies to the tundamental movement towards 
unification with God in order for there to be nn orientation of 
consciousness in regard to it that would become an explicit and 
permanent value of lite. 
To understand the significance ot this passage in this con-
text it is important to keep in mind that the unification with 
God and the orientation towards truth are not secondary or 
accidental features of the person, but together are constitutive 
of the person as such. Rationality, the constitutive principle 
ot the person, is consubstantial with truth. It is constituted 
in its tendency towards absolute truth and exists only through 
it. Therefore, as grounding the reality of the person, the 
absolute can not be merely the ideal projection of the prooes-
si ve reality ot the person, but, as reflected in the depths ot 
that personal reality, must itself be personal. The constitu-
tive activity that rises out of these depths is, then, in its 
initiating movement and most basic character a personal and 
freely constituted response to the magnetic pull ot that personal 
absolute. In Sturzo•s own words, it is a case of "a freedom 
that seeks and of a truth-and-love that attracts." (t.L. 2~5) 
From an analysis of the factors involved, we see that this deter-
mining tendency towards absolute rationality manifests itself 
as a relationship with a personal absolute, and the actualiza-
tion of this determining relationship takes the form of a com-
municative union. 
From the nature of the person as a conscious being whose 
spirituality and subjectivity ontologically consist in the 
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immediacy of presence, it follows that the communicative union 
with God, as an immanent determinant of this presence, cannot 
lie beyond the present reality of this consciousness, but must 
make itself felt in his present experience of himself. (ct. S.P. 
60-1) 'l'h.is does not mean that the communicative union, as an 
existential fact of the person•s concrete nature becomes a 
direct and explicit experience through introspection. Never-
theless, as coextensive with our spiritual actiVity we are 
indirectly and implicitly conscious of it, before any objective 
grasp of it, simply in being conscious of ourselves.34 But, 
although this union is implicitly posited in the act or aelf-
knowledge, for it to "find fulfilment with ita cognitional value 
for each man," it must become the explicit objective or the 
reflectively conscious strivings of man's spiritual lite. Only 
then is it able to take firm root and blossom forth from the 
subterranean levels of man's being into the clear light of con-
sciousness where its transformative power can take tull et.tact 
on that consciousness. 
The reason for this lies in the fact that this union is a 
contact or presence and presence involves the total d~m9nsions 
341 am indebted to the insights of Karl Rahner in his expla-
nation, as a theologian, o.t the supernatural a pr1~ri of our 
spiritual being. In the course of his exposit!one states, 
"Man lives consciously even when he does not 'know• it and does 
not believe it, i.e. cannot make it an individual object or 
his knowledge merely by introspection. This is the inexpres-
sible but existing ground or the dynamic power of all spiri-
tual and moral life in the actual sphere or spiritual existence 
founded by God, i.e. supernaturally elevated, a 'merely a-priori' 
existing ground, but still existing, something ot which we are 
conscious of in being conscious of ourselves, not as an object, 
but nevertheless existing.n Karl Rabner, Nature and Grace (London: 
Sheed and Ward, 1968), p. 31. 
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of the person. A contact or presence is not something that can 
be fully achieved on only one level of personal activity through 
implicit consciousness. We have seen that the personal activity 
of the human person jn establishing that contact of presence is 
a response to the presence of a personal absolute--a presence 
that has a stimulus and protundity to it alone. Thie is the 
exact locus of the difficulty since the presence here in ques-
tion is that of the transcendent person.hood ot God. 
How can there be a contact of presence with this transcen-
dent reality on the experiential conscious level of man? The 
conditions for this can be determined with some accuracy because 
a model for it is provided in every contact ot presence between 
two persons, which is itself a process of transcendence. Any-
contact ot presence between two subjects can occur only to the 
extent that they manifest their inwardness to one another in 
their actions towards and communication with each other. Our 
knowledge of other persons always involves and is dependent 
upon the self-manifestation of their subjectivity since it lies 
hidden beyond what is directly available to our experience of 
them. A contact of presence, then, is always a transcendent 
process, occurring beyond the limitations of our direct experi-
ence through the self-manifestations of the persons involved. 
such interpersonal communion provides the model for deter-
mining what is required for a diVine-human communion to take 
place within the conscious experience of man, at least as an 
hypothesis. Just as· the transcendent reality of the subjecti-
vity of a person can be known only through the self-communication 
264 
of that subjectivity, so also does this hold true for a knowledge 
of the transcendent reality of God. In both instances, within 
the paradigmatic situation of interpersonal communion, the cate-
gory that is correlative to transcendence is that or self-mani-
festation, or revelation. Therefore, on whatever level there 
is effected a contact of presence with God, it is primarily and 
essentially dependent on God's self-manifestation. 
We have already seen this self-manifestation reflected 
through the various forms of His immanent activity which bears 
witness to "a presence in a certain fashion self-revealing." 
(S.P. 53; cf. also P• 46) But the contact of presence resulting 
from this manner of revelation clearly does not attain· that 
level of unification Sturzo maintains is necessary for it "to 
find fulfilment with its cognitional value in each man." The 
exact words of Sturzo are: "But, since this unification, though 
essential in the idea of creatureliness. in order to find ful-
filment with its cognitional value in each man, must in some 
way be inserted into human process, it will be well first of 
all to make it clear what human process means." (I.L. xxiv) The 
significant word in Sturzo's statement is "inserted" and it is 
clear from the context that what he wants to accent with this 
term is that the level of unification referred to is transcen-
dent not merely to the human process, but even to the total 
intrinsic intelligible structure of the human process. Since 
it is a unification that occurs within the human process and 
yet transcends the intelligible structure of that process, it 
will consequently be a unification in which God acts towards 
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and communicates with man in a special manner that cannot be 
derived from a rational analysis of the human process. And it 
will be more revelatory ot God's presence than is possible to 
the receptive dimensions of rational consciousness. Therefore, 
in order tor the human person to enter into a new and higher 
communicative union with God, this contact of presence will have 
to take place through an added dimension in the subjective struc-
ture or rational consciousness through which he is able to be 
aware ot the mysterious reality of God more directly and fully. 
The awareness which makes possible this higher and yet more 
fundamental contact of presence--more fundamental because only 
~ it can fill the depths of the human spirit--can only occur 
through an illumination of faith in which God is the principal 
agent. 
Given the need tor a higher unification with God and the 
conditions necessary tor it, the inescapable question we are 
now confronted with is whether it is something that bas "found 
realization in lif'e--that has been embodied, 'incarnated•"? 
This raises the question of "the historical problem of Jesus, 
of His influence, of the realization of His word through the 
centuries," because it is the Christian claim that in the person 
of Christ the unification of the human in the divine has in fact 
found "a historical center" tor the fullness of its realization. 
It is a phenomenon that rests entirely on the historical fact 
of the Incarnation of Jesus Obrist. 
'?he historical fact of Jesus, His preaching, His mira-
cles, cannot be separated from His affirmation that He 
is the Son of God, that He and the Father 'are one.• 
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'fhey must either be acoepted together or denied together. 
But to deny them is not to solve the historical problem 
of Jesus, of His influence, of the realization of His 
word through the centuries. It would have the unforeseen 
yet logical result: that of depriVing history of any in-
trinsic meaning, reducing it to an interplay of facts 
without outcome, to a continuous immanent repetition or 
human activity without resolution. (T.L. 231) 
This is what Sturzo maintains will be the consequence of deny-
ing the Christian claim because the communication of God to man 
through Jesus Christ is integrally connected with every histori-
cal manifestation of God. But through this communication in 
which the divine has become a part of history in a special way, 
it has been revealed that mankind does exist on another level 
of participation in and unification with divine reality within 
history--a level that has traditionally been termed ttsupernatural". 
Sturzo also uses the traditional natural-supernatural termi-
nology in bringing his immanent-transcendent theory of history 
to completion. But it must be definitely established that he 
is not developing his theory within the framework of a dualistic, 
bifurcated view of reality, the natural and the supernatural, 
which ia common to the traditional use of the terms. For Sturzo, 
the two-world view of the natural-supernatural dualism flows from 
the fallacy of abstractionism. 
others, brought up to consider the two domains from 
the point of view of abstract speculation and not in 
concrete reality, end by unreflectingly transforming 
the distinction between natural and supernatural into 
a kind of intellectual separatism. The non-existence 
of pure nature, the close interweaving of nature with 
the supernatural, through a mysterious and absorbing 
fact, is not made the basis of a thoroughgoing scru-
tiny of reality. (T.L. 46) 
Therefore, the natural-supernatural terminology that Sturzo 
employs does not signify a metaphysical dualism of two worlds, 
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but rather two dimensions of a single reality which in its 
fundamental character can only be adequately described as •his-
torical.' This historical reality has two dimensions and both 
are necessary for the historicity of man and the ivorld. Neither 
dimension is secondary to or reducible to the other. but rather 
both together constitute the single reality of the historical 
process. Or conversely, the historical process. is the very 
reality in which the divine and human come together. One of 
the fundamental points tor Sturzo in articulating his histori-
cism was to clearly establish the intrinsic unity ot these two 
dimensions of the historical process. For in doing this he 
was directly engaging the prevailing im.manentistic theories ot 
history, and more importantly, was showing the theoretical 
inadequacies and, consequently, the practical dangers of secu-
larism in all its forms. 
Nevertheless, the acceptance of the supernatural fact as 
an integral dimension or the human process raises some serious 
problems. For example, to mention one, it poses a serious 
methodological problem tor every investigation of human reality 
in its socio-historical process, that is, as it is concretely 
and existentially, that aias to be scientific. If this super-
natural factor does pervade the whole of this reality as an 
integral dimension of it, then, as transcendent and acknow-
ledged only through the vision of a faith that is itself trans-
cendent, how can it be accounted for scientifically? Yet, 
Sturzo insists that 11to dwell as many do on rational and natural 
motives, either through speculative abstractionism or in accor-
dance simply with methodological criteria (with the praiseworthy 
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aim of not confusing the two planes, the natural and the super-
natural), renders them inapt to see the synthetic values of 
reality and to fight the original separatism that is at the 
bottom ot the modern crisis." (C. & S. 559) Just as history 
presents to the t11inker 0 the historicization ot the divine as 
a constant datum," so also "society in the concrete historicizes 
such problems, too, with all their various consequences, be they 
in the scientific, cultural, ethical or religious f'ielda .. ";5 
Thus, despite the manifold problems the presence of the divine 
within the structure of concrete reality presents to one who is 
trying to account for all the dimensions of it, if the inser-
tion of the divine into the human process is a historical and 
social phenomenon, he cannot ignore it nor undervalue its influ-
ence. Both factors, the human and divine, must be considered 
in any analysis of the "concrete real," if they are present, 
or else one will fall guilty of "abstractionism." 
In order to be able to understand and analyze society 
in the concrete, the sociologist cannot ignore the in-
sertion, or, better, the historicization ot the divine 
in lite. While admitting that this fact, of exceptional 
as well as perennial importance inthe history of human-
ity, has been and may be interpreted in diverse and even 
Qpposite ways, yet if those who treat of society in the 
concrete in its morphological complex and in its becoming 
omit or undervalue the religious factor in its historic 
worth, they fail in the task they have set themselves 
and distort human reality.36 
Consequently, in the development of his integral, histori-
cist sociology, Sturzo was inexorably drawn into the problem of 
the historicization of the divine, and more specifically, in 
35sturzo, "Historicist Sociology," p. 336. 
36Ibid., P• 335. 
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its Christian form.3? To say that Sturzo was "inexorably" 
drawn into dealing with this problem is to indicate that he is 
not guilty of the charge that he started from a ready-made 
thesis and sought "to introduce an extraneous dogmatic element 
into sociology, thus talsif'ying a science grounded on experiment 
and induction." (T.L. 12) It was only his attempt to develop 
a truly experimental, four-dimensional science of society in 
the total complexity of its concrete existence and historical 
development that brought him to the problem of the Christian 
presence in history. 
Although I wished to establish the natural data of soci-
ety and keep to historical experience, I could not but 
bring into light what history itself teaches us about 
Christianity in its special characteristics, not to be 
confounded with those of any other religion. In doing 
this I started from no dogmatic preconception, but from 
historical elements, elements which I interpreted from a 
strictly sociological viewpoint, as every author has 
the right to do. My theory of historioiat sociologJt 
obliged me to study the thesis of supernaturalism in 
history, given that this is accepted and professed by 
the Christian peoples, whose number, geographical ex-
tent and continuity in time surpass those ot any other 
human experience historically known. (T.L. 13) 
As the intricacies of Sturzo•e theory become unravelled, it is 
clear that the movement of his thought is from a consideration 
of the socio-historical process in its natural dimension to its 
supernatural dimension. The pivotal concept in this movement, 
as we have seen, is the concept of transcendence, and the vari-
ous meanings and degrees Sturzo assigns to it indicates the 
shifts of perspective in his theory. It is only in his last 
3?This, of course, is not to deny the non-Christian forms 
ot an awareness of the divine in history. 
I 11,: 
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major work, The True Life: Socioloftt of the SuRernatural, that 
Sturzo undertakes a thorough exposition of the problem of 
transcendence in its Christian meaning of the supernatural. 
Since it ia the supernatural that integrates and transcends 
nature, a sociological study or the supernatural presupposes 
an analysis of the natural. (T.L. l?-18; I.L. xxiv) 
It is evident, then, that the inclusion or the religious-
Christian understanding of transcendence within Sturzo's analy-
sis or the socio-historical process cannot be construed as an 
a priori or dogmatic factor in his theory, nor can his theory 
be viewed, and dismissed, simply as an apology tor Christianity 
by setting up in sociological idiom as !h,! anthropological model, 
the classical "homo religiosus.n In the first place, both of 
these views are contrary to hie historicist methodology and the 
cognitive orientation of his thought. In View ot both it should 
be apparent that, for Sturzo, there can be no such theoretical 
construct as the anthropological model. In his integral, his-
-
toricist approach be is simply attempting to determine, through 
a deepening of sociological-historical research, human reality 
as it is so that the indeterminancy of the human process may 
be directed toward a broader, deeper and richer future. 
Any kind of Christian apology stands as much in opposition 
to Sturzo's thought as an a priori rejection of transcendence 
or the supernatural by a reductive naturalistic position. In 
regard to this, Sturzo says, "I feel bound to point out that 
the historicization of the religious fact cannot be examined by 
the sociologist as a unilateral or particularist vision ot 
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society, nor in a polemical position allied with those who deny 
the supernatural or those who assert a natural religiosity. 11 38 
As A. R. Caponigri has pointed out, Sturzo had no sympathy for 
e!forte to reconstruct history from the point of view of Chris-
tianity. All that the recognition of the presence of a divine, 
transcendent factor within history does mean for him is the 
need to formulate tta theory of history wide enough and dynamic 
enough to embrace in a complex unity this duality of presence 
without the undue subordination of one element to the other."39 
Since Sturzo's theory of history is an essential component 
of his comprehensive sociological theory, it ia important in 
understanding both to determine his perspective on the science 
of sociology and how it can incorporate transcendent !actors 
within its study of the socio-historical process. Sturzo him-
self provides this information 1n the "Introduction" to The 
-
True Life in order to establish the methodological and formal 
distinction between his theory of society, termed by him "inte-
gral sociology," which remains open to every detail or reality, 
and others, which, by contrast, are either abstractionist, ana-
lytical, morphological, or particularist. For our purposes here 
it is enough to emphasize that in Sturzo's understanding of 
sociology it is a study of society in the concrete, in its 
historical development, and directed toward discovering "the 
inner laws that are bound up with its very nature." (T.L. 3) 
38sturzo, "Historicist Sociology,'' p. 336. 
39A. R. Caponigri, "Introduction" to Sturzo's Church and 
State, P• xii. 
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By contrast, for other sociologists, especially those influenced 
by positivism, sociology is a study of society in the abstract, 
in its fixed morphology, and directed toward the gathering of 
external tacts. Methodologically, Sturzo's view of sociology 
differs from other views in his emphasis on bringing the re-
sults of analysis into synthesis so that society is approached 
and understood in its liVing, concrete complexity. Consequently, 
if a transcendent factor is at work within the human process, 
it must be accounted for within a study of society "in the 
concrete.n Otherwise, it is "either simply analytical (presup-
posing'the synthesis' with the supernatural), or is falsified 
by the omission of essential data on the social reality." (T.L. 
14) Another distortion that follows from an a priori rejection 
or the supernatural is the reduction of religion, as a social 
fact, to either a closed naturalism or to a political moralism, 
which is preservative of the status and privileges of the 
ruling classes. All or these errors "spring from considering 
sociology an experimental science of external facts, and elimi-
nating both philosophy, as a metaphysical construction, and 
history, as the inner process of society." (T.L. 5) 
But for Sturzo, developing his historicist social theory 
in accord with his historical method, the empirical data of 
history, "not the outer history of the material facts but their 
inner reason, their logical connection, the metaphysic to which 
they give birth," does in fact point to the intervention of 
special divine action within the temporal process. The fac-
tual elements that reflect a human-divine synthesis at work 
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within the temporal process revolves around the transformation 
effected through Christianity in the history ot man. 
The sociologist cannot deny the transformation effected 
by Christianity, whether he regards it from the histori-
cal point of viewt or compares Christian societies with 
non-Christian, or truly Christian societies with those 
which are Christian in name only or which have degener-
ated in faith and morals. All the naturalistic explana-
tions cannot suffice to elucidate the reason tor such 
a transformation." (T.L. 5; 12) 
Two difficulties immediately present themselves. Has 
Sturzo confused those factors of reality that can be acknow-
ledged only with the vision of faith with those that can be 
subjected to a strictly rational, scientific explanation? It 
he has not done this, how can the transcendent character of the 
socio-historical process be present to the sociologist as such, 
that is, as a scientist? The emphasis which Sturzo gives to 
the transcendence of the supernatural dimension of history makes 
it clear that he has not attempted to reduce what can be acknow-
ledged only through faith to rational analysis. As transcen-
dent the divine activity in history manifests very little or 
its transcendental character in any single event. And as trans-
cendent it can never be reached or recognized by adding the 
empirical data of the historical process. (T.L. 228) The his-
torical process can never directly reveal divine activity within 
it, but to the extent that it is immanent within the process, 
the process does function as a refracting medium of this divine 
action. What Sturzo does maintain is that no reductive, natur-
alistic approach to history can provide the context of meaning 
for interpreting, and thereby making intelligible, the histori-
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cal process which includes the transformation wrought by Chris-
tianity. 
In regard to the second difficulty, namely, how a socio-
logist as such can handle transcendent facts within his disci-
pline, Sturzo affirms: 
The supernatural is not made a separate section ot 
social life, something juxtaposed to the natural, which 
individuals may accept or reject at will. In studying 
society in its complex wholeness, in the concrete, it 
is found to exist within the atmosphere or the super-
natural, and to act and react to it according to the 
sociological laws which are at its natural basis. (T.L. 
18) 
Since the individual forms the constitutive principle of society 
in all its forms, all that touches the spirit of man, whether 
naturally or supernaturally, will manifest itself in society. 
''In the concrete" there is no such thing as a "purely natural" 
life. There is only a dual-dimensional, natural-supernatural, 
life in which the latter dimension raises the former to itself, 
"coordinates its values and ends, and synthesizes it in its own 
form. tt {T.L. 26) Thus, the sociologist who views sociology as 'I 
"the science of the concrete" and wishes to investigate social 
phenomena as they are "in the concreteu cannot view the results 
of his research as "purely natural" facts. To do so is to 
reduce the results of his research to "a mental or methodolo-
gical abstraction." (T.L. l) 
The natural and supernatural are so intertwined in all 
social 11.fe that in the concrete of history it is hard 
to discern where one is at work without the interven-
tion of the other. The tacts themselves, in their com-
plexity, show the imprint of a higher value as soon as 
we discern the motives of faith and love that have 
shaped them." (T.L. 12) 
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Consequently, in his work, The True Life, Sturzo examines the 
nature, value. and influence ot the supernatural dimension ot 
the human process on society as it exists concretel7. The 
notion of a close interweaving of the natural with the super-
natural, with one influencing the other and vice versa, forms 
the basis of this work. 
Within the scope of this essay, a central question remains 
to be answered in view ot the acknowledgement of the special 
divine dispensation made manifest through the Incarnation ot 
Christ. If this essay accurately portrays the logical movement 
of Sturzo•e thought, what effect does the acknowledgement of 
this new dispensation, which admittedly can be grasped in its 
true and full historical value only through faith, have on the 
rational presentation of his theory. In other words, what 
readjustments, if any, must be made in that theory in view ot 
the fuller picture proVided by the light of faith? Sturzo him-
self provides the answer to this question within the context of 
his discussion of the movement towards, and attainment or, 
truth by those peoples who were outside Israel in pre-Ohristian 
times. 
When at last these peoples (and similarly each indivi-
dual) arrive at a knowledge of the substantial truth, 
the Word ot God in His Incarnation, then all their 
past conquests (of truth) are lit by a new lite, the 
glimmerings ot truth grow bright, everything is reori-
ented and coordinated, and their histo%'7 reveals itself 
as a hesitant journey in the dark towards this term, 
a secret symbol which is now unveiled •••• (T.L. 239J 
Conclusion 
In arriving at and acknowledging the historicization of 
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God's own divine nature in the person of Cb~ist, Sturzo'a theory 
of soeio-personalism and this essay have come full circle. We 
began our treatment of Sturzo by stating that the individual 
person was the central concern of both his socio-political 
theory and activity--o! his theory to uncover the nature of 
the person and the conditions necessary tor its realization, 
and of his activity to create the economic and socio-political 
conditions that are commensurate to that nature, preserving its 
innate dignity and enhancing the possibilities for its comple-
tion. Since the person, for Sturzo, is ultimately and essen-
tially constituted in his primordial relationship to and move-
ment towards God, and since Christianity, as the historical 
prolongation-participation in the divine person ot Obrist, has 
fully revealed and brought about the fullness of this relation-
ship, the insight into the nature of the person is basically and 
essentially a Christian insight. And due to the nature ot both 
the person and Christianity, it is an insight that is only 
mediated through history. 1'hus, it is also history that testi-
fies that "the fundamental error is to conceive ot Humanism and 
Christianity as separate. to keep their values distinct and often 
to oppose them, and finally to eliminate one ot the two from 
the redeeming synthesis." (C. & s. 560) With his theory ot 
history, consequently, Sturzo's socio-personalisa is brought to 
completion, and reveals itself to be in its most fundamental 
character a Christian-humanism. 
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